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The Boston Foundation, Greater Boston’s community foundation, is one of the oldest and largest community foundations 
in the nation, with assets of $796 million. In Fiscal Year 2010, the Foundation and its donors made more than $82 million 
in grants to nonprofit organizations and received gifts of close to $83 million. The Foundation is made up of some 900 
separate charitable funds established by donors either for the general benefit of the community or for special purposes. 
The Boston Foundation also serves as a major civic leader, provider of information, convener, and sponsor of special 
initiatives designed to address the community’s and region’s most pressing challenges. For more information about the 
Boston Foundation, visit www.tbf.org or call 617-338-1700.
The Kitty and Michael Dukakis Center for Urban and Regional Policy conducts interdisciplinary research, in collaboration 
with civic leaders and scholars both within and beyond Northeastern University, to identify and implement real solutions to 
the critical challenges facing urban areas throughout Greater Boston, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the nation. 
Founded in 1999 as a “think and do” tank, the Dukakis Center’s collaborative research and problem-solving model applies 
powerful data analysis, a bevy of multidisciplinary research and evaluation techniques, and a policy-driven perspective to 
address a wide range of issues facing cities and towns. These include affordable housing, local economic development, work-
force development, transportation, public finance, and environmental sustainability. The staff of the Dukakis Center works 
to catalyze broad-based efforts to solve urban problems, acting as both a convener and a trusted and committed partner 
to local, state, and national agencies and organizations. The Center is housed within Northeastern University’s innovative 
School of Public Policy and Urban Affairs.
The Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association (CHAPA) is a statewide organization that represents the interests of all play-
ers in the housing and community development fields, including non-profit and for-profit developers, municipal officials, 
homeowners, tenants, bankers, real estate professionals, property managers, and government officials. The organization is a 
sponsor of many research projects concerned with housing and in 1998 commissioned a study from the Donahue Institute at 
the University of Massachusetts entitled “A Profile of Housing in Massachusetts.” This report began the work of measuring 
progress in key housing policy areas such as supply, affordability, and accessibility. Over the past five years, CHAPA has 
assisted in the funding and development of each of the Greater Boston Housing Report Cards.  
The Warren Group collects public record data on real estate sales and ownership throughout New England and offers a 
range of real estate products, information services and printed publications, including the weekly newspapers Banker & 
Tradesman and The Commercial Record. The company also produces and organizes trade shows and events for a variety 
of industries, including bankers, mortgage brokers, credit unions and lawyers. Based in Boston, the company was estab-
lished in 1872 and is now in its fourth generation of family ownership and management. 
UNDERSTANDING BOSTON  is a series of forums, educational events and research sponsored by the Boston Foundation to provide 
information and insight into issues affecting Boston, its neighborhoods, and the region. By working in collaboration with 
a wide range of partners, the Boston Foundation provides opportunities for people to come together to explore challenges 
facing our constantly changing community and to develop an informed civic agenda. Visit www.tbf.org to learn more 
about Understanding Boston and the Boston Foundation.
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The Boston Foundation is proud to publish the ninth annual Greater Boston Housing Report Card .  
As always, this report has been prepared by Barry Bluestone, Dean of the School of Public Policy 
and Urban Affairs at Northeastern University and Director of the Kitty and Michael Dukakis Center 
for Urban and Regional Policy . His expert team, informed by the data resources of The Warren 
Group, once again bring their deep knowledge and analysis to a complex set of issues that are 
related not only to housing but to our entire economic system .
Last year’s report card, called “Taking Stock in an Uncertain Time,” correctly predicted the 
likelihood of another wave of foreclosures and paid special attention to the impact of our region’s 
student population on housing prices . 
While raising some alarms, the report offered the encouraging news that Massachusetts was ahead 
of the national curve in terms of job creation and more immune than other states to the larger 
economic crisis in America .
This report contains tentative good news as well . Our area’s housing market has not sustained 
anything close to the damage experienced in other states and regions throughout the country .  
In addition, Massachusetts has a stronger economy in general than many other states .
However, one of the major conclusions of this year’s report card is that Massachusetts and Greater 
Boston are not immune to the forces that are negatively affecting the nation’s economy as a whole . 
In fact, the leading economists we rely on for economic forecasts are concerned that we are in for 
some rough times ahead .
The analysis in these pages also concludes that until we solve the housing crisis, the larger economic 
crisis impacting our state, region and country will not begin to abate . That is, in fact, the primary 
conclusion of this year’s report card—and clearly it is the indicator we should follow as we move 
forward .
So, the signals for an end to our housing and larger economic woes are mixed, but, as always,  
they are invaluably illuminated by the Dukakis Center’s analysis . Through the power of 
information, we can face the future with knowledge and preparedness—and seek to create our  
own path to the future rather than simply react to the economic forces that our shaping our 
community and our lives .
Paul S . Grogan
President and CEO
The Boston Foundation
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Last year’s Greater Boston Housing Report Card was 
subtitled, Taking Stock in an Uncertain Time . The 
national economy had shown signs of recovering from 
the recession that had begun in December 2007, but the 
pace of economic growth and the persistence of high 
unemployment were worrisome . As we noted in that 
report released in October 2010, “As of this moment, 
there are too many disconcerting statistics that point 
to a continued weakness in the overall economy and 
the housing market . While Greater Boston and the 
Commonwealth appear to be doing better, indeed 
considerably better than the nation as a whole on a 
range of economic indicators, we are not an island 
unto ourselves . If the national economy continues to 
suffer, we will suffer its tailwinds .”
Looking back over the past year, these words appear 
to have contained an accurate forecast of the nation’s 
economy, a correct assessment of the Commonwealth’s 
superior economic performance, and reason for contin-
ued concern about the Greater Boston housing market .
Since last October, the nation’s economic growth rate 
has continued to fall and the consensus forecast for the 
rest of this year and into 2012 is for growth of no better 
than 2 percent, below the level needed to reduce unem-
ployment . Civilian employment is barely higher today 
than 12 months ago and the national unemployment 
rate remains stubbornly above 9 percent and could go 
higher . With such a weak labor market, wages have 
been stagnant and real disposable household income is 
no higher near the end of 2011 than four years ago . This 
stymies consumption and therefore economic growth .
In such a weak economy, housing starts across the 
country in 2011are projected to clock in at their lowest 
level in at least a decade—indeed at only one-fourth the 
rate of production during the last recession in 2001 and 
only one-fifth the rate in 2005 . Residential fixed invest-
ment is down to just $324 billion this year compared 
to $775 billion just five years ago . Indeed, the decline 
in home construction has been a leading factor in why 
the 2007 cyclical recession has turned into the Great 
Recession . Between the spring of 2008 and this past 
spring, the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has 
dropped by 0 .3 percent led by a 30 percent decline in 
residential fixed investment . By comparison, non-resi-
dential fixed investment in factories, commercial opera-
tions, and retail and wholesale trade was down by just 
11 percent, while the other major component of GDP, 
personal consumption expenditures, actually increased, 
albeit by an anemic 1 .0 percent .
In past housing report cards we focused on how hous-
ing production, sales and prices were driven by the 
economy . However, in this Great Recession, there is a 
giant “feedback loop” between housing and the econ-
omy, with the depressed housing market actually driving 
the economy . Until the housing market recovers, there 
is little hope for an end to slow economic growth and 
high unemployment . Housing continues to be at the 
very center of the ongoing economic crisis . 
Here in Massachusetts and in Greater Boston, our hous-
ing market has not sustained anything near the collapse 
experienced in other states and regions . Production has 
not declined as much and prices have not plummeted as 
far . As such, since December 2007 the growth in economic 
activity in the Commonwealth has exceeded every state 
but one (North Dakota) and by the spring of 2011 had 
recovered to its pre-recession level . Nationally, the level 
of economic activity was still 4 .3 percent below its 2007 
level in July . At the same time, the state’s employment 
level was still 1 .3 percent below its 2007 peak, but this  
was a far much better record than the nation’s 5 percent 
dip . Just between January and August of 2011, the 
Commonwealth added more than 40,000 jobs .
The much better performance of the Massachusetts’ 
economy correlates well with its relatively healthier 
housing market . A statistical analysis carried out for 
this report card with data from all 50 states revealed a 
strong inverse correlation between the decline in home 
prices since 2006 and the change in economic activ-
ity . Those states that have experienced the largest loss 
in home value such as Nevada, Arizona, California 
and Florida have suffered the most economic fallout . 
Those, like Massachusetts, that did not see a near total 
collapse in their housing markets have recovered faster 
from the Great Recession .
Executive Summary
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of permits issued for larger residential complexes will 
likely decrease by nearly a third (32 percent) . 
Over the past two decades, there has been a shift in 
where housing is being produced within the Greater 
Boston region . In the early 1990s, nearly all of the hous-
ing permits issued in the five-county Greater Boston area 
were outside of Suffolk County—essentially outside the 
City of Boston . However, Suffolk County’s share of the 
region’s total housing production has been increasing 
steadily in recent years . Between 2006 and 2010, its share 
had increased to more than 12 percent . Housing produc-
tion has shifted away from Essex, Middlesex and Plym-
outh counties, while Norfolk has more than held its own . 
This suggests that households are moving back into the 
City of Boston and seeking housing here .
Comparing Boston Housing Production to 
Other Metropolitan Regions
Comparing housing production in Boston with other 
metropolitan regions reveals a mixed record . A 
number of metro regions, including Phoenix, Miami, 
Las Vegas and Minneapolis, have all experienced a 
drop of more than 80 percent in housing production 
since 2005 . Boston, New York, Seattle and Raleigh all 
experienced a decrease between 60 percent and 75 
percent over this period . Austin, in comparison, is the 
only metropolitan area among the nine against which 
we compared Boston that suffered a decrease of less 
than 60 percent (54 .7 percent) . While this puts Boston 
in middle of the nine-metro area pack in 2011, it actu-
ally reveals deterioration from 2010 when it had the 
smallest decline in permit activity of all .
Foreclosures in Greater Boston
Housing supply is not only affected by construction, 
but by foreclosure . In Greater Boston, there was a 
moderate downturn in foreclosure activity in 2008, as 
a result of the state’s right-to-cure law which imple-
mented a 90-day moratorium on new foreclosure 
petitions in order to give delinquent homeowners an 
opportunity to catch up on payments . With the expira-
tion of that moratorium, however, foreclosure activ-
ity shot back up in 2009, and it remained quite high 
through most of 2010 . Beginning in September 2010, 
however, and continuing through the first half of 2011, 
But here is the rub . Massachusetts and Greater Boston 
are not immune to the travails of the national economy, 
or for that matter, the global economy . As such, leading 
economists in the state now worry that the continu-
ing national housing crisis and weak economy will 
adversely affect the state and Greater Boston . Hence, 
understanding the nature of the housing crisis and find-
ing ways to fix the housing market nationwide—as well 
as in our region—is critical to prosperity here at home .
Specific Findings for  
2010–2011 
Production, Supply, and Foreclosures
Production of New Housing  
in Greater Boston
The overall weakness of the national economy appears 
to have taken its toll on housing production in Greater 
Boston as it has elsewhere . For all of 2010, the five 
counties in the Greater Boston region issued a grand 
total of just 5,823 permits for new units of housing . 
The “good” news is that this represented an improve-
ment of nearly 24 percent over the extraordinary low 
2009 level . The “bad” news was that the higher total 
in 2010 was only slightly higher than half (52 percent) 
the average annual number of permits issued between 
2000 and 2007, and 2011 seems to be shaping up to be 
even worse than 2009, with the total number of permits 
sinking below 4,500 . This would mark the lowest produc-
tion total in at least two decades and less than 30 percent of 
the most recent peak year (2005) . 
The decline in housing production in the region has 
been most severe in multi-unit buildings . Between 
2005 and 2009, the number of permits for single-family 
homes declined by nearly 62 percent, but this was 
eclipsed by the 72 percent decline in two-to-four unit 
buildings and by 75 percent in larger buildings with 
five units or more . We project continued declines in 
2011: single-family production is forecast to decline by 
14 percent from 2010, while production in two-to-four 
unit buildings will be down 51percent . The number 
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Compared to July 2009, single-family home sales in 
July 2010 were nearly 800 lower . And with only two 
exceptions, every month between July 2010 and June 
2011 has seen monthly home sales plummet from their 
level one year prior . What this implies is a sudden 
stalling of the recovery that appeared to be underway 
in late 2009 and early 2010 . Despite some signs of 
recovery last year, the market for single-family homes 
in Greater Boston is still quite weak .
This conclusion is even more apt when we turn 
our attention to the local condominium market . In 
contrast to the single-family home sales market, 
condominium sales in the region did not pick up 
after their precipitous drop between 2007 and 2008 . 
Rather, they continued to fall in 2009 and 2010 . Every 
month from July 2010 through June 2011 has seen a 
lower condo sales total than the same month one year 
prior, and in nine of those 12 months, the decline in 
monthly sales has been in excess of 300 units . These 
trends make it likely that 2011 will mark the sixth 
straight year of decreased annual condominium sales 
in the five-county region, and will once more set a 
new low point for annual regional condo sales since 
at least 2000 .
Homeowner Vacancy Rates
As we have noted year after year, Greater Boston has 
been perpetually among the most expensive regions 
of the nation where one might purchase a home . A 
number of important factors contribute to the continu-
ally high cost of housing in the region, but the statistic 
that sums up all of these is the region’s apparently 
intractable low homeowner vacancy rate . 
For all intents and purposes, Greater Boston’s home-
ownership vacancy rate has been below the 2 percent 
national standard since at least 1990 . Only in 2006 did 
the region’s vacancy rate hit 2 percent, and this was 
enough to begin sending home prices lower . Since 
then and through 2010, vacancy rates have declined 
modestly so that Greater Boston’s home prices fell, 
but not nearly as much as in other metro areas . Once 
again, however, the vacancy rate has been inch-
ing upward so that by the first quarter of 2011, the 
vacancy rate once again exceeded 1 .5 percent . This 
increasing rate has led to another softening in the 
region’s home prices .
the number of foreclosure petitions on single-family 
homes plummeted as the result of a second right-to-
cure period and a slowdown in mortgage company 
foreclosure processing . While the number of petitions 
for all types of homes remains high, recent months 
have seen the lowest rate of foreclosure filings since 
2005, perhaps indicating a return to something resem-
bling normalcy in the housing market sometime in the 
near future . 
The story is different when it comes to foreclosure deeds 
resulting in households actually losing their homes . 
The trajectory of foreclosure deeds tends to lag behind 
foreclosure petitions . The first peak in foreclosure deeds 
occurred in 2008, followed by a moderate reduction the 
following year and another peak in 2010 . Because of this 
lag, the optimistic trends seen in the trajectory of fore-
closure petitions do not appear in the data on foreclo-
sure deeds . Hundreds of foreclosures that were begun in 
Greater Boston during the worst months of the housing 
crisis are still working their way through the pipeline . 
As a result, the monthly number of foreclosure deeds 
has climbed steadily from a recent low of 94 in Novem-
ber 2010 all the way to 232 in June 2011 . While the 
worst of the foreclosure crisis may have passed, Greater 
Boston still has a long way to go before all of the foreclo-
sure proceedings are settled, all of the seized properties 
are sold and the housing market stabilizes again .
Elevated foreclosure activity ultimately affects home 
prices . Indeed, the sharpest declines in single-family 
home prices between 2005 and 2010 occurred in 
precisely those neighborhoods and municipalities that 
suffered the most foreclosures .
Housing Sales, Vacancies, Prices, 
and Rents
Home Sales Volume
In last year’s Housing Report Card, we noted optimisti-
cally that 2009 marked the first year in half a decade 
in which the number of single-family home sales in 
Greater Boston rose over the previous year . It seems 
now that such optimism was premature . With only 
23,478 homes sold throughout the entire year, 2010 was 
the second-slowest year since 2000 for single-family 
home sales in the five-county Greater Boston region .
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Rental Market
Rents are driven by a range of factors, but like the 
homeownership market, among the most significant 
is the rental vacancy rate . In Greater Boston, rental 
vacancy rates have been extraordinarily volatile for the 
last two decades . With the recession that began in late 
2007, the vacancy rate in Greater Boston continued to 
rise . By 2009, the rate exceeded 6 percent for the first 
time in at least 20 years . Effective rents fell that year by 
3 .1 percent . Beginning in the spring of 2010, vacancy 
rates began to decline, and they continued this descent 
right through the second quarter of 2011, to 4 .4 percent . 
As such, in the midst of a weak economy, the aver-
age effective rent in Greater Boston set a new all-time 
record of $1,665 in the second quarter of 2011 . With 
household incomes stagnant for all but the highest 
earners in the region, we expect no improvement in 
rental affordability in the foreseeable future . A combi-
nation of little rental housing production and demand 
fueled by foreclosed households seeking rental apart-
ments, young families remaining in rental housing 
because of tightened mortgage credit or fear of buying 
into a falling market, and increased student demand 
have all contributed to record rents .
Comparing Boston Rents to Other Regions
As of mid-year 2011, the typical Greater Boston studio 
or efficiency apartment rent was just 16 percent higher 
than the U .S . average . But for larger apartments, the 
Greater Boston premium was much greater: 51 percent 
for one- and two-bedroom units and 70 percent higher 
for three-bedroom units . As of spring 2011, Greater 
Boston appears to have the third highest average rent 
among major metropolitan areas . Only New York and 
San Francisco are more expensive . As the economy 
continues to stumble along, one can expect more and 
more families to make rational decisions about where to 
live . If jobs are available in metro regions with substan-
tially less expensive housing, Greater Boston could once 
again see a major exodus of young working families .
The Significance of Homeownership
Homeownership has conveyed a set of important 
benefits to most American families . Moreover, there 
have been social benefits in terms of community 
Home Prices
As home sales continued to suffer month after month 
during the most recent recession and vacancy rates 
remained high by Greater Boston standards, home 
prices declined across the region . As with the data 
on sales volume, it seemed that 2010 would mark the 
beginning of an upturn in home prices . Indeed, the 
median typical price for a single-family home rose 
nearly 4 percent in 2010 over 2009 levels . However, 
again in line with the sales volume figures, this recov-
ery seems to have been short-lived . March 2009 marked 
the lowest point for home prices since 2005 (about 
$294,000) . One year later, in March 2010, the typi-
cal price had increased more than $28,000, to almost 
$323,000 . Yet the price increases stopped there; by 
March 2011, the typical price had fallen slightly, hover-
ing at just over $322,000 . Barring some unforeseeable 
development, it is likely that the average annual price 
for single-family homes in Greater Boston will end up 
lower in 2011 than in 2010 . 
Up until last year, home prices in Greater Boston 
seemed to be following the same path as experienced 
in the last regional housing cycle that ran from 1988 
to 1997 . Home prices declined for 43 months and then 
began a steady recovery in that cycle . It took nine years 
for the median home price to return to its previous 
peak . In the current cycle, home prices began their 
decline in November 2005 and continued for an identi-
cal 43 months, tracking the old cycle almost perfectly . 
Through much of last year, prices were recovering 
very much in line with that cycle so that we could proj-
ect that full recovery would come sometime in 2014 . 
However, the price recovery stalled out in May 2010 
and it appears that single family home prices are in for 
a “double dip .” In this case, it may take a lot longer 
than nine years for a full recovery of home prices to 
their 2005 level . Instead of 2014, we may be looking at 
sometime late in this decade .
The older industrial cities of Chelsea, Brockton, Everett 
and Lawrence, along with the Boston neighborhoods 
of Mattapan, East Boston and Roxbury, all saw median 
single-family home prices decline by 33 percent or 
more while the average decline in the entire Greater 
Boston region was half this rate . While price cuts were 
seen across almost all cities and towns in the region, 
they were most acute in the poorer communities where 
the foreclosure crisis hit most dramatically .
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In Greater Boston, the picture is no better and perhaps 
worse . Among the largest 100 metro areas in the country, 
Hispanics and Asian-Pacific Islanders living in our region 
have the 3rd lowest rates of homeownership . Non-hispanic 
blacks are hardly better in 4th place from the bottom . 
This low rate of homeownership among minority families 
places them and their communities at some disadvantage 
given what we know about the individual and social 
benefits that stem from homeownership, including:
■■ private wealth generation
■■ increased aggregate consumption and economic 
growth
■■ improved home (and therefore community) upkeep
■■ higher rates of voting and civic engagement
■■ higher rates of academic achievement and educa-
tional attainment for students living in owner-occu-
pied homes
A new analysis of the social effects of homeownership 
by the Dukakis Center and summarized in this report 
points to a number of individual and social benefits 
that accrue to homeowners even when compared to 
renters who have lived in the same place for nearly 
10 years and have equivalent social-economic status 
(SES)—income, education and age . Homeowners accrue 
much higher levels of wealth even after controlling for 
income . Homeowners are more likely than renters to 
participate in community activities, presumably leading 
to more desirable neighborhoods . The low homeowner-
ship rates in minority communities in Greater Boston 
may contribute to neighborhood dysfunction .
Now with tightened mortgage credit and the possibil-
ity of changes in federal institutions that have encour-
aged homeownership since the 1930s, the large racial 
and ethnic gaps in homeownership may become much 
more difficult to eradicate . 
Public Policy and Public Spending  
in Support of Housing
State and Federal Legislation
During the past year, the most significant state-level 
housing development was not so much new legislation 
as the successful defense of Chapter 40B . By mid-2010, 
stability and local civic engagement that may very 
well be attributed to homeownership itself . Yet, in 
the aftermath of the collapse of the housing market 
there is widespread questioning of whether too much 
encouragement of homeownership was respon-
sible for calamitous effects on homebuyers and the 
economy as a whole . To that end, we have included a 
new chapter in this year’s Housing Report Card dedi-
cated to investigating homeownership rates in the 
region and the country, disparities in homeownership 
by race and ethnicity, and government support for 
homeownership .
By 2005 nearly 69 percent of all U .S . households owned 
their own homes . But recently, the homeownership 
rate has declined to an estimated 66 .2 percent in 2011 .
In Massachusetts, the homeownership rate rose from 
35 percent in 1900 to nearly 56 percent in 1960 and 
then grew more slowly through 2000 when it stood 
at 59 percent . For most of the 20th century, the state’s 
homeownership rate lagged the nation’s . Unlike the 
rest of the country, however, with an improving econ-
omy through the first half of the last decade, a better 
economic record in the second half, and taking full 
advantage of low mortgage rates and easy credit, the 
homeownership rate in the Commonwealth soared to 
65 .3 percent by 2010—nearly reaching the U .S . rate of 
66 .9 percent . The Great Recession has had a much less 
damaging impact on homeownership in the Common-
wealth than the nation as a whole .
Compared to other metropolitan areas, Greater 
Boston’s homeownership rate, like that of the Conmon-
wealth, had been low for decades, although it had been 
steadily converging toward the national average . The 
convergence has been so strong over the past decade 
that by 2010, Greater Boston could boast a slightly 
higher homeownerhip rate than the U .S . metro aver-
age . Despite the foreclosure crisis, Greater Boston’s 
homeownership rate is now at its highest level ever .
Nevertheless, the homeownership rate among black 
households in Massachusetts is well below the compa-
rable rate for the nation and the black/white home-
ownership gap much higher . Indeed, the black/white 
homeownership gap in Massachusetts is one of the 
highest in the nation . Nationally, in 2000, the black rate 
was 25 .0 percentage points below the non-Hispanic 
white rate . In Massachusetts the racial gap was 34 .3 
percentage points .
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fiscal crisis have taken a toll on the state share of 
DHCD operating funds, declining from $158 million in 
FY2008 to $115 million in FY2011 .
Federal funds flowing to DHCD jumped to $620 
million in FY2009 and $644 million in FY2010 . An 
additional $364 million was made available to DHCD 
during FY2010, and $180 million in FY2011, as part 
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) . As such, the total amount of federal funds 
allocated to DHCD increased from $449 million in 
FY2008 to more than $1 billion in FY2010 . In addition, 
Washington supplied $12 .5 million in homeless assis-
tance funds in FY2010 and $12 .3 million in FY2011 .
Now with most of the ARRA money spent, the federal 
government focused on deficit reduction, and state 
revenues still hurting from the weaker economy, it is 
likely that funds for housing programs over the next 
few fiscal years will be substantially lower than in the 
recent past . Of perhaps even greater concern is the 
possibility of the repeal of laws that have been central 
to the development of affordable housing and home-
ownership among households of modest income . This 
could spell further trouble for Greater Boston’s hous-
ing market and especially for lower income renters and 
the communities where they live .
Conclusion 
Overall, the Commonwealth and Greater Boston are 
faring in this Great Recession substantially better 
than most regions of the country . The economy here 
is stronger than most and its housing market in less 
disarray .
But there are too many troublesome signs in the 
national economy and in the likely course of federal 
housing legislation that make us worry that we are 
by no means out of the woods and the next few years 
could be as rocky as any we have encountered to date .
Chapter 40B had supported the development of more 
than 1,000 projects with more than 58,000 housing units 
and has been considered one of the most important tools 
for affordable housing development in Massachusetts . 
It has also generated significant controversy at the local 
community level, leading to an ultimately unsuccessful 
ballot initiative in November 2010 aimed at its repeal .
While not at the same intensity as last year, there has 
been important activity at the state level in Massachu-
setts over the past several years . Important milestones 
in the Commonwealth include:
■■ The implementation of the HomeBASE Program 
providing short-term rental assistance to house-
holds who face homelessness
■■ The passage by the State Senate of An Act Relative to 
Community Housing and Services providing a link 
between affordable housing and supportive services
■■ The advancement of H .4544, state legislation to 
promote innovative strategies in public housing
■■ The signing into law of An Act to Stabilize Neigh-
borhoods (The Foreclosure Relief Bill) to provide 
more time and resources for homeowners to avoid 
foreclosure
■■ The signing of Chapter 40T to help preserve afford-
able housing units from moving to market rate 
■■ The continued operation of Chapter 40R to encour-
age Massachusetts communities to create smart 
growth overlay zoning districts where denser, transit-
oriented affordable housing can be built as as-of-right
There is, unfortunately, little help on the housing front 
coming from Washington . Indeed, if new housing legis-
lation is approved by Congress, it is likely to be aimed 
at reversing policies that could have helped increase the 
amount of affordable housing and encourage homeown-
ership . Bills were filed recently to eliminate critically-
needed programs such as the National Housing Trust 
Fund and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit .
Public Spending on Housing in the 
Commonwealth
The Commonwealth has two sources of funds to assist 
homeowners, renters and developers of housing . One 
is from its own revenue, the other from a variety of 
federal programs . The current recession and the state’s 
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1.
Introduction
Anyone who read the Greater Boston Housing Report 
Card 2008 when it was issued in the fall of that year 
knew we were at the beginning of a difficult economic 
period for the nation .1 Each day brought a new report 
of rising unemployment, skyrocketing foreclosures, 
increasing residential vacancy rates, and a collapse in 
housing values . Few would have expected that three 
years later, the national economy would still be suffer-
ing from unemployment in excess of 9 percent, that 
home prices would not have stabilized in many metro 
areas throughout the country, and that a double dip 
recession was not only a possibility, but more and 
more likely . 
Indeed, in our 2009 Report Card, we were encouraged 
by some progress we were seeing on the economic 
front and in the housing market . We wrote, 
The overall conclusion—tentative as it must be—is 
that the worst of the current economic and demo-
graphic situation is finally abating . That could 
mean that housing sales will continue to pick up, 
that housing vacancy rates will begin to fall, that 
housing prices will continue to improve, and that 
we will need to find ways of assuring an adequate 
supply of housing for a growing population .2
That cautious optimism was reflected in the report’s 
subtitle: Positioning Boston in a Post-Crisis World .
By the time the next Greater Boston Housing Report Card 
was published in the fall of 2010, we had become less 
sanguine about the future of the national economy 
and the housing market . We subtitled that report 
Taking Stock in a Perilous Time given the continued 
weakness in the housing market and stubbornly high 
unemployment .
Now in 2011, we see many signs that we face even 
more perilous times than we have seen in decades . 
Persistently slow economic growth, anemic job 
creation, violent swings in the stock market, sovereign 
debt crises in Europe, and an entrenched political 
stalemate in Washington threaten to derail any recov-
ery that might have been on the horizon . Some are 
talking of a “new normal” characterized by economic 
stagnation, jobless growth, permanent belt-tightening, 
and a weak housing market in place of an economy 
of rising expectations, rising incomes, stable home 
values, and improved living standards .3  While Massa-
chusetts continues to perform better—indeed, much 
better—than the nation as a whole, the state inevita-
bly is vulnerable to deteriorating national and global 
conditions . 
As we will see, the continuing weakness in the national 
economy is unlike most post World War II reces-
sions . It is deeper and longer-lasting because its root 
cause is different from most “normal” business cycle 
downturns . This one has a lot less to do with too much 
manufacturing inventory leading to temporary layoffs, 
to short-term oil shocks, or to overzealous Federal 
Reserve Bank attempts to wring inflation out of the 
economy by driving up interest rates and killing off 
investment . This time around, it was a peculiar set 
of events in America’s housing market that turned a 
normal business cycle downturn into what many have 
dubbed the “Great Recession .” America continues 
to suffer and likely will do so for a number of years 
to come . Greater Boston is positioned to ride out this 
nasty storm better than most, but the storm’s winds 
will no doubt cause some damage to the region’s econ-
omy and extend the horizon before the local housing 
market fully recovers .
In past reports, we have begun by checking up on 
how the economy is affecting the housing market . 
In this report, we will focus equal attention on the 
reverse: how the housing market itself has contrib-
uted to the wild swings in the economy and why 
fixing the housing market may be the most important 
step that can be taken to return to some semblance of 
economic prosperity . In response to President Obama’s 
recently proposed jobs program, Kenneth Rogoff, a 
renowned Harvard University economist and expert 
on macropolicy and sovereign debt, spoke for many 
economists when he told the Boston Globe, restructur-
ing underwater mortgages is ‘the best simple step 
to getting out of a recession faster .”4  The collapse of 
the housing market led us into the Great Recession; 
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to slip again and by the first quarter of 2011 it had 
slowed to only 0 .4 percent . The stimulus had provided 
ignition, but not sufficient power to lift the economy 
back into a smooth orbit . During the second quarter, 
GDP growth increased but still remained at a lacklus-
ter 1 .0 percent—well below the 2 .5 to 3 percent growth 
rate needed to seriously reduce unemployment . 
The latest forecasts provide little hope that the rate 
of economic growth will increase . All through the 
summer of 2011, one forecaster after another lowered 
estimates of economic growth for the remaining two 
quarters of 2011 and for much of 2012 . With remark-
able stock market volatility and declining producer 
and consumer confidence, not to mention serious 
concern about the European economy, Goldman Sachs 
slashed its third-quarter 2011 real GDP forecast to 1 .0 
percent and projected fourth-quarter growth at no 
more than a 1 .5 percent annual rate .5 Mortgage Bank-
ers Association economists predicted that real GDP 
will grow by no more than 1 .5 percent for all of 2011 
and by an average rate of no more than 2 .3 percent 
in 2012 . If these forecasts pan out, 2011’s growth rate 
will be the lowest since the recession began in 2007 . At 
these rates, national unemployment will remain near 
or above 9 percent for at least the next 18 months .6
The inability to sustain a more rapid GDP growth rate 
has produced one of the weakest labor markets in 
decades . As Figure 1.2 reveals, U .S . civilian employ-
ment peaked in 2007 just before the recession began . 
From the end of the 2001–2002 recession to the begin-
ning of the latest one, the total number of employed 
workers increased by nearly 10 million to 146 million . 
The recession that began in December 2007 displaced 
over seven million of them . Despite a return to posi-
tive economic growth, over the past year—between 
July 2010 and July 2011—employment has increased by 
only 305,000 . The employment trend is flat .
The result, of course, has been persistently high unem-
ployment even as many discouraged workers have 
stopped looking for work altogether and therefore are 
no longer counted as unemployed . Figure 1.3 demon-
strates how devastating the recession has been to work-
ers and their families . The total number of unemployed 
Americans increased from seven million in 2006 to 
more than 15 million in November 2010 . Since then, the 
number of unemployed has decreased by 1 .1 million, 
but as of August 2011 there were still nearly 14 million 
stabilizing home prices, dealing aggressively with the 
foreclosure crisis, and expanding housing produc-
tion to put Americans back to work and reduce future 
upward pressure on rents will be needed to restore the 
nation’s health . 
A Brief Look at National Economic Trends 
Recalling the history of the Great Recession is a good 
place to begin . It began officially in December 2007, now 
nearly four years ago . All through the following year, 
the recession deepened . In the last three months of 2008, 
it reached its nadir with real GDP declining at a fright-
ening annual rate of 8 .9 percent . The following year, 
however, brought great hope . From the first quarter of 
2009 through the last, the nation’s real GDP growth rate 
improved steadily and entered positive territory by the 
third quarter (see Figure 1.1) . In the first three months 
of 2010, the growth rate was back to nearly 4 percent, 
even stronger than in the 2004–2007 period when rapid 
economic growth drove down the nation’s unemploy-
ment rate to just 4 .6 percent . It appeared that we were 
coming out of the recession at last . 
By most, but not all accounts, the nearly $800 billion 
economic stimulus package engineered by the White 
House and the Federal Reserve Bank’s commitment to 
extraordinarily low interest rates helped turn around 
the economy and boost economic growth . But, unfortu-
















Source: Council of Economic Advisers, “Economic Indicators,” July 2011
FIGURE 1 .1 
Percentage Change in Real GDP 
2004–2011:2Q
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the jobless rate . But with the return to extremely slug-
gish economic growth in the first half of 2011, the rate 
has actually climbed back to 9 .1 percent and seems to 
be stuck there . Official Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) forecasts do not see the nation returning to “full 
employment” (under 6%) until 2017 .8  If this prediction 
holds true, the nation will have experienced a string of 
nine years in a row with unemployment greater than 6 
percent, a streak longer than any since World War II . 
who were officially unemployed . Among these, six 
million have been unemployed for at least six months .7
With so little employment growth and so little attrition 
in the ranks of the unemployed, the official national 
unemployment rate has hardly budged since 2009 . 
As the official tally declined from 9 .8 percent to 8 .8 
percent between November 2010 and March 2011, it 








































FIGURE 1 .2 
U.S. Civilian Employment 2001–2011 (July)
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rely on wages for most, if not all, of their income, it is 
not surprising that personal income has stagnated for 
more than a decade, as demonstrated in Figure 1.5 . As 
of spring 2011, real personal disposable income was 
lower than in 2007 and only 11 percent higher than in 
2001 . With such little growth in disposable income, 
personal consumption has also slumped . Because 
personal consumption represents more than 70 percent 
of GDP, it is not surprising that the economy cannot 
recover until consumers start spending again .9 And 
consumers will not start spending again until they feel 
their main source of wealth—housing—is stable . 
The Economy and the Housing Market 
There are, of course, a plethora of reasons for the dismal 
performance of the economy . Consumer confidence 
and business confidence remain at historically low 
levels, leading to depressed consumption and invest-
ment . Over the course of just one month, from July to 
August of 2011, the Thomson Reuters/University of 
Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index fell from 63 .7 to 
54 .9, the lowest level since 1980—lower even than in 
November 2008 at the height of the financial crisis .10  
On top of this, global economic chaos has roiled stock 
markets and America’s export performance . Although 
U .S . corporate profits have rebounded smartly from the 
High unemployment is not the only problem afflicting 
the labor market . Even among those who are working 
steadily, the vast majority have seen little increase in 
their paychecks . As Figure 1.4 reveals, between 2001 
and 2010 average real gross weekly earnings of non-
farm workers in the U .S . increased by only 5 .2 percent 
or $15 per week . Since then, weekly wages have actu-
ally declined by 1 .2 percent . Because most households 
FIGURE 1 .4
Average U.S. Real Gross Weekly Earnings (1982–1984 Dollars)  
Total Non-Farm Employment Sector 2001–2011 (June)





























































Source: Council of Economic Advisers, “Economic Indicators,” July 2011
FIGURE 1 .5
U.S. Real Per Capita Personal Disposable Income 
(2005 Dollars) 2001–2011:2Q
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community . Financial institutions packaged the new 
mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) 
which were then marketed globally . These securities 
ultimately carried much higher risk than investors 
imagined because they included mortgages which 
were likely to go into foreclosure once the economy 
slowed and borrowers could not service them . When 
the risky nature of these MBSs was discovered, they 
plunged in value creating massive losses for some 
of the world’s largest banking and insurance institu-
tions . Thus, the beginning of the Great Recession had 
everything to do with housing . Moreover, the bailout 
of the financial sector by the federal government was 
partially responsible for the huge increase in federal 
debt which has since led to cutbacks in spending just 
when the nation requires added economic stimulus to 
put people back to work .
“Wealth” Effect
Even those not facing foreclosure or losing money 
in financial markets were deeply affected by the 
collapse of the housing market . Since the middle of 
2006, U .S . single family home value has fallen by $6 .3 
trillion from $22 .4 trillion to just $16 .1 trillion—about 
28 percent .13 In an important paper released in Febru-
ary 2011, economists Karl Case, John Quigley, and 
Robert Shiller found that changes in housing wealth 
have a substantial impact on household consumption, 
that the effect is “consistently larger than the effect 
of stock market wealth upon consumption,” and that 
the “effects of declines in housing wealth in reduc-
ing consumption are at least as large as the effects of 
increases in housing wealth in increasing the course of 
household consumption .”14 Part of this effect is due to 
the real temporary or permanent loss in home equity 
and, therefore, the diminished ability of homeowners 
to borrow against the value of their homes . Another 
part of the effect is psychological in that homeowners 
who experience a decline in the value of their most 
important asset feel “poorer” and compensate by 
cutting back on current consumption . 
Case, Quigley, and Shiller’s statistical analysis revealed 
that a 1 percent decline in housing wealth generates, 
on average, a  .08 percent decline in annual household 
consumption .15 When we apply this ratio to the 28 
percent loss in national housing wealth between 2006 
and 2011, we find that this produced something on the 
order of a 2 .3 percent reduction in personal consumption . 
recession (reaching nearly $1 .8 trillion in the first quarter 
of 2011—up 25 percent since the first quarter of 2008), 
corporate investment in non-residential assets is off by 
more than 11 percent over the same period .11 This essen-
tially means corporations are saving, not investing . 
Hard-strapped consumers are doing the same . Since 
the recession began in 2007, households have been 
saving an average of 5 .3 percent of their disposable 
personal income—the highest rate since the 1990s—
and up from an average of just 2 .8 percent between 
2001 and 2007 .12 When you are anxious about losing 
your job and when the value of your home and 
perhaps your 401(k) has plummeted, your appetite for 
consumption wanes . 
Each of these factors helps to explain why this 
economic downturn has been so steep and lasted so 
long . But to really understand the depth and duration 
of this Great Recession, one must consider the abso-
lutely central role of America’s boom-and-bust hous-
ing market and the associated near financial collapse of 
the nation’s banking system .
Financial Meltdown
Why the housing market boomed and then plummeted 
is a complex story that we will return to in Chapter 
4, but we can touch upon the key points here . As we 
demonstrated in earlier Housing Report Cards, housing 
prices soared during the first half of the last decade not 
just in Greater Boston, but even more so in other metro 
areas . Home prices skyrocketed because housing 
demand was so strong . The demand for housing was 
so strong because of the expansion of all kinds of new 
mortgage instruments that made it possible for house-
holds to get into the home buying market even if they 
had a limited ability to service those mortgages in the 
event of a slowdown in the economy . When the econ-
omy faltered in 2008, many of these households could 
not keep up with their mortgage payments and ended 
up in foreclosure . The value of these homes plum-
meted as a supply of foreclosed homes flooded the 
market . This new supply of market housing affected 
the value of virtually all other housing stock .
This, in itself, might not have led to such a long and 
deep downward-spiraling national economic crisis . 
But how those mortgages were financed and how they 
were sold on global markets led to a financial collapse 
affecting a wide swath of the mortgage banking 
16 U n d e r s t a n d i n g  B o s t o n
the real monthly cost of purchasing a home . Yet this 
has not been the case since the recession began . Credit 
rules have been tightened making it difficult for many 
households to take advantage of these low mortgage 
rates . Moreover, credit-worthy customers are anxious 
about entering a housing market that might still pose 
significant downside risk and so many of them have 
remained on the home-buying sidelines .
With so few potential home buyers in the housing 
market, developers have all but ceased producing 
housing units . Since 2007, a lack of housing produc-
tion has put a damper on economic growth . As Figure 
1.7 demonstrates, after the housing bubble began to 
leak in 2005, the number of new housing starts plum-
meted . From more than two million units in 2005, the 
number of new units under construction has continued 
to shrink almost every year . Based on construction data 
through July, we project only 420,000 new homes and 
apartment units will be built nationwide in all of 2011 . 
That is just one-fifth the number of homes built in 2005 
and one-fourth the production numbers during the 
2001–2002 recession years . As a result, real U .S . residen-
tial fixed investment—a major component of GDP—has 
declined from $775 billion in 2005 to a projected annual 
figure of just $324 million in 2011 (see Figure 1.8) .
When housing production slumps, a whole slew of 
other sectors slump with it, including the appliance 
With personal consumption expenditures of $10 .7 trillion 
in the second quarter of 2011, this translates into a loss of 
nearly $250 billion in consumer spending each year . 
We can use this number to estimate how much 
economic growth might have occurred if housing 
wealth had not deteriorated . Between the second quar-
ter of 2010 and the second quarter of 2011, nominal 
GDP expanded by $529 billion or 3 .7 percent .16 If hous-
ing wealth had not declined by 30 percent, additional 
consumption alone, according to the Case-Quigley-
Shiller estimate, would have raised the nominal GDP 
growth rate to 5 .4 percent—a 45 percent increase . 
Given the implicit GDP price deflator for the year 
ending in the second quarter of 2011, we calculate that 
real GDP growth would have been closer to 3 percent 
rather than 1 percent . With such an improved growth 
rate, employment almost surely would have expanded 
and unemployment would have declined .
Investment and Construction
Interest rates, and especially mortgage interest rates, 
are near the lowest levels seen in more than 10 years, 
as shown in Figure 1.6 . As of July 2011, the average 
30-year home mortgage had a commitment rate of just 
4 .5 percent, a full two percentage points lower than in 
July 2008, and four percentage points below the prevail-
ing rate in 2000 . Such low interest rates would normally 
power a housing boom since low mortgage rates reduce 
FIGURE 1 .6
Monthly National Average Commitment Rate on 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgages,  
January 2000–July 2011
Source:  Freddie Mac, Primary Mortgage Market Survey
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investment, government consumption, and net exports 
(exports minus imports) . Note that between the second 
quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2011, real 
GDP declined by 0 .3 percent, meaning virtually no 
growth . A small increase in personal consumption 
expenditures (+1%) propped up GDP a bit, as did two 
other factors: a strong increase in exports (+4 .8%) and 
a massive increase in federal stimulus (+10 .9%) . The 
decline in GDP was driven by a 5 percent decline in 
state and local expenditures, an 11 percent decline in 
non-residential fixed plant and equipment investment, 
and a whopping 30 percent decline in residential fixed 
investment . If housing investment had not collapsed so 
dramatically, the length and depth of the Great Reces-
sion would have been greatly attenuated .
The Near Term Future 
As noted above, until quite recently, most economists 
expected the pace of economic growth to pick up in 
2011 and accelerate even more in 2012 . That forecast 
seems more and more unlikely given the recent down-
ward revisions in GDP growth rates for the first half 
of 2011 and the fact that the federal government is no 
longer stimulating the economy, but rather contract-
ing spending as part of the debt ceiling agreement . 
The Federal Reserve Bank has vowed to keep real 
interest rates as close to zero as possible, yet so far low 
and furniture industries which in turn affects raw 
material producers from those who mine iron ore 
to those who make steel . The “domino” effect in the 
housing sector is vast .
Figure 1.9 summarizes the impact of declining resi-
dential investment on GDP . The main components of 
GDP are: personal consumption expenditures, fixed 
Source: Council of Economic Advisers, “Economic Indicators,” July 2011
FIGURE 1 .7


















Source: Council of Economic Advisers, “Economic Indicators,” July 2011
FIGURE 1 .8
Real U.S. Residential Fixed Investment  


























Source: Council of Economic Advisers, “Economic Indicators,” July 2011
FIGURE 1 .9
Components of Real GDP Decline 
2008:2Q–2011:2Q
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Under this scenario, the national housing market will 
not recover . With home prices still falling in many 
parts of the country, the stock market experiencing 
great volatility, and unemployment remaining stub-
bornly high and perhaps rising again, prospective 
homebuyers are staying on the sidelines, developers 
are cautious about building new units, and foreclo-
sures may continue to remain high . The result is a 
“feedback loop” where “one piece of bad economic 
data has a way of making everything else worse .”20 
The Massachusetts Economy 
In Massachusetts, we are more fortunate than most . 
The Commonwealth’s economy (as measured by the 
Economic Activity Index computed by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia) finally achieved a 
milestone in February 2011 when economic activity 
in Massachusetts reached a point equal to the level 
prevailing before the beginning of the recession . Its 
recovery was led by the state’s construction industry, 
its information services, its education and medical insti-
tutions, and its leisure and hospitality industry .21 And 
since February both the economic activity index and 
employment have continued to improve . Figure 1.10 
compares the trends in both of these economic indices 
for Massachusetts and the U .S . since the official begin-
ning of the recession in December 2007 .
interest rates have not stimulated much investment .17 
Its current attempt to “twist” interest rates by selling 
short-term paper and buying long-term bonds is aimed 
at lowering long term interest rates even further . But 
there is little reason to believe that even lower interest 
rates will boost investment .
The $787 billion economic stimulus passed by 
Congress in February 2009 has virtually all been spent . 
In Massachusetts, only about 4 percent or $300 million 
of the original $7 .4 billion allocated to the Common-
wealth under the stimulus package remains .18 
While President Obama has proposed a new $447 
billion package of tax breaks and new government 
spending, it is almost certain that Congress will agree 
to support only some of these measures . In any case, 
many economists believe that even passage of the Pres-
ident’s full package would do little to spur the near-
term rate of economic growth or appreciably lower 
the nation’s unemployment rate .19 The President’s call 
for increased infrastructure spending will take time to 
implement . It is not clear that consumers will spend 
much of the extended payroll deduction they may be 
offered and it is unlikely that many firms will take 
advantage of a jobs tax credit to create new jobs in the 
face of weak consumer demand . 
FIGURE 1 .10
Economic Activity Index and Employment Index, Massachusetts vs. U.S. 
December 2007–July 2011
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to drive down the state’s unemployment rate to 7 .4 
percent—a full 1 .5 percentage points below the U .S . rate .
As noted above and shown in Figure 1.13, the recent 
jobs recovery in Massachusetts has been led by a set of 
important industries . Between July 2010 and July 2011, 
information services employment expanded by more 
than 5 percent . Construction (mostly non-residential) and 
As of July 2011, U .S . economic activity remained 
4 .3 percent behind its December 2007 level; at the 
same time Massachusetts’ economic activity already 
exceeded its pre-recession level by 2 .2 percent . As for 
employment, Massachusetts has still not fully recov-
ered to its pre-recession peak, but as of mid-2011 it 
trailed that level by only 1 .7 percent . By contrast, 
U .S . employment was still a full 5 percent below its 
December 2007 level .
Relative to other states, Massachusetts is doing so 
well that it ranks second in the nation in terms of its 
economic activity . (Only North Dakota does better) . 
In fact, as Figure 1.11 demonstrates, only five states 
had surpassed their December 2007 economic activity 
index by July 2011 . Ten states still trailed their 2007 
index readings by 10 percent or more . Among these 
are three that were plundered by the housing collapse 
that began in 2006: Florida, Arizona and Nevada .
The recent increase in economic activity has provided 
the foundation for relatively strong employment growth 
in the state . As Figure 1.12 reveals, after losing nearly 
45,000 jobs in 2008 and more than 60,000 more in 2009, 
Massachusetts saw a modest improvement in the 
jobs picture in 2010 with a net increase of 12,600 . This 
improvement has strengthened in 2011 . Just through 
the first eight months of the year, employment in the 
Commonwealth has grown by more than 40,000, helping 
FIGURE 1 .11
Percent Change in Economic Activity Index by State 
December 2007–July 2011



























Source: U .S . Bureau of Labor Statistics
FIGURE 1 .12
Change in Total Non-Farm Employment in 
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leisure-and-hospitality added nearly 4 percent to their 
job base while both professional and business services 
and education and health services increased employment 
by more than 2 percent . In seven of 10 major economic 
sectors, the Commonwealth’s jobs picture was better 
than the nation’s . 
Overall employment in Massachusetts would have 
expanded even faster if not for the loss of public sector 
jobs . In just the past year, government employment 
in the Commonwealth has shrunk by 1 .9 percent as a 
result of the declining state and local coffers . 
Housing and Regional Economic Activity
As we noted in last year’s Greater Boston Housing Report 
Card, the recent, more encouraging trends in economic 
activity and employment in Massachusetts are quite 
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FIGURE 1 .14
Home Price Performance by State, June 2006–June 2011






















































Source: Freddie Mac Update, August 2011
21T h e  G r e a t e r  B o s t o n  H o u s i n g  R e p o r t  C a r d  2 0 1 1
much of their housing assets disappear that they cut 
back on their consumption . As this ricocheted through-
out state economies, economic activity slowed and jobs 
disappeared . Figure 1.14 shows the change in average 
home prices in each state between June 2006 and July 
2011 . Note the big losers: Nevada, Arizona, Florida, 
California and Idaho . 
Figure 1.15 compares the change in home prices in each 
state with the percentage change in their economic activ-
ity index . There is a clear correlation between the two 
with economic activity generally falling further in states 
with the largest declines in home prices . It is possible that 
the causation runs from a decline in economic activity to 
a decline in home prices, but in almost all states the home 
different from the trends following both the 1990–91 
and 2001–2002 recessions, when the Commonwealth 
trailed the nation’s recovery by a substantial margin . 
What is different this time around? For one thing, 
Massachusetts has benefited from its dominance in 
higher education, healthcare, information services, 
and even the leisure and hospitality industry . Regions 
of the country where these industries are strong have 
fared better than others, and Massachusetts surpasses 
nearly all other states in at least the first two . 
In addition, much of the economic downturn in other 
parts of the country was precipitated by a near total 
collapse in the housing market . Home prices fell, 
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unemployment rate might decline to no more than 7 
percent by early next year . 
But there are a critical number of potential flies in the 
ointment . The first is that this optimistic forecast is 
based on what appears to be surging payroll numbers 
in the state . These figures come from a survey of 
Massachusetts employers carried out each month . If, 
on the other hand, one looks at the nation’s monthly 
survey of households, the spectacular increase in 
employment looks quite different . According to the 
employer survey, Massachusetts added 12,700 jobs in 
July 2011 . According to the national household survey 
(which include self-employed workers), the number of 
employed Massachusetts residents fell by 15,200 in that 
month and grew by just 400 in the first seven months of 
the year altogether . Both surveys are samples and thus 
are subject to considerable error . If the truth lies some-
where between these disparate estimates, then Massa-
chusetts still outperformed the nation by a substantial 
margin, but neither the nation nor the state grew as 
much as estimated . According to results published 
in Massachusetts Benchmarks, economic growth in the 
Commonwealth over the first half of 2011 may be over-
stated by as much as a full percentage point . This still 
makes Massachusetts look very strong, but not strong 
enough to sustain a trajectory toward full employment, 
rising wages or rising household incomes . 
Adding to pessimism about the coming year is the “lead-
ing index” for Massachusetts . Composed of 10 indicators 
price collapse preceded the steep decline in the economy . 
Most likely there is a strong “feedback loop” between 
the two so that home prices and overall economic perfor-
mance affect each other, creating a “vicious circle” in 
states such as Nevada, Arizona and Florida . 
Near-Term Economic Prospects 
With recent performance as prelude, what is likely to 
happen in the Massachusetts economy over the next 
year? The short-term prospects for the last six months 
of 2011 look reasonably good, according to forecasts 
published in Massachusetts Benchmarks .22 As Figure 1.16 
suggests, since the second quarter of 2010, the growth 
in real output in the Commonwealth has exceeded 
GDP growth in the nation, with Massachusetts pulling 
further and further ahead of the country .
Based on the Benchmark’s forecasting model, Massa-
chusetts is poised to experience economic growth 
of 4 .9 percent in the third quarter of this year and to 
finish the year with a 3 .2 percent growth rate in the 
fourth quarter . This would truly be buoyant growth 
and would suggest that the state has avoided, at least 
for the present, a double-dip recession . Whether the 
nation can avoid this economic outcome is still very 
much in doubt . With such economic activity in the 
state, employment should continue to expand and the 
FIGURE 1 .16
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health care cost containment and the difficulty families 
are having in paying for higher education will begin to 
erode growth in this super sector will help determine 
how well Greater Boston fares in the near future . The 
ability to continue to attract convention traffic and 
tourists to the city will play a critical role as well since 
these fuel the local leisure and hospitality industry .
Conclusion 
With the relative improvement in economic activity 
and employment in Massachusetts and particularly in 
Greater Boston, it would not be surprising to find that 
home prices stabilized in the region during the past 
year and that rents remained stable or rose . What is 
harder to predict is what will happen in 2012 and there-
after . With the nation’s housing market still in disar-
ray, despite low mortgage rates, the national economy 
continues to suffer a major disability . With the overall 
domestic economy growing only slowly and the global 
market unstable, it is unclear how much longer Massa-
chusetts and Greater Boston can push against the tide . 
A double-dip recession will add considerable down-
ward thrust to an economy that has yet to pull out of 
the Great Recession . The “feedback loop” between 
the health of the housing market, the strength of the 
domestic economy and world economic events is alive 
and well, and at the present time, the loop looks very 
much like a vicious cycle rather than a virtuous one . 
including employment, withholding taxes, sales tax 
revenue, motor vehicle sales taxes, the unemployment 
rate, consumer confidence, interest rates and a stock 
market index, the leading index has been falling since 
May 2011 . A number of these indicators have declined 
in recent months due to a series of downside risks posed 
by the debt crisis in Europe, the federal budget crisis in 
the U .S ., continued high and perhaps rising unemploy-
ment elsewhere in the nation, continued weakness in the 
nation’s housing market, and the effects of all of these on 
consumer spending, business hiring and investment .23
Of course, Massachusetts is not an island . No matter how 
much the state has positioned itself to take advantage of 
expanding industries, the Commonwealth is subject to 
headwinds created at the national level and on the global 
stage . In the current economic and political climate, 
Washington has come close to declaring unilateral 
disarmament in the face of a renewed economic crisis . 
The White House-Congressional agreement on the debt 
ceiling limit has constrained federal fiscal policy in such 
a way that it has little room to stimulate the economy . 
The Federal Reserve Bank has vowed to keep interest 
rates low through 2013, but low interest rates do not 
seem a sufficient spur to higher investment spending 
by big business, small business or households . It is hard 
to discern what institutions or what economic factors 
might help revive the economy . In this environment, it 
is not clear how long Massachusetts can continue to see 
improvement in economic activity or in employment .
The Greater Boston Economy 
The Greater Boston metropolitan area has served as the 
main generator of jobs in the Commonwealth over the 
past year . Between May 2010 and May 2011, total non-
farm employment in the state increased by 24,600 . Of 
these, Greater Boston was responsible for 21,500 or 87 .4 
percent, despite the fact that the metro area represents 
only 76 percent of total state non-farm employment .24 
Within Greater Boston, two sectors were overwhelmingly 
responsible for job growth as shown in Figure 1.17 . These 
were Education and Health Services and Leisure and 
Hospitality . Taken together, these two created 97 percent 
of the net employment growth in the metropolitan area . 
Note that government employment in the region declined 
by more than 9,000, a drop of 3 percent from May 2010 .
Continued growth in these two sectors will be criti-
cal to the future of the region . Whether the drive for 
Source: U .S . Bureau of Labor Statistics
FIGURE 1 .17
Greater Boston Employment Growth by Industry Sector 
May 2010–May 2011
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The growth in the available housing stock in the 
nation as a whole is heavily influenced by the state 
of the economy . Normally, during periods when the 
economy is flourishing, developers come forward 
to provide new housing to meet increased demand . 
When the economy weakens, housing production 
slows as developers are wary of building units that 
will remain unsold or not rented . As we noted in 
Chapter 1, residential construction is such a large share 
of total national output that there is a feedback loop 
between economic growth and housing production . 
A weak economy drives down housing production; a 
reduction in housing production further weakens the 
economy .
At the municipal level, the state of the economy 
is certainly one factor that determines residential 
construction . The City of Detroit has almost no new 
housing construction given the existing excess supply 
in an economy characterized by massive unemploy-
ment . When Las Vegas was booming and attracting 
thousands of new families seeking jobs in the city’s 
resort casinos and associated industries, there was a 
boom in housing construction . 
But local zoning ordinances and building codes often 
affect construction as well . Cities and towns with 
restrictive zoning have seen much less construction 
than municipalities with zoning that encourages 
development .
From the perspective of providing an effective 
supply of housing, the amount of new construction 
and housing rehabilitation is, of course, the domi-
nant factor . Yet in times when foreclosures are on 
the rise, the total supply of units on the market is 
augmented by the level of foreclosure activity . When 
a new unit of housing comes on the market, supply 
goes up . When an existing unit of housing comes on 
the market because a family loses its home to foreclo-
sure, the supply of unsold units is further increased . 
In normal times, production dominates . Since 2005, 
foreclosures have added many more units to effec-
tive supply than new construction . In this chapter, 
we look at both .
The Trend in Housing in Housing Permits
In last year’s Greater Boston Housing Report Card, we 
predicted on the basis of permitting data available for 
the first half of the year that 5,500 new housing units 
would be added to the stock of housing in Greater 
Boston in 2010 .1 With the exception of 2009, that would 
mark the lowest total since at least 1990 . By the end 
of the year, as shown in Figure 2.1, it turned out that 
the five counties in the region issued a total of 5,823 
permits for new units . That represented an improve-
ment of nearly 24 percent over 2009, but equaled 
only a little better than half (52%) the average annual 
number of permits issued between 2000 and 2007 and 
the second lowest total in at least two decades .2 
Since last year, developers are on a trajectory in 2011 
to pull even fewer permits, making this year’s hous-
ing production performance the poorest in at least two 
decades . Indeed, based on data for the first six months 
of the year, we project the total number of permits 
issued in all of Greater Boston will sink below 4,500 . 
This is half the rate of 2000 and less than 30 percent of 
the recent record year of 2005 . Moreover, it marks the 
third year in a row in which fewer than 6,000 permits 
have been pulled . With the exception of a small 
rebound in 2010, Figure 2.1 makes it clear that Greater 
Boston has been on a six-year path toward ever lower 
production levels . Clearly, the continuing weakness 
of the economy has kept developers from consider-
ing new production despite the apparent improved 
prospects of the Massachusetts and Greater Boston 
economies . Such little production of housing has, in 
turn, taken its toll on the economy and especially on 
the local construction industry . 
The decline in housing production has been most severe 
in multi-unit buildings as shown in Table 2.1 . Between 
2005 and 2009, the number of permits for single-family 
homes declined by nearly 62 percent, but this was 
eclipsed by the 72 percent decline in two-to-four unit 
buildings and by 75 percent in larger buildings with 
five units or more . Essentially, apartment construc-
tion collapsed . Given our estimates for 2011, this same 
pattern has prevailed over the last year . Single-family 
2.
Housing Supply in Greater Boston
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FIGURE 2 .1
Number of Housing Permits Issued in Greater Boston, 1990–2011 (est.)






























Single-Family and Multi-Family Building Permits in Greater Boston, 2000 to 2011
Year Total Units
% Change 













from Prior Year 
(Units in 2–4 
Unit Structures)





Year (Units in 
Buildings with 
5+ Units)
2000 9,563 6,376 660 2,527
2001 8,929 -6 .6% 5,604 -12 .1% 642 -2 .7% 2,683 6 .2%
2002 8,558 -4 .2% 5,531 -1 .3% 709 10 .4% 2,318 -13 .6%
2003 11,120 29 .9% 5,290 -4 .4% 1,067 50 .5% 4,763 105 .5%
2004 12,713 14 .3% 6,222 17 .6% 985 -7 .7% 5,506 15 .6%
2005 15,107 18 .8% 6,552 5 .3% 991 0 .6% 7,564 37 .4%
2006 12,332 -18 .4% 4,910 -25 .1% 1,180 19 .1% 6,242 -17 .5%
2007 9,772 -20 .8% 4,139 -15 .7% 636 -46 .1% 4,997 -19 .9%
2008 6,529 -33 .2% 2,682 -35 .2% 376 -40 .9% 3,471 -30 .5%
2009 4,714 -27 .8% 2,507 -6 .5% 278 -26 .1% 1,929 -44 .4%
2010 5,823 23 .5% 3,057 21 .9% 340 22 .3% 2,426 25 .8%
2011 (est .) 4,427 -24 .0% 2,619 -14 .3% 166 -51 .2% 1,642 -32 .3%
% Change, 
2000–2005 58 .0% 2 .8% 50 .2% 199 .3%
% Change, 
2005–2009
-68 .8% -61 .7% -71 .9% -74 .5%
% Change, 
2009–2010




-24 .0% -14 .3% -51 .2% -32 .3%
Source: U .S . Census Building Permit Survey for Essex, Middlesex, Norfolk, Plymouth, and Suffolk Counties
Note: The estimates of 2011 housing permits were produced by calculating the ratio of 2010 housing permits issued from January to June and applying this ratio to the data from January to June in 2011 .
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including Boston, Billerica, Tyngsborough, Randolph 
and Newton . Cohasset and Chelsea made it to the top 
15 almost entirely because of the number of multifam-
ily units the two cities approved (240 out of 245 and 112 
out of 112 respectively) . Newton (ranked 13), Westford 
(ranked 14) and Lexington (ranked 15), on the other 
hand, issued most of their permits to single-family 
structures (82 out of 96, 80 out of 90, and 71 out of 83 
respectively) . Winthrop is the only town that did not 
issue any permits at all in both 2009 and 2010 . 
As for single-family units, Plymouth issued the larg-
est number of permits (132), followed by Billerica 
(96), Newton (82), Westford (80) and Concord (78); 
almost half of the municipalities (7) that made it to 
the top 15 in 2009 also appeared in the top 15 in 2010 . 
Noteworthy is Plymouth, which issued the most 
permits for single-family structures between 2005 and 
2008, coming back to first place after its relative weak 
performance in 2009 (27, ranking 33rd) . At the bottom 
of the list, Medford and Winthrop once again issued 
no such permits . 
As for multi-family developments, Concord issued 
the largest number of permits (308), followed by 
Boston (264), Stoughton (240), Cohasset (166) and 
Wareham (160) . Four municipalities made repeat 
performances to the top 15 including Boston, Chelsea, 
Randolph and Billerica . Cohasset and Chelsea, as 
mentioned above, issued almost all of their permits 
to units in multi-family structures . Within the region, 
125 municipalities—more than three-quarters of the 
161—did not approve any multifamily housing, close 
to the 128 municipalities in 2009 and 122 in 2008 . 
As such, only a small proportion of communities in 
Greater Boston are responsible for all new housing 
construction .
Comparing Boston to Other Metro Areas  
and to the Nation 
While Greater Boston is on pace to produce fewer 
housing units in 2011 than in any year since at least 
1990, one may wonder how the rest of the country is 
doing . As indicated in Figure 2.3, a number of metro 
regions including Phoenix, Miami, Las Vegas and 
Minneapolis have all experienced a drop of more than 
80 percent in housing production since 2005 . Boston, 
New York, Seattle and Raleigh all experienced a 
production is forecast to decline by 14 percent from 
2010, while production in two-to-four unit buildings 
will be down 51 percent and the number of permits in 
larger residential complexes down by nearly a third 
(32%) . As we will see in Chapter 3, the collapse of multi-
unit production has contributed to a sharp reduction in 
rental vacancy rates and an increase in rents .
The Changing Location of Housing 
Production in Greater Boston
Over the past two decades, there has been a shift in 
where housing is being produced within the Greater 
Boston region . As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, in the early 
1990s, nearly all of the housing permits issued in the 
five-county Greater Boston area were outside of Suffolk 
County—essentially outside the City of Boston . Of the 
41,000 permits issued between 1991 and 1995, fewer 
than 1,100 or just 2 .7 percent of the total was issued 
in Suffolk County . Middlesex County accounted for 
nearly 38 percent of all permits during that five-year 
period with Essex, Norfolk and Plymouth each with 
about one fifth (18 .8% – 21 .4%) of the total . Over the 
three succeeding five-year periods, Suffolk County’s 
share of the total has been increasing steadily so that 
between 2006 and 2010, its share had increased to more 
than 12 percent . Housing production has shifted away 
from Essex, Middlesex and Plymouth Counties while 
Norfolk has more than held its own . This is consistent 
with demographic trends which show that the popula-
tion of the City of Boston has increased by 44,000 over 
the past two decades from roughly 574,000 in 1990 
to 618,000, according to the recently released 2010 
Census .3 Housing demand is slowly but surely shifting 
from the suburbs to the Greater Boston’s central city .
2010 Housing Production by  
Type and Location 
To provide more detail on where housing production 
is now taking place, we examined housing permit data 
for 2010 for the 161 cities and towns in Greater Boston 
(Table 2.2) .4 While overall production in the region 
was very low, Concord ranked first with 386 permits, 
followed by Boston (351), Stoughton (245), Cohasset 
(239) and Plymouth (223); only five towns out of the 
top 15 in 2009 also made it to the top 15 list in 2010, 
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perhaps not surprising given the dismal production 
numbers we have witnessed in our region since the 
beginning of 2011 . 
Foreclosures
Housing supply is not only affected by construction, 
but by foreclosure . When a household loses its home 
to foreclosure, it adds another unit of housing onto 
the housing market . The crisis in the housing market 
that gripped the entire nation at the end of the last 
decade was driven, in large part, by a massive wave 
of foreclosure activity, as hundreds of thousands of 
homeowners (first those with subprime mortgages, 
and later those with conventional loans) fell behind on 
their payments and were issued foreclosure petitions 
by their mortgage companies or banks . Greater Boston 
was no exception to this trend, as evidenced by the 
data on annual petitions to foreclose on single-family 
homes, presented in Figure 2.4 . The number of foreclo-
sure petitions in the region increased slowly between 
2000 and 2003, but began its rapid escalation in 2004 . 
From 2003 to 2004, the number of petitions nearly 
doubled; it nearly doubled again in 2005, and once 
more in 2006 . By 2007, there were nearly 9,000 petitions 
to foreclose in the region, a figure significantly higher 
than the number of petitions filed during the entire 
period between 2000 and 2005 .
decrease between 60 percent and 75 percent over this 
period . Austin, in comparison, is the only metropolitan 
area among the selected nine that suffered a decrease 
of less than 60 percent (54 .7 percent) .
While this puts Boston in the middle of the nine-metro 
area pack in 2011, it actually reveals deterioration 
from 2010 when it had the smallest decline in permit 
activity of all . New York, Seattle, Raleigh-Durham and 
Austin appear to have weathered the housing collapse 
a bit better than Boston over the past year . This is 
FIGURE 2 .2
Percentage of Housing Permits Issued by County in Greater Boston






















Source: U .S . Census Bureau, Annual New Privately-Owned Residential Building Permits
FIGURE 2 .3
Percent Change in Building Permits for Selected 
Metropolitan Areas, January through June, 2005-2011
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TABLE 2 .2













1 Concord 386 32 47
2 Boston 351 332 2
3 Stoughton 245 2 148
4 Cohasset 239 3 143
5 Plymouth 223 32 47
6 Wareham 198 20 69
7 Wellesley 187 36 39
8 Andover 147 19 73
9 Billerica 139 106 10
10 Tyngsborough 115 115 9
11 Chelsea 112 44 31
12 Randolph 110 63 11
13 Newton 96 56 15
13 Westford 90 55 17













145 Sherborn 4 12 95
148 Avon 3 2 148
148 Plympton 3 125 6
148 Townsend 3 43 33
151 Medford 2 0 158
151 Milton 2 33 45
153 Somerville 1 16 81
153 Wenham 1 0 158
155 Harvard 0 12 95
155 Malden 0 5 138
155 Millville 0 2 148
155 Nahant 0 3 143
155 Stoneham 0 6 128
155 Swampscott 0 1 156













1 Plymouth 132 27 33
2 Billerica 96 42 11
3 Newton 82 34 22
4 Westford 80 55 3
5 Concord 78 32 26
6 Lexington 71 39 14
7 Needham 58 51 4
8 Dracut 55 49 6
9 Taunton 55 50 5
10 Methuen 51 44 10
11 Wellesley 49 36 17
12 Acton 48 32 26
13 Burlington 47 29 28
14 Weymouth 45 20 44












145 Townsend 3 7 107
148 Milton 2 1 154
149 Arlington 1 2 144
149 Somerville 1 16 63
149 Wenham 1 0 157
152 Chelsea 0 0 157
152 Harvard 0 6 117
152 Malden 0 3 137
152 Medford 0 0 157
152 Millville 0 2 144
152 Nahant 0 3 137
152 Stoneham 0 6 117
152 Swampscott 0 1 154
152 Watertown 0 2 144
152 Winthrop 0 0 157
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of petitions to foreclose fell off substantially in late 
2010 and the beginning of 2011 . While the number of 
petitions for all types of homes remains high, recent 
months have seen the lowest rate of foreclosure filings 
since 2005, perhaps indicating a return to something 
resembling normalcy in the housing market sometime 
in the near future . 
The story is different when it comes to foreclosure 
deeds . Not all petitions to foreclose culminate in the 
seizure of a property; in some cases, homeowners 
are able to get back on track with their payments or 
manage to reach a settlement with their lenders .  
Even in cases where a home is finally seized (as a 
recorded in a foreclosure deed), the process tends to 
take many months to complete . As a result, the trajec-
tory of foreclosure deeds tends to lag behind fore-
closure petitions . This lag is clear in a comparison of 
Figure 2.5, which tracks foreclosure deeds on single-
family homes in the Greater Boston Region, with the 
data on foreclosure petitions in Figure 2 .4 . The number 
of petitions peaked in 2007, fell the following year, and 
peaked once more in 2009 . By comparison, the first 
peak in foreclosure deeds occurred in 2008 followed by 
a moderate reduction the following year, and another 
peak in 2010 .
Because of this lag, the optimistic trends seen in the 
trajectory of foreclosure petitions do not appear in the 
data on foreclosure deeds . Hundreds of foreclosures 
There was a moderate downturn in foreclosure activ-
ity in 2008, as a result of the state’s right-to-cure law 
which implemented a 90-day moratorium on new fore-
closure petitions in order to give delinquent homeown-
ers an opportunity to catch up on payments . With the 
expiration of that moratorium, however, foreclosure 
activity shot back up in 2009, and it remained quite 
high through most of 2010 . 
Beginning in September 2010, however, and continu-
ing through the first half of 2011, the number of fore-
closure petitions on single-family homes plummeted . 
Where there had been more than 600 petitions each 
month from late 2006 forward, monthly totals from the 
end of 2010 to the present have hovered around 300 . 
Similar patterns in the rate of petitions to foreclose are 
evident among condominiums and homes in two-unit 
and three-unit structures . For all types of units, after 

















1 Concord 308 0 34
2 Boston 264 235 2
3 Stoughton 240 0 34
4 Cohasset 166 0 34
5 Wareham 160 0 34
6 Wellesley 138 0 34
7 Andover 115 0 34
8 Chelsea 112 37 11
9 Tyngsborough 96 0 34
10 Plymouth 91 5 31
11 Randolph 91 52 9
12 Quincy 62 0 34
12 Saugus 58 0 34
13 Ipswich 48 0 34
15 Billerica 41 64 7
Source: U .S . Census Bureau, Annual New Privately-Owned Residential Building Permits for Places in MA .
Source: The Warren Group
FIGURE 2 .4
Annual Petitions to Foreclose on Single-Family Homes 
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that were begun during the worst months of the hous-
ing crisis are still working their way through the pipe-
line . As a result, as Figure 2.6 illustrates, the monthly 
number of foreclosure deeds has climbed steadily from 
a recent low of 94 in November 2010 all the way to 232 
in June 2011 . A similar jump has occurred in the condo 
market, where monthly foreclosure deeds increased 
from 48 in November 2010 to 112 in the following June . 
A more modest escalation in foreclosure deeds has 
occurred among homes in two- and three-unit struc-
tures . These trends indicate that, while the worst of 
the foreclosure crisis may have passed, Greater Boston 
still has a long way to go before all of the foreclosure 
proceedings are settled, all of the seized properties are 
sold and the housing market can restabilize .
Source: The Warren Group
FIGURE 2 .5
Annual Foreclosure Deeds on Single-Family Homes 











Monthly Foreclosure Deeds on Single-Family Homes in Five-County Greater Boston Region,  
January 2009–June 2011
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In places like Brockton, the intense concentration of 
foreclosed homes has led to widespread vacancy, 
abandonment and blight . Perhaps more significantly, 
it has sown the seeds of doubt in the minds of poten-
tial homebuyers, who have stayed away from these 
communities out of fears of further price declines . This 
has had the self-reinforcing effect of pushing prices 
down further, reducing the value of families’ greatest 
asset, cutting down on the wealth of the community 
and putting even more homeowners at risk of future 
foreclosure . In Brockton, for example, the median 
home price for a single-family home is down more 
than 31 percent since 2004—nearly double the loss 
experienced in Greater Boston as a whole . Home prices 
in Lynn, Lowell and Lawrence are down by 28 percent, 
25 percent and 28 percent, respectively . 
What Does the Near Future Hold?
Given the dismal economic forecast suggested in 
Chapter 1, it is hard to be optimistic about housing 
production in the rest of 2011 or for much of 2012 . 
Perhaps the production numbers will rebound a bit, 
if only for the fact that the first half of this year has 
seen less production than anytime over the past two 
decades . With so much foreclosed property on the 
market and few people in the market for new homes, 
developers are naturally anxious about investing 
heavily in new stock .
As we will see in the next chapter, however, while the 
market for single family homes may continue to be 
quite weak, the market for rental apartments presum-
ably in multi-family developments may pick up in 
the months ahead . Vacancy rates have been falling 
and rents are at an all-time peak . This should provide 
the necessary incentive for some new badly-needed 
construction . Unfortunately, that is what we predicted 
last year as well and despite decreasing rental vacancy 
rates, new production declined anyway .
Foreclosures, Housing Supply,  
and Home Prices
Such elevated foreclosure activity ultimately affects 
home prices . This will become clear in Chapter 3 where 
we find that rising vacancy rates caused prices to fall . 
In this case, the higher vacancies were not due to an 
increase in housing production but almost exclusively 
due to an increase in foreclosure deeds . Indeed, the 
sharpest declines in single-family home prices between 
2005 and 2010 occurred in precisely those neighbor-
hoods and municipalities that suffered the most 
foreclosures . As Table 2.3 reveals, Lynn, Lowell and 
Lawrence each had more than 100 foreclosure deeds in 
2008 alone, and Randolph, Taunton, Haverhill, Revere 
and Dorchester all issued more than 50 deeds . By far 
the leader in foreclosure activity, though, was Brock-
ton; in that city only one foreclosure deed had been 
issued in 2005; three years later, there were 299, nearly 
twice as many as the second highest city total of 167 in 
Lynn . Indeed, Brockton has been the site of the highest 
number of foreclosure deeds every year since 2007 .
TABLE 2 .3
Communities with the Highest Number of  
Foreclosure Deeds in Greater Boston, 2008
















Source: The Warren Group
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Changes in home prices can be a double-edged sword . 
Between 2000 and 2005, the median price of a single 
family home in Greater Boston increased by a whop-
ping 55 percent .1 As we reported in our Greater Boston 
Housing Report Cards published during this period, 
affordability became a serious problem for many 
households . Businesses feared that such high prices 
would encourage young families to move to other 
metro areas with substantially lower housing costs and 
that such high housing prices would make it difficult 
to attract young families to come to Massachusetts 
to take jobs . Indeed, by 2004, the state was losing, 
on net, more than 60,000 residents per year due to 
out-migration .2 
On the other hand, those who already owned homes in 
Greater Boston experienced a huge increase in their net 
worth and, as we noted in Chapter 1, this contributed 
to an increase in household consumption that helped 
to increase local economic activity and create jobs . No 
doubt the improvement in the region’s economy and 
its salutary effect on employment growth is at least 
partially due to this “wealth effect .”
Falling home prices also have both a positive and a 
negative effect . Lower prices can mean greater afford-
ability for first-time homebuyers or those in the market 
for a second home, at least as long as prices fall faster 
than incomes . In normal times, this could make it 
easier for families of moderate means to join the ranks 
of homeowners .
But the negative effects of steeply falling home prices 
can be devastating to a local economy and to the hous-
ing market itself . With large numbers of homeowners 
underwater with the value of their mortgages exceed-
ing the new lower value of their homes, it is difficult for 
homeowners to refinance their homes even as interest 
rates fall . Those well underwater may walk away from 
their mortgages, creating a glut of real estate owned 
homes (REOs) on the market, leading to a deflationary 
cycle of lower and lower prices . As a result of lower 
home values, a negative wealth effect can take hold, 
reducing household consumption and, as we have seen, 
contributing to a sustained economic recession . 
As such, the best outcome is when housing demand 
and housing supply remain in rough balance so that 
home prices do not skyrocket nor plummet . Precisely 
the opposite has occurred in most regions of the 
country over the past decade . Home prices exploded 
between 2000 and the middle of the decade and then 
fell sharply . In metro areas in states such as Nevada, 
Florida and Arizona, the result has been calamitous, 
leading to massive foreclosure, a sharp curtailment in 
household consumption and business investment, and 
double-digit unemployment rates . 
In Greater Boston, the result has been less than calami-
tous, but nonetheless painful for those who lost a 
home to foreclosure, lost home value that might have 
been needed for retirement or lost a job as a result of 
the housing market’s effect on the economy and the 
job market . Ironically, the decline in home prices in 
Greater Boston also adversely affected renters . With 
families facing foreclosure, they entered the rental 
market . Young families that would have moved from 
rental housing to homeownership deferred their 
purchase, remaining in rental housing . As a conse-
quence, demand for rental units increased, sending 
rents to record levels . 
This chapter will review what has happened to home 
prices and rents, particularly since the beginning of the 
Great Recession . 
Housing Supply and Demand
For the most part, home prices are determined by the 
same factors that determine most other prices: supply 
and demand . When demand surges ahead of supply, 
we get a “sellers’ market” because potential buyers 
compete for homes, often driving up prices . When 
supply exceeds demand, the opposite occurs . A “buyers’ 
market” develops where nearly everyone trying to sell a 
home is in implicit competition with other sellers seek-
ing a scarce set of buyers . Prices, as a result, fall .
It is not easy to observe housing demand per se . 
Even the number of presumed buyers is often not 
3.
Home Sales, Prices, and Rents in Greater Boston
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that sums up all of these is the region’s apparently 
intractable low homeowner vacancy rate . 
Historically, new home construction has lagged 
demand in Greater Boston for a variety of reasons, 
including zoning restrictions . With demand exceed-
ing the resulting supply, vacancy rates remained low . 
Nationally, a vacancy rate of 2 percent is generally 
considered normal . At such a rate, home prices tend  
to stabilize .3
For all intents and purposes, Greater Boston’s home-
ownership vacancy rate has been below the 2 percent 
national standard since at least 1990 as shown in 
Figure 3.1 and at least for the past 20 years it has been 
well below the average for metro areas around the 
country . Indeed, by 1998 it reached a remarkable low 
of just 0 .3 percent and from 1995 through 2004, it never 
exceeded 1 .5 percent . Not surprisingly, with demand 
so exceeding supply, home prices soared . Only in 2006 
did the region’s vacancy rate hit 2 percent and this was 
enough to begin sending home prices down . 
Since then and through 2010, vacancy rates declined 
modestly so that Greater Boston’s home prices fell, 
but not nearly as much as in other metro areas . Once 
again, however, the vacancy rate has been inching 
upward so that by the first quarter of 2011, the vacancy 
rate once again exceeded 1 .5 percent . As we will see, 
this increasing rate has led to another softening in the 
region’s home prices . 
an accurate reflection of real demand because some 
are serious about finding a home and others are just 
“window-shopping .” Housing supply is not easy to 
measure for a similar reason . Some homeowners abso-
lutely need to sell their properties while others are 
willing to allow their homes to remain on the market, 
sometimes for years without budging on price . In this 
case, it may not be accurate to consider such homes as 
being on the market even if there is a “For Sale” sign 
on the front lawn .
As a result, what is commonly used to measure the 
relative amount of supply and demand in the housing 
and rental markets are vacancy rates . When housing 
demand exceeds housing supply, excess inventory is 
generally absorbed by home sales and vacancy rates 
decline . When demand falls, vacancy rates tend to 
increase as the level of unsold inventory rises . Prices 
have been shown to move roughly in concert with 
vacancy rates, rising as vacancy rates fall and declining 
as vacancy rates rise . 
Homeowner Vacancy Rate
As we have noted year after year, Greater Boston has 
been perpetually among the most expensive regions 
of the nation where one might purchase a home . A 
number of important factors contribute to the continu-
ally high cost of housing in the region, but the statistic 
FIGURE 3 .1
Homeowner Vacancy Rates, Greater Boston vs. U.S. Metro Areas 
1990–2011
Source: U .S . Census Bureau, Quarterly Vacancy Survey
Boston Metropolitan Area
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excess of 700 more homes sold than in April, May and 
June of 2009 . Thus, through mid-year, it seemed that 
the housing market was picking up steam .
That trend ceased abruptly in July . Compared to July 
2009, single-family home sales in July 2010 were nearly 
800 lower . And with only two exceptions, every month 
between July 2010 and June 2011 has seen monthly 
home sales plummet from their level one year prior . 
What this implies is a sudden stalling of the recovery 
that appeared to be underway in late 2009 and early 
2010 . With many other analysts, we saw what we 
believed to be the bottom of the housing market in the 
2008 sales figures . At this point, however, the monthly 
sales data point toward a prolonged sluggishness, 
and it would be unwise to assert that the local hous-
ing market has truly found its bottom . Despite some 
signs of recovery last year, the market for single-family 
homes in Greater Boston appears still quite weak .
This conclusion is even more apt when we turn 
our attention to the local condominium market (see 
Figure 3.4) . In contrast to the single-family home sales 
market, condominium sales in the region did not pick 
up after their precipitous drop between 2007 and 
2008 . Rather, they continued to fall in 2009 and 2010 . 
Condo sales declined more than 22 percent from 2007 
to 2008, fell another 6 percent from 2008 to 2009, and 
declined once again, by nearly 4 percent, from 2009 to 
Figure 3 .1 also demonstrates why the housing crisis 
has been so severe in other parts of the nation . The 
average vacancy rate for all U .S . metropolitan areas 
virtually doubled from under 1 .5 percent in 2000 to just 
below 3 percent in 2008 . In some metro areas, vacancy 
rates shot up between 2005 and 2009 well beyond 3 
percent, leading to sharp reductions in home prices . 
Orlando, Florida, experienced a 3 .8 percentage point 
increase in its vacancy rate; Greensboro-High Point, 
North Carolina, saw its rate climb by 3 .5 percentage 
points, while a number of communities in California 
experienced increases of 2 .8 points .4
By comparison, Greater Boston fared quite well . In 
2006, its vacancy rate was 0 .4 percentage points lower 
than the national metro area average . By 2010, the gap 
was nearly 1 .5 percentage points, a disparity seen in 
only one other year (1998) over the past two decades . 
Home Sales Volume
In last year’s Housing Report Card, we noted optimisti-
cally that 2009 marked the first year in half a decade 
in which the number of single-family home sales in 
Greater Boston rose over the previous year . It seems 
now that such optimism was premature . While home 
sales did accelerate through the first half of 2010, the 
second half of the year saw such a renewed downturn 
that the annual home sales figure for 2010 was actu-
ally lower than in 2009 . In fact, with only 23,478 homes 
sold throughout the entire year, 2010 was the second-
slowest year since 2000 for single-family home sales in 
the five-county Greater Boston region (see Figure 3.2) . 
Only two-thirds as many homes were sold in 2010 as 
in the recent peak sales year of 2004 . 
An examination of monthly sales figures can shed light 
on the current trend in single-family sales and help 
to better understand where the local housing market 
is headed . Figure 3.3 presents these figures for every 
month going back to January 2009 . Home sales move 
in predictable cycles—sales are always highest in the 
summer months and lower in the winter months . 
Comparing the number of sales in one month to the 
same month in the previous year provides a clearer 
portrayal of the trajectory of sales figures . In 2010, as 
this chart shows, monthly sales in the region exceeded 
their 2009 level for every month between January 











Source: The Warren Group
FIGURE 3 .2
Annual Single-Family Home Sales in Five-County 
Greater Boston Region, 2000–2010
35T h e  G r e a t e r  B o s t o n  H o u s i n g  R e p o r t  C a r d  2 0 1 1
2010 . Indeed, the 14,490 condos sold in the five-county 
region throughout 2010 were barely more than one 
half the annual sales total of 26,127 observed in the 
most recent peak year of 2005 .
Just like in the single-family home market, condo-
minium sales appeared to be picking up in the late 
2009 and through the first half of 2010 . As Figure 3.5 
illustrates, year-over-year monthly sales figures for 
condominiums were much higher for each of the first 
six months of 2010 . However, just as single-family 
home sales began to drop in July 2010, so did condo-
minium sales . Every month from July 2010 through 
June 2011 has seen a lower condo sales total than the 
same month one year prior, and in nine of those 12 
months, the decline in monthly sales has been in excess 
of 300 units .
These trends make it likely that 2011 will mark the 
sixth straight year of decreased annual condominium 
sales in the five-county region, and will once more set 
a new low point for annual regional condo sales since 
at least 2000 .
FIGURE 3 .3
Monthly Single-Family Home Sales in Five County Greater Boston Region 
January 2009–June 2011



















Source: The Warren Group
FIGURE 3 .4
Annual Condominium Sales in Five-County Greater 
Boston Region, 2000–2010
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In last year’s Housing Report Card, we paid greater 
attention to the market for homes in two-unit and 
three-unit structures . Although these make up a 
relatively small proportion of total home sales in the 
region, they are of critical importance in several urban 
communities in and around Boston, where duplexes 
and triple-deckers are nearly ubiquitous on residential 
streets . We noted that sales in these types of units had 
been decimated in the second half of the last decade, 
with sales of three-family units falling more than 61 
percent between 2005 and 2007 . From there, a slow 
recovery seemed to be underway . But, as with the 
trends for single-family homes and condominiums, 
this recovery has also stalled . Figure 3.6 shows that, 
after rising slightly in 2008 and 2009, sales of units in 
two – and three-unit structures fell once again in 2010 . 
Moreover, this slowdown has continued into 2011 . In 
January of 2011, only 75 homes in three-family struc-
tures were sold within the entire five-county region of 
Greater Boston . This was the lowest monthly sales total 
for these types of units since February 2008 . Similarly, 
the 159 units in two-unit structures that were sold in 
February 2011 marked the lowest sales figure for these 
units in three years, and the third-lowest monthly sales 
total since 2000 .
FIGURE 3 .5
Monthly Condominium Sales in Five-County Greater Boston Region 
January 2009–June 2011









Units in Two-Unit Structures









Source: The Warren Group 
FIGURE 3 .6
Annual Sales of Units in Two-Unit and Three-Unit 
Structures in Greater Boston, 2000–2010
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marked the lowest point for home prices since 2005 
(about $294,000) . One year later, in March 2010, the 
typical price had increased more than $28,000, to 
almost $323,000 . Yet the price increases stopped there; 
by March 2011, the typical price had fallen slightly, 
Home Prices
As home sales continued to suffer month after 
month during the most recent recession, home prices 
declined across Greater Boston . Figure 3.7 shows that 
the median price for single family homes in the five-
county region held relatively steady for two years, 
after peaking in 2005 at $405,000 . By 2007, the median 
selling price had fallen only about $7,000 from that 
peak . Over the following two years, however, prices 
sank deeply . The typical price for a single-family home 
in 2008 was about $359,000, nearly 10 percent lower 
than the same figure the year before . By 2009, the 
median price fell to $338,000, 6 percent lower than in 
2008, and nearly 17 percent lower than the 2005 peak .
As with the data on sales volume, it seemed that 2010 
would mark the beginning of an upturn in home 
prices . Indeed, the median typical price for a single-
family home rose nearly 4 percent in 2010 over 2009 
levels . However, again in line with the sales volume 
figures, this recovery seems to have been short-lived . 
As the monthly data presented in Figure 3.8 demon-
strate, any price recovery has apparently stalled . 
Home prices, like home sales, tend to demonstrate a 
fair amount of seasonality, so it is helpful to compare 












Source: The Warren Group
FIGURE 3 .7
Annual Weighted Average of Median Prices  
of Single-Family Homes in Five-County Greater  
Boston Region, 2000–2010
FIGURE 3 .8
Monthly Weighted Average of Median Prices of Single-Family Homes in Five-County Greater Boston Region 
January 2009–June 2011
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structures . This is partly due to the fact that these 
prices fell far more precipitously during the housing 
downturn than prices for single-family homes and 
condominiums . As Figure 3.11 illustrates, the typi-
cal home in a three-unit building in 2009 sold for less 
than half as much as the typical home in a three-unit 
building in 2005 . For homes in two-unit buildings, 
the comparable drop in prices was about 40 percent . 
Typical prices increased in 2010 over 2009 levels for 
both types of homes, just as they did for single-family 
homes and for condominiums . 
What sets the two-unit and three-unit homes apart, 
however, is that these price increases have contin-
ued through the first half of 2011, as portrayed in 
Figure 3.12 . Between June 2010 and June 2011, the 
typical sales price for a home in a two-unit structure 
went up 12 .6 percent, from about $315,000 to about 
$355,000 . Among homes in three-unit structures, 
prices went up 18 .3 percent, from about $298,000 to 
about $352,000 over that time span . By comparison, 
over that same period, the increase in prices for 
condominiums was 3 .9 percent, and for single-family 
homes 2 .7 percent . Despite their continuing recovery, 
the prices of two—and three-unit homes are still well 
below their peak levels .
Price Volatility in Low-Income Communities
As with all aggregate quantitative data, averages tend 
to obscure important pieces of the story . The housing 
crisis has affected all types of individuals, families, 
communities and regions, but it has been felt most 
acutely by those least capable of coping with its effects . 
Just as this is true for poor families facing foreclosure, 
it is also true for disadvantaged cities and towns, 
which have struggled the most with the massive wave 
of foreclosures along with the vacancies, blight and 
destruction of wealth that have accompanied it .
During the boom in home prices that took place over 
the first half of the last decade, existing homeowners 
in lower-income communities benefited greatly, often 
seeing the average selling price of their single-family 
homes more than double . Over that period, the largest 
percentage increase in the price of a single-family home 
in Greater Boston was found in East Boston, where the 
median price rose 137 percent, from $139,500 in 2000 to 
$330,000 in 2005 . In fact, as Table 3.1 indicates, among 
hovering at just over $322,000 . Barring some unforesee-
able development, it is likely that the average annual 
price for single-family homes in Greater Boston will 
end up lower in 2011 than in 2010, further evidence of 
a protracted sluggishness in the housing market . The 
median price in June 2011 was $385,176, more than 
$10,000 below the median price a year ago .
Prices in the condominium market have followed 
the same trend as in the single-family home market, 
but the fluctuations have been more muted . With the 
exception of the profound and rapid slide in prices that 
took place in the second half of 2008, when the typical 
price of a condominium in the region fell 29 .4 percent 
over the span of seven months, condominium prices 
have been relatively stable over the past six years, 
hovering around $300,000 from 2005 through 2010 
(see Figure 3.9) . While the market showed a robust 
price increase between 2009 and 2010, that growth 
has stagnated, just like in the single-family market . 
But, as Figure 3.10 shows, prices over the past year 
have not retreated, as they have among single-family 
homes . Instead, 2011 has been a period of anemic, yet 
noticeable, price increases in the condominium market, 
although the number of sales is well down from previ-
ous levels .
Encouraging signs of price stability are even more in 










Source: The Warren Group
FIGURE 3 .9
Annual Weighted Average of Median Prices of 
Condominiums in Five-County Greater Boston 
Region, 2000–2010
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the 10 communities where the percentage change in 
prices was the highest between 2000 and 2005, four 
were lower-income neighborhoods in Boston (East 
Boston, Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan), and 
three others—Chelsea, Lawrence and Brockton—were 
older industrial cities that had faced difficult times for 
FIGURE 3 .10
Monthly Weighted Average of Median Prices of Condominiums in Five-County Greater Boston Region  
January 2009–June 2011
























































































































Units in Two-Unit Structures Units in Three-Unit Structures
Source: The Warren Group
FIGURE 3 .11
Annual Weighted Average of Median Prices of Homes 
in 2-Unit and 3-Unit Structures in Five-County 
Greater Boston Region, 2000–2010
TABLE 3 .1
Communities with the Highest Percent Change in 








East Boston $139,500 $330,000 $190,500 136 .6%
Roxbury $157,500 $340,000 $182,500 115 .9%
Wareham $129,900 $270,000 $140,100 107 .9%
Dorchester $177,500 $365,000 $187,500 105 .6%
Chelsea $159,000 $323,250 $164,250 103 .3%
Mattapan $165,000 $327,000 $162,000 98 .2%
Lawrence $124,900 $247,000 $122,100 97 .8%
Millville $169,950 $331,250 $161,300 94 .9%
Middleboro $176,350 $339,900 $163,550 92 .7%
Brockton $142,900 $275,000 $132,100 92 .4%
Source: The Warren Group
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decades following the industrial flight that began in 
the mid-20th century . While these communities did not 
witness the largest absolute price increases in the region 
(these were seen in the wealthy suburban communities 
of Brookline, Lincoln and Wellesley), the high percent-
age increases in these poorer communities represented 
the expansion of wealth for residents who for many 
years had seen little appreciation in the value of their 
homes . Of course, the explosion of home prices in these 
communities often made it difficult for younger fami-
lies of modest income to buy into these communities . 
When they did, the subsequent decline in home prices 
would be devastating to many of these households as 
their homes lost value rapidly after 2005 .
As we now know too well, the extension of mortgage 
lending, particularly in the form of subprime loans, 
had disastrous consequences in thousands of cases . 
Families that bought homes in these communities at 
the peak of the market often were the victims of mort-
gages they could not afford (see Chapter 4) . Many 
homebuyers whose income declined as the economy 
weakened and unemployment increased—and many 
who likely should not have qualified for mortgages 
in the first place—fell behind in their loan payments, 
leading to a glut of foreclosures that were concentrated 
in these very same communities where the average 
FIGURE 3 .12
Monthly Weighted Average of Median Prices of Homes in 2-Unit and 3-Unit Structures in Five-County  
Greater Boston Region, January 2009–June 2011











































































































Units in Two-Unit Structures
Units in Three-Unit Structures
TABLE 3 .2
Communities with the Highest Percent Change  








Mendon $485,000 $296,000 -$189,000 -39 .0%
Chelsea $323,250 $200,000 -$123,250 -38 .1%
Mattapan $327,000 $202,450 -$124,550 -38 .1%
Wareham $270,000 $169,000 -$101,000 -37 .4%
Brockton $275,000 $174,500 -$100,500 -36 .5%
Everett $350,000 $225,000 -$125,000 -35 .7%
Hopedale $387,500 $250,900 -$136,600 -35 .3%
East Boston $330,000 $216,075 -$113,925 -34 .5%
Roxbury $340,000 $225,000 -$115,000 -33 .8%
Lawrence $247,000 $165,000 -$82,000 -33 .2%
Source: The Warren Group
41T h e  G r e a t e r  B o s t o n  H o u s i n g  R e p o r t  C a r d  2 0 1 1
in Greater Boston lost 17 percent of its value between 
November 2005 and what appeared to be its trough in 
May 2009 . This figure conforms closely with the data 
we have used in this chapter from the Warren Group . 
The last time Greater Boston went through a hous-
ing slump, the decline lasted almost exactly the same 
number of months (43) and the loss in home value 
was nearly identical (15 percent) . The earlier slump 
began in July 1988 and continued until January 1992 . 
As Figure 3.13 demonstrates, once this slump ended, 
prices began to rebound and continued to do so . By 
March 1997, prices were back to their July 1988 peak . 
Altogether, it took 62 months—more than five years—
for this recovery .
The recovery from the slump that began in November 
2005 appeared to be following almost precisely the 
same track as the 1988–1997 cycle . If this had contin-
ued, we would have expected prices to regain their 
November 2005 peak by September 2014 . However, as 
the figure reveals, after 12 months of recovery, prices 
began to dip again . As such, it appears less and less 
likely that the current home price cycle is going to 
mimic the old one . In this case, it is difficult to judge 
how much longer it might take for prices to fully 
recover . If they continue to “bump along the bottom,” 
we may not see a full price recovery until very late in 
this decade . In this case, those who bought homes near 
selling price had risen so sharply over the first half of 
the decade . As Table 3.2 reveals, most of the commu-
nities that had experienced the largest percentage 
increase in single-family home prices between 2000 
and 2005 were the same ones that saw the largest price 
decline over the following five years—in large measure 
because of the explosion in foreclosures and newly 
vacant housing units . 
While the single highest percentage decline occurred in 
the small town of Mendon, the older industrial cities of 
Chelsea, Brockton, Everett and Lawrence, along with 
the Boston neighborhoods of Mattapan, East Boston 
and Roxbury, all saw median single-family home 
prices decline by a 33 percent or more while the aver-
age decline in the entire Greater Boston region was half 
this rate . While price cuts were seen across almost all 
cities and towns in the region, they were most acute in 
the poorer communities where the foreclosure crisis hit 
most dramatically . 
The Long-Term Trend in Housing Prices
Data from the Case-Shiller home price index permits 
us to look back in time to consider the current home 
price cycle in Greater Boston with the one that began in 
1988 and continued through 1997 .5 According to these 
data on single family home prices, the typical home 
FIGURE 3 .13
Greater Boston Housing Cycles, 1988–1997 vs. 2005–20??, Case-Shiller Single-Family Home Price Index
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During the entire decade of the 1990s, demand for rental 
units soared while the supply increased only modestly, 
as demonstrated in Figure 3.15 . Over the entire decade, 
there was a net increase of just 6,100 rental units in 
Greater Boston, or 4 percent .7 As a result, the rental 
vacancy rate declined from a relatively low 4 .8 percent 
to practically zero (0 .7 percent) . In such an extreme sell-
ers’ market, as Figure 3.16 demonstrates, effective rents 
(taking into account any and all discounts) skyrocketed 
from $820 per month in 1990 to $1,460 in 2000—an 
increase of 78 percent in a single decade . From 1994 
through 2000, effective rents increased every year by 5 .2 
percent or more . In 2000, the vacancy rate of 0 .7 percent 
permitted landlords to raise rents by a whopping  
14 .5 percent in a single year (See Figure 3.17) . 
With such a hunger for rental property, residential 
developers went to work constructing a substantial 
number of apartment buildings . In contrast to the paltry 
6,100 units added to the rental housing stock during the 
1990s, the period between 2000 and 2009 saw an addi-
tion of nearly 23,000 rental units in Greater Boston . Not 
surprisingly, the spurt in supply (plus weaker demand 
due to the 2000–2001 recession) caused a sharp reversal 
of the vacancy rate so that by early 2003, it exceeded 5 
percent . The sellers’ market temporarily turned into a 
buyers’ market, and effective rents came down from 
their 2001 peak . For the next four years (2004–2008), 
the peak of the cycle may remain underwater for quite 
some time to come .
Rental Market
With such a prospect in the homeowner market, it is 
time to turn to the Greater Boston residential rental 
market . Rents are driven by a range of factors, but like 
the homeownership market, among the most signifi-
cant is the rental vacancy rate . When vacancy rates are 
rising, landlords often have to hold the line on rent or 
reduce what they are charging in order to keep their 
apartments occupied . When rental vacancy rates are 
falling, the opposite holds . Households compete for a 
limited supply of available units and therefore land-
lords can raise rents knowing they are likely to attract 
a renter even if they hike the monthly cost of a unit . 
In Greater Boston, rental vacancy rates have been 
extraordinarily volatile for the last two decades, as 
Figure 3.14 reveals . In general, rents tend to rise when 
the vacancy rate remains below 5 to 6 percent for an 
extended period of time, and they only stabilize or 
decline when vacancies rise above that range .6 The 
further the rate falls below 6 percent, the more rapidly 
rents tend to increase; the further above 6 percent, the 
more they tend to fall . 
FIGURE 3 .14
Greater Boston Rental Apartment Vacancy Rate, 1990–2011:2Q
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What Has Happened Since?
With the economy continuing to be so weak in 2010 
and 2011, one would think that vacancy rates would 
remain high and that rents would therefore remain at 
relatively depressed levels . But that is not what has 
happened at all . 
with vacancy rates between 5 and 6 percent, annual rent 
increases were limited to 2 to 4 percent . With the reces-
sion that began in late 2007, the vacancy rate in Greater 
Boston continued to rise . By 2009, the rate exceeded 6 
percent for the first time in at least 20 years . Effective 
rents fell that year by 3 .1 percent . 
FIGURE 3 .15
Total Apartment Units in Greater Boston, 1990–2011:2Q





























Greater Boston Asking vs. Effective Rents, 1990–2011:2Q
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homes stayed in rental units and therefore did not 
free up apartments for new renters .
■■ The continuing pressure of college students, particu-
larly graduate students, on the rental market helped 
to absorb scarce supply, with a rapidly growing 
number of students competing with other house-
holds for rental units .
The result is that in the midst of a weak economy, the aver-
age effective rent in Greater Boston set a new all-time record 
of $1,665 in the second quarter of 2011. In early 2011, the 
price of even the typical 485 sq .ft . studio/efficiency 
apartment in Greater Boston reached $1,215 per month, 
with three bedrooms apartments averaging 1,325 sq .ft . 
going for nearly $2,500 (See Table 3.3) . If the economy 
does not weaken considerably over the next year and 
Beginning in the spring of 2010, vacancy rates began to 
decline, and they continued this descent right through 
the second quarter of 2011 . By then, only 4 .4 percent of 
the rental housing stock in Greater Boston was vacant 
and a sellers’ market was reemerging . If one were to 
only consider the weak economy, the fact that rents 
would rise by 3 percent in 2010 and another 4 percent 
in 2011 would make little sense . 
What explains this otherwise strange behavior of 
rents is an intriguing story . On the one hand, supply 
stopped growing . Between 2009 and the spring of 2011, 
there was a net increase of fewer than 1,200 rental units 
in all of Greater Boston . At the same time, the demand 
for rental units increased sharply . Three factors explain 
this increased demand:
■■ A large number of households who lost their homes 
to foreclosure turned to the rental market, pushing 
up rental demand . Most families who fell victim to 
foreclosure did not end up homeless, but ended up 
competing with existing renters for rental units .
■■ A decrease in the number of younger families 
moving up the housing ladder from rental units to 
homeownership kept pressure on rental demand . 
Either because of tighter credit regulations or 
because of anxiety about buying into a housing 
market that might still see home prices decline, 
home sales plummeted . Those who did not buy 
FIGURE 3 .17
Greater Boston Annual Effective Rent Increases, 1990–2011 (est.)






















Greater Boston Average Apartment Rents,  
Spring 2011
Rent Avg. Sq.Ft. Avg. Rent/Sq.Ft.
Studio/Efficiency $1,215 485 $2 .51 
One Bedroom $1,583 762 $2 .08 
Two Bedroom $1,887 1,076 $1 .75 
Three Bedroom $2,499 1,325 $1 .89
Source: Reis . Inc .
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families, especially with children, is considerable . 
Many factors, especially employment opportunities, 
affect families’ location decisions, but such large rent 
differentials also play a role .
Indeed, as of spring 2011, Greater Boston appears 
to have the third highest average rent among major 
metropolitan areas . As Figure 3.18 demonstrates, 
only New York and San Francisco are more expen-
sive . The typical rent in Washington, D .C . is 15 
percent lower than in Greater Boston . Miami is 38 
percent cheaper, Chicago 40 percent cheaper and 
Minneapolis 45 percent cheaper . The typical apart-
ment in Denver rents for just half of the Greater 
Boston effective rent . Perhaps most importantly, there 
are metro areas with which firms in Greater Boston 
must compete for talent where rents are even lower . 
Portland, Oregon, is 53 percent cheaper; Charlotte is 
56 percent less expensive; and in Phoenix the typical 
apartment rents for just 41 percent of the average rent 
in Greater Boston .
Since the beginning of the recent recession in the 
fourth quarter of 2007, Greater Boston’s effective 
rents have increased by a little more than 4 percent . 
little supply is added to the rental stock, one would 
expect to see rents continue to remain at this new 
record high or perhaps move even higher . With house-
hold incomes stagnant for all but the highest earners in 
the region, we expect no improvement in rental afford-
ability in the foreseeable future .
Relative Rents 
For those who are not geographically mobile and must 
remain in Greater Boston, these rents pose a serious 
affordability problem . For those who are mobile, these 
rents pose a serious challenge to retaining the region’s 
workforce and attracting new residents to the region . 
As of mid-year 2011, the typical Greater Boston 
studio or efficiency apartment rent was just 16 
percent higher than the U .S . average .8 But for larger 
apartments, the Greater Boston premium was much 
greater: 51 percent for one – and two-bedroom units 
and 70 percent higher for three-bedroom units . The 
smaller apartment premium may not discourage 
young singles from remaining here and living in 
tiny studios or efficiencies, but the impact on young 





























Source: Reis, Inc .
FIGURE 3 .18
Effective Rents in Major Metropolitan Areas  
2011:2Q





























Source: Reis, Inc .
FIGURE 3 .19
Percent Change in Effective Rents, Major 
Metropolitan Areas, 2007:4Q–2011:2Q
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foreclosures which add to excess supply particularly 
in low income communities, developing ways to refi-
nance existing mortgages where the homeowner is 
underwater so as to keep these units from eventual 
foreclosure, and inventing ways of taking real estate 
owned units following foreclosure (REOs) and turning 
them into rental housing both to reduce excess supply 
in the homeowner market and increase the supply 
of residential rental properties . We also need to find 
ways to absorb excess homeowners units by encour-
aging home buying among credit worthy households 
who are temporarily on the home purchase sidelines . 
Essentially, we need to move from a buyer’s market to 
a market where supply and demand are balanced .
The rental market in Greater Boston requires just the 
opposite . With rents rising, we need to encourage poli-
cies that include new rental housing production for a 
range of consumers from the elderly and low-income 
families to undergraduate and graduate students . The 
goal should be to stabilize rents so as to assure greater 
affordability for all of these households .
In short, we need to “twist” the housing market, at 
least temporarily, from a focus on production of home-
ownership units to rental units in order to stabilize 
home prices and keep them from falling further and 
increase the supply of rental units in order to stabilize 
rents and keep them from rising .
As Figure 3.19 reveals, this was just half the increase 
experienced in Washington, D .C . and somewhat 
lower than that in Denver, Portland (Oregon), Dallas, 
Tacoma, Fort Worth and Charlotte . On the other 
hand, rents rose faster here than in such compet-
ing regions as New York, San Francisco, Seattle and 
Minneapolis . 
As the economy continues to stumble along, one 
can expect more and more families to make rational 
decisions about where to live . If jobs are available 
in metro regions with substantially less expensive 
housing, Greater Boston could once again see a 
major exodus of young working families .
Summing Up
In each of the Greater Boston Housing Report Cards from 
2002 through at least 2008, we repeatedly made the 
case for increasing the supply of housing in Greater 
Boston in order to moderate rapidly increasing home 
prices and keep rents from escalating . Now, with the 
Great Recession seeming to continue without end 
in sight and with what appears to be a second dip 
in home prices, our major concern is with stabiliz-
ing prices in order to restore consumer confidence 
so as to help the economy recover . As we will see in 
Chapter 6, this will require finding ways to limit new 
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America was founded on the political principle of 
democracy and the economic tenet of private property . 
Indeed, in its early years the two were linked together, 
as only property owners had the right to vote . None-
theless, until the 20th century, homeownership as a 
form of private property was largely limited to farm-
ers in rural areas . Even on the eve of World War II, 
well less than half of all American households were 
homeowners . That would change dramatically in the 
second half of the century . Between 1940 and 1960, the 
ownership rate would climb from less than 44 percent 
to more than 62 percent, and climb still higher until 
the collapse of the housing bubble . By 2005, nearly 69 
percent of all U .S . households owned their own homes . 
(See Figure 4.1) This represented a higher fraction than 
most European countries, although not quite as high 
as in Ireland, Italy, Australia, the United Kingdom, 
Canada or Finland .1
As we will see in this chapter, homeownership has 
conveyed a set of important benefits to most Ameri-
can families . Moreover, there have been social bene-
fits in terms of community stability and local civic 
engagement that may very well be attributed to home-
ownership itself . Yet, in the aftermath of the housing 
bubble with its extraordinary rise in home prices, its 
subsequent collapse, and the financial turmoil that 
followed, there is widespread questioning of whether 
too much encouragement of homeownership was 
responsible for a calamitous impact on families who 
recently bought homes, on the neighborhoods where 
they live, on long-term homeowners who have seen 
the value of their most important asset depreciate, and 
on the nation’s economy .
Already such concerns have led to tighter regulation 
of mortgage financing making it more difficult for 
households to purchase a home, calls for restructur-
ing or possibly doing away with federal government 
support of the private mortgage market, and sugges-
tions for restricting or eliminating the mortgage inter-
est tax deduction which privileges homeownership 
over renting . 
As a result of these forces, we decided to devote a 
chapter in this year’s Greater Boston Housing Report 
Card to a look at the history of homeownership, its 
private and social benefits, and its distribution by 
race and ethnicity . A number of important questions 
surface . Do we now run the risk of an over-reaction 
to the recent abuses in the housing market, adding 
too many barriers to homeownership and restrict-
ing access for too many households? Could this 
have a disproportionate impact on racial and ethnic 
minorities? Might this possibly further hamper a full 
economic recovery, as well as put another damper on 
the production of affordable housing nationwide and 
in our region?
Homeownership Trends in the U.S., 
Massachusetts and Greater Boston
For the U .S . as a whole, we already can detect a 
decline in homeownership rates not experienced 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s . As Figure 4.2 
reveals, the homeownership rate has already declined 














Source: U .S . Census Bureau
FIGURE 4 .1
U.S. Homeownership Rate, 1940–2005
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the nation . Moreover, recent annual Census data 
suggest that the homeownership rate in Massachu-
setts has declined only slightly since 2008 despite the 
increase in foreclosure activity noted in Chapter 2 . In 
Massachusetts, the rate declined by just 0 .4 percent-
age points between 2008 and 2010, compared to 0 .9 
percentage points decline in the U .S .2
That the Great Recession had a much less damaging 
impact on homeownership in the Commonwealth 
than the nation as a whole is due in large measure 
to the extraordinary decline in homeownership in a 
small number of states that had huge housing bubbles 
followed by massive foreclosures . Between 2006 and 
2010, when the national homeownership rate was 
falling by 1 .9 percentage points, Massachusetts actu-
ally experienced a slight increase of 0 .1 percentage 
points, from 65 .2 to 65 .3 . During the same four year 
period, Nevada experienced a 6 percentage point 
drop; Arizona a 5 point decline, and both California 
and Florida’s homeownership rates fell by more than 
3 percentage points . States in the industrial Midwest 
suffered large losses as well .3 
Homeownership in Greater Boston
Compared to other metropolitan areas, Greater 
Boston’s homeownership rate, like that of the 
Conmonwealth, had been low for decades, although 
If this rate of decline were to continue for five more 
years, homeownership nationwide would fall to a level 
not seen since 1990 .
The Massachusetts Record 
The long-term homeownership rate in Massachusetts 
has closely followed the national trend, although until 
quite recently it has remained lower than the national 
average . Within the state, as shown in Figure 4.3, the 
homeownership rate rose from 35 percent in 1900 to 
nearly 56 percent in 1960, and then grew more slowly 
through 2000 when it stood at 59 percent . Unlike the 
rest of the country, however, with an improving econ-
omy through the first half of the next decade, a better 
economic record in the second half, and taking full 
advantage of low mortgage rates and easy credit, the 
homeownership rate in the Commonwealth soared to 
65 .3 percent by 2010—nearly reaching the U .S . rate of 
66 .9 percent . 
From 1990 through 2010, the gap between the 
national average and that of the Commonwealth 
declined by more than half between 1900 and 1970—
from 11 .5 percentage points to 5 .4 points; increased 
again to 7 .5 percentage points by 2000, and then 
closed to within 2 percentage points by 2010 . This 
more or less follows the economic fortunes of the 
state, as it moved from lagging behind the nation 
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FIGURE 4 .2













Source: U .S . Census Bureau
FIGURE 4 .3
Homeownership Rates, U.S.  
vs. Massachusetts, 1900–2010
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Race, Ethnicity, and Homeownership
The rapid rise in homeownership has not been 
shared equally across racial and ethnic groups . The 
overall trend in black and white homeownership 
going back to 1900 is found in Figure 4.5 . Note that 
from 1900 through 1940, homeownership rates for 
both whites and blacks did not change very much, 
with whites about twice as likely to be homeown-
ers . Between 1940 and 1960 and then again between 
it has been steadily converging toward the national 
average (see Figure 4.4) .4 The convergence has been 
so strong over the past decade that by 2010, Greater 
Boston actually boasted a slightly higher homeown-
ership rate than the U .S . metro average . Despite the 
foreclosure crisis, Greater Boston’s homeowner-
ship rate is now at its highest level ever . The strong 
economy of the region has kept the ownership rate 
from shrinking .
FIGURE 4 .4
Homeownership Rate, Boston Metropolitan Area vs. U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 1986–2010
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homeownership rate among Asians has always been 
lower than that of whites and the national average, 
but higher that those of Hispanics and blacks . Rela-
tive to Hispanics, the homeownership among blacks 
was slighty higher between 1984 and 2004, but fell 
between 2005 and 2010 . In 2004, African-Americans 
recorded their highest homeownership rate to date 
(49 .1%), and in 2006 the Hispanic homeownership 
rate reached nearly 50 percent (49 .7) . 
Following the 1990–1991 recession, homeowner-
ship began to surge again as a result of a recovering 
economy . For black and Hispanic households, there 
were substantial gains aided by new Federal Hous-
ing Administration (FHA) policies that focused to a 
greater extent on low-income and minority borrowers .5 
According to the U .S . Government Accounting Office, 
in 1995 two-thirds of FHA’s borrowers might not have 
qualified for private mortgage insurance for the loans 
they received .6 “In 1996,” Stuart Gabriel explains, “the 
FHA insured more loans for minority borrowers than 
the private mortgage industry .”7 By the late 1990s, 
mortgage companies were offering subprime loans to 
those who would not otherwise qualify for a conven-
tional mortgage and lending standards were further 
relaxed . The black homeownership rate soared from 
just 42 .3 percent in 1994 to 49 .1 percent in 2004 . The 
1960 and 1980, homeownership rates increased 
sharply for both groups, but as Figure 4.6 reveals, 
the increase in the black rate was substantially higher 
in both periods . This great progress was due in large 
measure to the migration of southern black families 
to the North where they found jobs in defense plants 
during World War II and remained working there 
when these plants were reconverted after the war 
to produce automobiles, home appliances, tires and 
other manufactured goods . Union wages and benefits 
made it possible for many black families to afford 
their first home . This helped continue the upward 
trend in black homeownership that had begun in 
1940 . As such, by 1980 more than 45 percent of black 
households owned their own homes . 
Unfortunately, the deep back-to-back recessions 
in the early 1980s and the “deindustrialization” of 
much of the industrial Midwest during the rest of 
that decade and into the first half of the next took its 
toll, especially on black families . By 1994, the black 
homeownership rate had fallen back to just a bit 
more than 42 percent . 
Including other racial groups in the analysis allows 
for a more detailed comparison of homeownership 
rates (see Figure 4.7) . The rates for all racial groups 
share a similar pattern in that each group gradu-
ally increased their homeownership rates between 
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FIGURE 4 .6
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FIGURE 4 .7
U.S. Homeownership Rates by Race and Ethnicity 
1996–2011:1Q
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interstate disparity is due to the higher concentration 
of southern blacks in rural areas where homeown-
ership is the norm . In Massachusetts, most black 
households live in urban areas . However, even in 
the industrial Midwest, blacks are more likely to be 
homeowners . In Michigan, the rate is 50 .7 percent; in 
Ohio, 42 .6 . Only a couple of heavily urbanized states 
appear to have a lower rate of black homeownership 
than Massachusetts: in New York, the rate is 29 .1; in 
Rhode Island 28 .2 . Even then, in the fully-urbanized 
District of Columbia, nearly 39 percent of blacks 
owned homes in 2000, well above the 31 .6 percent 
rate in the Commonwealth .9
As such the black/white homeownership gap in 
Massachusetts is one of the highest in the nation . 
Nationally, in 2000, the black rate was 25 .0 percentage 
points below the non-Hispanic white rate . In Massa-
chusetts, the racial gap was 34 .3 percentage points . 
In the South, the racial gap is as low as 20 .2 points 
in Alabama and only 17 .8 points in Mississippi . The 
gap in New York in 2000 was even lower than that in 
Massachusetts: 33 .2 percentage points . 
The 2010 data indicate that the black-white gap has 
increased still further in the Commonwealth, swell-
ing to 35 .4 percentage points as the white ownership 
rate increased faster during the decade than the 
black rate .
Hispanic rate shot up from 42 .8 percent in 1996 to a 
peak of 49 .7 percent in 2006 . 
Even with the growth in subprime lending, before 
the housing bubble meltdown in 2008, the vast major-
ity of these loans were paid in full and on time with 
few foreclosures and little decline in ownership rates . 
Indeed, until 2005, according to a 2008 Boston Federal 
Reserve Bank study, an overwhelming percentage 
(82 percent) of those in Massachusetts who took out 
subprime mortgages were “successful,” insofar as 
they were able to remain in their homes and continue 
to make their monthly payments for at least a 12-year 
period or sell their homes at a profit . For those early 
into the subprime market, the foreclosure rate was less 
than 6 percent .8
After 2007, however, with the collapse of the 
housing bubble, a wave of foreclosures turned 
homeowners once again into renters . This was 
particularly true among black and Hispanic home-
owners who were more likely to have bought a 
home on the basis of a subprime mortgage . The 
black homeownership rate declined by nearly 4 
percentage points or nearly 8 percent . The Hispanic 
rate fell by more than 2 percentage points . Once 
the housing market soured and home values plum-
meted, access to subprime credit and variable rate 
mortgages turned into misfortune for the borrower 
and lender alike, contributing to the nation’s fore-
closure crisis, declining homeownership rates and 
the nation’s economic downturn . 
The Racial Homeownership Gap in 
Massachusetts
The homeownership rate among black households 
in Massachusetts is well below the rate in the nation 
and the black/white homeownership gap much 
higher . In 2000, 46 .3 percent of blacks owned their 
own homes across the country . But as Figure 4.8 
reveals, in the Commonwealth, the rate was just 31 .6 
percent in 2000 and 33 .5 percent in 2010 . This rate 
is a bit lower than in 1970 and most remarkably not 
much higher than in 1930 . Blacks are much more 
likely to be homeowners in the South, according 
to the 2000 Census . In Alabama, for example, the 
black homeownership rate is nearly 58 percent; in 




























Source: U .S . Census Bureau
FIGURE 4 .8
Massachusetts Homeownership Rate,  
Black vs. White, 1930–2010
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Why Homeownership Matters
If the form of home tenure—homeownership vs . 
rental—made little difference in the wellbeing of 
families and communities, these large racial and 
ethnic gaps might be of less concern . However, there 
are data that suggest that during normal times, when 
home values are not in free-fall, there are substan-
tial benefits that flow from homeownership to the 
individual household and to the national economy, 
and even some benefits for neighborhoods and 
communities .
Since the housing bubble burst, many have ques-
tioned the idea of homeownership itself . The key 
argument against homeownership is that it inhibits 
worker mobility in an era when mobility is important 
to give workers a chance for finding employment in 
a weak economy .12 As such, some have argued that 
homeownership is now impeding national economic 
recovery .13 Still others contend we have always valued 
homeownership too highly given that it has fostered 
environmentally unfriendly suburban homeowner 
development where the single-family home dominates 
over the alternative: energy-conserving urban apart-
ment rental units .14
Despite the backlash, there is evidence of both individ-
ual and social benefits that stem from homeownership 
including:
■■ private wealth generation
■■ increased aggregate consumption and economic 
growth
■■ improved home (and therefore community) upkeep
■■ higher rates of voting and civic engagement
■■ higher rates of academic achievement and educa-
tional attainment for students living in owner-
occupied homes . 
Individual Household Benefits
One of the most compelling arguments in favor of 
homeownership is that one’s own home is a ‘good 
investment’ in normal economic times and serves 
as a legitimate means to private individual wealth 
generation . In fact, most of the wealth possessed by 
households takes the form of housing equity and 
evidence has suggested that homeowners’ ability to 
borrow against their housing investment has helped 
The Racial Homeownership Gap in  
Greater Boston
The racial gap in Massachusetts is pretty much 
mirrored in Greater Boston as shown in Figure 4.9 .10 
In 2000, the non-Hispanic white homeownership rate 
was 67 .1 percent . This compares with a Hispanic rate 
of only 37 .3 percent and a non-Hispanic black rate 
of 40 .2 . Asians and Pacific Islanders did a bit better 
with a homeownership rate of 48 .2 percent . Hence 
the Hispanic/non-Hispanic white gap is nearly 40 
points, while the black/non-Hispanic white gap is 
close to 37 points .
These gaps are relatively large compared with metro 
areas across the country . Among the largest 100 
metropolitan regions in the U .S ., the non-Hispanic 
white homeownership rate in Greater Boston is the 
19th lowest . However, the ranking for other groups 
in Greater Boston are much lower . The Hispanic rate 
here is the 3rd lowest in the country; the same holds 
true for Asian/Pacific Islanders . Non-Hispanic blacks 
in Greater Boston do not fare much better . Their home-
ownership rate is 4th lowest among these 100 large 
metro regions .11 
Essentially, homeownership is unequally distributed 
nationwide across racial and ethnic groups and even 




















Source: U .S . Census Bureau
FIGURE 4 .9
Greater Boston Homeownership Rates  
by Race and Ethnicity, 2000
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economy in the post-World War II period that lasted 
from 1947 to 1973 . During that period, real median 
household income more than doubled in a single 
generation, by all rights the fastest increase in national 
economic prosperity in American history .17 
Social Benefits
There also exists compelling evidence that points to 
many non-financial benefits that accrue to people 
who own their own home . In some of the earliest 
investigations into homeownership, a number of 
research teams found a positive correlation among 
homeownership, life satisfaction and happiness . 18 
Others have found a positive association between 
self-esteem and homeownership after controlling for 
demographic and neighborhood context .19 Follow-up 
studies have provided more evidence to support this 
conclusion, and more robust tests have indicated that 
simply being a homeowner contributes to a positive 
perception of self .20 
While the benefits of homeownership are most 
pronounced for the individual homeowner and family, 
there is evidence to indicate that homeownership 
has positive outcomes for entire neighborhoods and 
communities . One of the most investigated relation-
ships is that among homeownership, civic engagement 
and voting . 21 Homeowners are more engaged in local 
politics and local improvement activities than renters 
and prove to be more knowledgeable about political 
leaders and issues . Low-income homeowners in disad-
vantaged neighborhoods are more likely to vote than 
renters or even homeowners living in less disadvan-
taged areas .22 
Homeownership is positively associated with “social 
capital,” the ability of individuals to access various 
financial, educational, and cultural opportunities and 
benefits .23 Social capital is often derived from the inter-
personal relationships individuals form from participa-
tion in community groups or attendance at religious 
services . According to research involving moderate 
and low-income households, homeownership is posi-
tively associated with social capital because homeown-
ers are more likely to interact with their neighbors 
and have a greater sense of ‘place attachment’ .24 
While home values do not affect voluntarism, simply 
being a homeowner is associated with higher rates of 
volunteering .25 
many families not only access capital and credit, 
but prevented them from plunging into poverty .15 
In 2004, before the housing meltdown, the middle 
20 percent of all U .S . households held an average 
of $148,400 in non-stock assets and only $7,500 in 
stocks . Non-stock assets—which are overwhelmingly 
housing equity—made up over 95 percent of their 
total wealth .16 
This suggests that renters are less likely to accumu-
late assets over their lifetime and this can hinder their 
ability to provide a nest egg for retirement or borrow 
against their home equity to begin a small business 
or pay for their own or their children’s education . To 
be sure, some renters accumulate by forsaking home-
ownership in favor of investing in the stock market 
or a private business . But the net assets of renters 
are generally much lower than those of homeown-
ers, even controlling for income . In 2007, according 
to the Federal Reserve Bank’s Survey of Consumer 
Finances, the before-tax income of the median home-
owner family was $61,700, approximately two times 
higher than the income of renters ($27,800) . The 
higher income of homeowners by itself would make 
it possible for them to save more and accumulate 
assets . But the difference in accumulated family 
assets is much larger than the difference in income . 
The mean asset holdings of homeowners in 2007 of 
$345,000, was 25 times higher than the $13,600 for 
renters . Even accounting for the fact that renters tend 
to be younger, homeownership is likely responsible 
for some of the difference between their income and 
asset positions .
Homeownership, when purchased on a 15- or 30-year 
fixed rate mortgage, also has the advantage of shield-
ing households against rising housing costs . For 
younger families who are moving up the “age-income” 
curve, that means over time their basic housing costs 
decline as a share of their household income . Renters 
usually do not have this advantage .
Economic Growth 
As we noted in Chapter 1, asset accumulation also 
helps spur personal consumption which in turn 
helps spur economic growth and employment . It is 
no surprise that there was a positive “feedback loop” 
between the rise in homeownership between 1940 
and the 1970s and the extraordinary growth in the 
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accrue simply as a result of length of residence rather 
than homeownership itself, this research controlled 
for this factor in order to measure the “net” effects of 
homeownership . 
In the Dukakis Center analysis of the NSFH data, it 
was possible to investigate the impact of homeowner-
ship on a range of factors including the respondents’ 
optimism about their own life circumstances; on 
church attendance; on getting together with neigh-
bors; on participation in group recreational activi-
ties; on the time they spend in local sports, hobby, 
and discussion groups; and in the number of times 
they participate in the activities of local service 
clubs, fraternal organizations and political groups . 
In addition to controlling for time in residence, the 
NSFH data allowed this new analysis to control for 
the income, age and education of the householder . 
Essentially, this analysis asks the following question: 
If renters had the same income, age, education, and 
residential tenure as homeowners, would they be as 
optimistic about their own lives and be as civically-
engaged as existing homeowners? Again, is there any 
benefit to homeownership per se?31 
The results of this new analysis point to a number of 
individual and social benefits that accrue to home-
owners even when compared to renters who have 
lived in the same place for nearly 10 years and have 
equivalent social-economic status (SES)—income, 
education and age . 
On the one hand, the analysis finds no difference 
between homeowners and renters in church atten-
dance, in getting together with friends or in partici-
pating in group recreational activities . On the other, 
homeowners tend to be more optimistic about their 
own futures, they participate more often in local sports 
and discussion groups, and most importantly are 
more civically engaged in service organizations, frater-
nal groups and political organizations . Here are the 
specific results:
■■ After controlling for housing tenure and SES, the 
analysis suggests that homeowners are 9 .5 percent 
more likely (6 .5/68 .3) to be optimistic about their 
futures .
■■ Before controlling for housing tenure and SES, 
37 .5% of homeowners but only 27 .2% of renters 
responded that they participated at least once a year 
in service clubs, fraternal organizations or political 
Homeownership also has been found to have a posi-
tive influence on academic achievement . The children 
of homeowners, particularly those in low-income fami-
lies, have a higher probability of staying in school than 
the children who live in rental housing because they 
are more likely to remain in the same school and not 
move from school to school .26 
While these alleged benefits of homeownership seem 
reasonable enough, housing advocates and researchers 
must be cautious when interpreting these results . As 
many scholars have pointed out, researchers investi-
gating the relationship between homeownership and 
various individual and social outcomes must be careful 
to consider the significance of an individual’s length of 
residence .27 What appears to be due to homeownership 
may simply be the result of longer tenure in one resi-
dence and neighborhood . Renters tend to move more 
often than homeowners and therefore do not build 
as strong ties to the community as the typical home-
owner . But renters who stay in the same residence 
for a long period of time may be just as active in their 
community as homeowners, in which case homeown-
ership is not the important determinant but simply a 
correlate with length of residence . 
Indeed, in at least one highly regarded study the 
authors found that homeownership was positively 
associated with a wide range of social outcomes 
including voting, working to solve local problems, 
church attendance and property maintenance, but 
when tenure was controlled for, the effects of home-
ownership largely disappeared . The authors concluded 
that long-term renters resemble homeowners, in that 
the benefits of homeownership can also accrue to non-
homeowners who live in the same place for a number 
of years .28 Other studies that have accounted for tenure 
have come to similar conclusions .29 Are the benefits 
of homeownership perhaps overrated in which case it 
would not be unreasonable to consider limiting access 
to homeownership options, including the traditional 
long-term fixed rate mortgage with no prepayment 
penalty and the mortgage interest deduction? 
To test the assertions made in the literature, the 
Dukakis Center has conducted a preliminary analy-
sis of its own, using data collected through the 
National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) 
fielded in 2001/2002 .30 Since, as the previous section 
discusses, many benefits of homeownership may 
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benefits that flow from homeownership and therefore 
there is reason to continue to encourage homeowner-
ship as a public policy goal .
Essentially, over the past 60 years the overwhelm-
ing majority of non-Hispanic white households have 
been able to become homeowners and most of them 
and their communities have benefited as a result . The 
majority of black and Hispanic households still have 
not been able to join their ranks . This is harmful to 
many families of color who could qualify for home-
ownership, it is harmful to the neighborhoods where 
they live and it reduces wealth in these communities 
which could help power consumption, investment and 
economic growth .
If, in the wake of the recent housing crisis, admittedly 
caused by overly lax lending standards and risky 
mortgage-backed securities, we move toward policies 
that dramatically lower access to mortgage finance and 
reduce the tax incentive for homeownership, we may 
find that we have overreacted . In that case, we will 
continue to experience huge disparities in homeowner-
ship by race and ethnicity and forego social benefits 
that contribute to community well-being .
In making decisions about changing the funda-
mental landscape of homeownership finance in the 
nation, policymakers need to take into account all of 
these factors . 
groups . After controlling for tenure and SES, renter 
participation appears to increase to 31 .5%, still 6 
percentage points less than homeowners . Thus, 
homeowners are 19 percent more likely to be active 
in these groups .
These are not trivial differences, especially given 
housing tenure and socio-economic controls . It is not 
entirely clear from this analysis what actually accounts 
for these statistically significant differences in sense of 
well-being and civic engagement, but it is not unrea-
sonable to believe that ownership of a substantial asset 
gives a sense of economic security in normal economic 
times and that maintaining the value of that asset 
induces homeowners to be more civically engaged in 
order to assure the quality of the neighborhood where 
they live . Unfortunately, in some cases, this turns into 
NIMBYism—“not in my backyard”—and leads to 
overly restrictive zoning practices in an effort, often 
misguided, to “maintain a neighborhood’s character .”
Conclusion
Two major conclusions follow from the data presented 
in this chapter . The first is that substantial racial and 
ethnic differences still exist in homeownership in 
America and the ownership gap is especially large in 
Massachusetts and in Greater Boston . The second is 
that there are positive individual, social and national 
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After a robust round of housing legislation passed 
at both the federal and state level in 2009-2010, the 
current year finds a public sector focused on the 
larger economic issues facing the country—unem-
ployment, global competition and, occasionally, the 
stagnant housing market—and a Congress focused 
on the national debt ceiling and no appetite for either 
increased taxes or increased spending on domestic 
programs . As a result, a number of existing federal 
housing laws are not being funded, others are up for 
repeal, and little new legislation to help meet the chal-
lenge of the national housing crisis is being brought 
out of committee and taken to a vote . This is particu-
larly true of legislation that could have helped deal 
with rental housing, the segment of Greater Boston’s 
housing market most in need of assistance . We still 
may see a more aggressive attempt at dealing with the 
foreclosure crisis if Congress agrees to go along with 
President Obama’s plan for homeowner relief, but 
even this legislation may be stalled .
While there were some bright spots on the Common-
wealth’s side, including public support to retain Chap-
ter 40B and level funding or better for state housing 
programs, in 2011 Massachusetts and the rest of the 
country are suffering the loss of federal stimulus fund-
ing under the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 which helped plug the gap in state funding 
for housing programs in 2009–2010 . With the excep-
tion of some hoped-for construction starts in Chapter 
40R Smart Growth Zoning Districts and Chapter 40B 
communities, 2012 is also likely to be a challenging 
year for housing in Massachusetts . 
Recent Advances in State Housing  
Policy—Saving 40B 
Indeed, during the past year, the best thing that 
happened to housing in the Commonwealth was not 
so much new legislation as the successful defense 
of Chapter 40B . The Housing Report Card for 2010 
covered in detail the history, goals and accomplish-
ments of Chapter 40B, The Massachusetts Comprehensive 
Permit and Zoning Appeals Act, first enacted in 1969 . By 
mid-2010, Chapter 40B had supported the develop-
ment of more than 1,000 projects with more than 58,000 
housing units and has been considered one of the most 
important tools for affordable housing development in 
Massachusetts . It also has generated significant contro-
versy at the local community level, leading to a ballot 
initiative in November 2010 aimed at repealing this 
particular zoning law statute in the Commonwealth .
According to the University of Massachusetts Donahue 
Institute, the economic benefits of Chapter 40B have 
been formidable .1 To sum up their report’s findings on 
the subject:
■■ In the last decade, nearly 22,000 homes have been 
built under the Massachusetts Affordable Housing 
Law . 
■■ These new homes have resulted in almost 50,000 
jobs and $9.25 billion in economic activity over the 
past 10 years alone . 
■■ Proposed construction of Chapter 40B homes and 
the resulting economic linkages is projected to result 
in total expenditures of $10.42 billion and 54,307 
jobs in the coming years . 
In summing up, the Institute noted that “Chapter 
40B has resulted in a significant economic benefit for 
Massachusetts and is achieving its goals of provid-
ing housing for low- and middle-income seniors and 
families .”
As part of the effort to defeat the November ballot 
question that would repeal Chapter 40B in the 
Commonwealth, the CHTF research staff at the Duka-
kis Center prepared an analysis of the impact of Chap-
ter 40B developments on median home values and 
median household income . This research was prepared 
to test the claim that the location of 40B developments 
in a community had adverse impacts on neighborhood 
“quality of life .” 
Data were gathered on median home values and 
median household income in 1980 and 2000 for each 
of 350 municipalities (out of the 351) in Massachusetts, 
5.
Public Policy and Public Spending in Support of Housing
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to make housing assistance, not shelter, the primary 
response to assisting families that are homeless .3 The 
new HomeBASE Program offers an alternative to shel-
ter centers and motels to families who are at serious 
risk of homelessness . 
Both the Massachusetts House and Senate agreed on 
the following components of the HomeBASE program, 
which became effective as emergency legislation on 
July 28, 2011:
■■ Families that face homelessness and are served 
with HomeBASE short-term rental assistance may 
secure rental housing with the help of regional 
nonprofits and the Central Massachusetts Housing 
Alliance . These families will pay no more than 35 
percent of their income towards rent and utilities 
when they are enrolled in the program . Families 
also can receive assistance of up to $4,000 to avoid 
homelessness if they do not need continuous rental 
assistance . HomeBASE assistance is capped at three 
continuous years . 
■■ HomeBASE-eligible families can earn no more than 
115 percent of the federal poverty level, but if they 
are successful in increasing their incomes while 
utilizing the program, families can earn up to 50 
percent of area median income without being termi-
nated from the program . 
■■ Families utilizing HomeBASE will be assigned 
a stabilization worker and receive stabilization 
services . The program administrators will be able 
to subcontract with other service providers to assist 
with stabilization services . 
■■ Families that seek HomeBASE assistance must be 
provided with temporary housing or shelter while 
they wait to secure an apartment . 
■■ HomeBASE rental housing costs should not exceed 
80 percent of the established Fair Market Rent, with 
some opportunity for flexibility if that maximum 
rent level is a barrier to securing housing .
This is an important piece of legislation, beyond its 
obvious value to families facing homelessness . It is a 
clear statement by the Commonwealth that homeless 
shelters are not the preferred solution to homeless-
ness—permanent housing is .
along with data on which of these communities had 
one or more 40B developments in place during this 
time period .
Using multiple regression analysis to test the impact 
of a 40B project on these two variables, the Dukakis 
Center reported that there was “absolutely no statisti-
cal evidence linking 40B developments to any differ-
ence in the change in median home values or median 
household incomes .” On average, communities with 
40B developments experienced increases in home 
values and household incomes that were no different 
from communities without 40B developments .2 
In large part due to the work of the Campaign to Protect 
the Affordable Housing Law, the ballot measure to repeal 
Chapter 40B was soundly defeated in November of 
2010 . The decisive electoral victory of 58 percent to 42 
percent was the largest margin of any ballot campaign . 
More than 1,249,600 voters and more than 80 percent 
of cities and towns affirmed their support for protect-
ing the affordable housing law for seniors and working 
families in urban, suburban and rural communities all 
across the state . 
The referendum vote maintains this critical tool to 
produce affordable housing in the Commonwealth 
and will allow the Commonwealth to expand the 
amount of affordable housing that can be built in 
the future . Furthermore, the voters sent a strong 
message to elected officials that Massachusetts citizens 
support affordable housing and this issue should be 
a top priority for government attention in the coming 
years .  
New State Housing Programs and Legislation
While not at the same intensity as last year, there has 
been important activity at the state level in Massachu-
setts during 2010–2011 in recognition of market factors 
that demand attention to issues of housing in the 
Commonwealth . 
The HomeBASE Program
With an increase in homelessness in the Common-
wealth, and informed by the report of the Special 
Commission Relative to Ending Homelessness in the 
Commonwealth, as part of their FY 2012 budgets, both 
the Massachusetts House and Senate adopted the 
Patrick-Murray Administration’s HomeBASE proposal 
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Legislation to Promote Innovative Strategies  
in Public Housing 
Also several years under consideration, a bill to 
change the way public housing is administered was 
filed by Rep . Jeffrey Sanchez (D-Boston) and Sen . 
Harriet Chandler (D-Worcester) .5 This legislation 
would reduce and streamline regulatory and statu-
tory requirements for participating housing authori-
ties . By not restricting the use of appropriated funds 
to one narrow purpose, housing authorities would be 
able to more effectively address local needs, which 
differ by locality . The bill also would authorize inno-
vative program design on issues such as rent calcula-
tion to reduce the administrative burden and cost on 
the housing authority, and to lighten the burden on 
tenants to produce the personal information often 
necessary to document income and exclusions . 
In the 2010 legislative session, the bill was reported 
favorably by the Housing Committee . However, the 
legislation, H .4544, did not advance from the House 
Committee on Ways and Means . In the 2011 session, 
the Housing Committee favorably reported the legisla-
tion once again . The Senate version is currently before 
the Senate Committee on Ways and Means and the 
House version is before the House Committee on 
Ways and Means . Affordable housing advocates have 
been supportive of this legislation as a way to promote 
innovative strategies to manage and rehabilitate state 
public housing, an extremely important resource of 
more than 46,000 units of state-aided low-income 
public housing .
An Act to Stabilize Neighborhoods (The Foreclosure 
Relief Bill) 
In August of 2010, the Massachusetts Legislature 
passed, and Governor Patrick signed, An Act to Stabi-
lize Neighborhoods to provide foreclosure relief to the 
many households affected by mortgage foreclosures 
in the state .6 This important legislation included the 
following provisions: 
■■ Delay a foreclosure by an additional 60 days (to 150 
days) if the financial institution neglects to consider 
a loan modification 
■■ Protect lawful tenants of foreclosed properties from 
unnecessary displacement so long as the tenant pays 
rent to the lender . The protections end when there is 
An Act Relative to Community Housing and Services
Filed by Sen . Patricia Jehlen (D-Somerville) in the 
Massachusetts Senate and by Rep . Kevin Honan 
(D-Boston) in the House, this legislation could lead 
to the development of up to 1,000 units of Support-
ive Housing in Massachusetts over the next three 
years . Supportive Housing—defined as affordable 
housing linked with supportive services designed to 
help tenants with modest incomes to maintain hous-
ing stability and maximize their independence—is 
a national best practice to end homelessness and 
is critical to enabling persons with disabilities and 
seniors with service needs to live independently in the 
community .
In order to build supportive housing for people with 
disabilities, elders or extremely low-income house-
holds, a developer must now access three separate 
pools of funds through multiple applications to cover 
capital costs, operating expenses, and supportive 
services . This consensus proposal coordinates the 
process to build supportive housing by establishing 
formal relationships and shared principles among  
the relevant state agencies involved in the process .  
A Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association 
(CHAPA) press release of July 21, 2010, describes  
this legislation as 
aim[ing] to increase the state’s focus on the 
development of permanent supportive housing . 
The legislation calls on the Administration to 
determine numeric benchmarks for the creation 
of supportive housing, charges them with creat-
ing an efficient and effective application process 
for creating supportive that eliminates govern-
ment silos, and establishes a target of 1,000 units 
of new supportive housing over the next 3 years . 
The legislation does not include any costs to the 
Commonwealth, but provides a more efficient 
framework to utilize current resources to benefit 
residents that need affordable housing and 
services .4
This statute could have a powerful effect on the abil-
ity of both nonprofit and for-profit developers to 
produce housing for an often-neglected segment of 
the housing market . The bill was passed by the Senate 
on July 21, 2011, and referred to House Ways and 
Means for action .
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DHCD promulgated regulations for the implementa-
tion of Chapter 40T on May 21, 2010, and as of July 
of 2011, the Commonwealth’s Community Economic 
Development Assistance Corporation (CEDAC) had 
received the required 40T Notifications from 81 proj-
ects with 12,544 total housing units, of which 11,073 
are affordable .10 It is too early to know how many 
of these projects will be offered to DHCD for sale or 
how much affordability will be maintained, but 40T 
goes the furthest of any Commonwealth effort to date 
to prevent the loss of as many expiring use units as 
possible . 
Chapter 40R
Now in force for more than five years, Chapter 40R is 
the “carrot” to Chapter 40B’s “stick .” The law comple-
ments 40B by encouraging municipalities to create 
specific “smart growth” zoning districts that allow for 
higher density housing development near transit, in 
town centers or on underdeveloped land, in return for 
additional state-provided local aid . The definition of 
smart growth includes mixed-use developments, open 
space and low-income housing availability . 
As of August of 2011, 31 cities and towns in Massa-
chusetts had approved Smart Growth Districts under 
Chapter 40R, 20 of which are in the Greater Boston 
area . With Reading and Marblehead each approving a 
second 40R District in their towns, the total number of 
40R districts now stands at 33 . The approved districts 
account for more 12,000 units that could be built as-of-
right when developers begin constructing housing 
again . More than 7,500 of these potential units are in 
Greater Boston . The as-of-right provision is especially 
important because it will allow developers to move 
more quickly once economic conditions improve and 
housing demand accelerates .
For the time being, it remains difficult to judge the true 
long-term impact of the program because we have no 
indication of when and if these 40R units will actu-
ally be constructed given the weakened economy and 
relatively weak housing demand . However, as of June 
2011, more than 1,400 units had been issued building 
permits in Chapter 40R districts, even in the midst of 
these difficult economic times . Given the reduction in 
the rental vacancy rate and the concomitant increase 
in rents in recent months, it is fair to expect that 2011-
2012 will see an increase in construction starts in Chap-
ter 40R districts .
a purchase and sale contract for the lender to sell the 
property 
■■ Criminalize willful acts of mortgage fraud 
■■ Mandate that a lender assumes a Massachusetts 
Rental Voucher Program rental assistance payment 
contract 
■■ Create a local option for municipalities to forgive 
property taxes on foreclosed properties acquired by 
nonprofits during the term of the rehabilitation
■■ Require in-person counseling for reverse mortgages 
beginning in 2012
It is more than likely that the sharp reduction in fore-
closure petitions beginning in September 2010 noted 
in Chapter 2 was related to this effort . In its quarterly 
look at distressed property levels, Foreclosure Moni-
tor found that the number of housing units in distress 
dropped 14 percent in Massachusetts from April 1, 
2010, to April 1, 2011 .7 
Chapter 40T 
In the making for more than 20 years, the Afford-
able Housing Preservation Bill was signed into law on 
November 24, 2009 . It contains requirements affecting 
owners of covered subsidized properties, including the 
requirement of a notice of intent to sell any property 
with an expiring affordability restriction .8 As reported 
by the John D . and Catherine T . MacArthur Founda-
tion, approximately 41,000 units of subsidized rental 
housing throughout Massachusetts may lose their 
affordability restrictions by 2019 as a result of prepay-
ments, opt-outs and, increasingly, the expiration of 
subsidized 40-year mortgages .9 In order to prevent this 
where possible, Chapter 40T provides: 
■■ additional notification requirements as a building 
gets closer to use restriction termination 
■■ an opportunity for the Massachusetts Department 
of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) 
or its designee to purchase publicly assisted housing 
that is for sale if the proposed private sector transac-
tion does not preserve affordability
■■ a maximum level that rents can be raised for a 
period of three years after a building’s use restric-
tions terminate if the tenants do not receive 
enhanced Section 8 vouchers .
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and operation of rental housing units for the lowest 
income households in the nation . It is the first federal 
rental housing production program proposed to be 
specifically targeted to extremely low income house-
holds since the Section 8 voucher program was estab-
lished in 1974 . Given the high and ever-increasing cost 
of rental units in Greater Boston, the NHTF could be a 
boon for the region and the Commonwealth if it were 
ever funded .
Under the proposed Act:
■■ Production of housing would be targeted for house-
holds who have incomes from 30 to 50 percent 
of area median income, including those facing 
homelessness
■■ At least 90 percent of the funds would be used for 
the production, preservation, rehabilitation or the 
operation of rental housing
■■ Up to 10 percent could be used for homeownership 
activities for extremely low or very low income first-
time homebuyers including down payment and 
closing cost assistance and assistance for interest 
rate buy-downs
■■ At least 75 percent of the funds for rental housing 
would benefit extremely low-income households 
(those with incomes at or below 30 percent of area 
median income) or households with incomes below 
the federal poverty line .
More than 2,250 organizations representing every 
Congressional district have signed a letter in support 
of capitalizing this critical priority program . None-
theless, and to the great dismay of supporters of the 
NHTF, on July 12, 2011, the Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises of 
the House Committee on Financial Services marked-
up H .R . 2441, the Housing Trust Fund Elimination Act 
of 2011. The bill to eliminate the NHTF was voted out 
of subcommittee to continue through the legislative 
process .
Housing Preservation and Tenant Protection Act  
of 2010 
On July 28, 2010, the House Financial Services 
Committee approved H .R . 4868, the Housing Preser-
vation and Tenant Protection Act of 2010, but the bill 
failed to pass the Congress in 2010 and died during 
the session in 2011 .11 This comprehensive affordable 
Indeed, the first signs of new construction under 40R 
can be found in one of the two approved 40R districts 
in the Town of Reading . Oaktree Development is 
nearing construction for a 53-unit multifamily in this 
downtown location . A second project, proposed for 
Reading’s other 40R district, originally called Addison-
Wesley and now called Gateway, should soon get 
underway . Pulte Homes has submitted plans to the 
town seeking to develop more than 400 condominium 
and townhouse units, only 200 of which will be age-
restricted . A percentage of the development will be 
within the 40R district . 
Given the difficulty of getting communities to accept 
more rental housing, particularly for younger families, 
the associated Chapter 40S providing for special state 
“school cost insurance” for those communities adopt-
ing 40R and finding large increases in public education 
expenses . It should help assure that when additional 
housing is developed, it will not be restricted to age-
restricted housing for older households .
Given the adoption of 40R districts in many parts of 
the state, the Trust Fund established to encourage 
districts to adopt this measure is nearly depleted . Of 
the $15 .2 million allotted since 2007, only $1 .5 million 
remains in the Trust Fund as of June 30, 2011 . As 
such, unless more funds are allocated to the fund it is 
possible that the state will not be able to honor its 40R 
commitments to existing adopters and no additional 
communities will join the program . 
Recent Events in Federal Housing Policy
There is, unfortunately, little help on the housing 
front coming from Washington . Indeed, if new hous-
ing legislation is approved by Congress, it is likely to 
be aimed at reversing policies that could have helped 
increase the amount of affordable housing . Bills were 
filed recently to eliminate critically-needed programs 
such as the National Housing Trust Fund and the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit .
National Housing Trust Fund
The National Housing Trust Fund was created as 
part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 
but there have been no efforts to capitalize it . Now it 
is facing tough opposition in the current Congress . 
NHTF would support the production, preservation 
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property while not requiring owners to sell their 
properties or prevent them from obtaining fair 
market value
■■ Allowed owners to request project-based assistance 
in lieu of enhanced vouchers, which serves to help 
preserve the long-term affordability of the project, 
assist with capital for rehabilitation, and ensure that 
tenants are not displaced
■■ Allowed owners to receive budget-based rent 
increases, thus ensuring that the properties are 
adequately maintained and encouraging owners to 
renew Section 8 contracts
■■ Closed gaps in existing law to ensure that all 
low- and moderate-income tenants are eligible for 
enhanced vouchers in the event that the assisted 
housing is converted to market rate housing
■■ Given HUD and affordable housing providers the 
tools needed to recapitalize the aging Section 202 
elderly housing portfolio
Clearly, this legislation could have yielded a number 
of key benefits to current low and moderate income 
renters, including many in Greater Boston . 
Livable Communities Legislation 
On August 3, 2010, the Senate Banking Committee 
passed Chairman Chris Dodd’s Livable Communities Act 
(S . 1619) to improve the coordination between housing, 
community development, transportation, energy and 
environmental policies to help create better places to 
live, work and raise families .12 In what is becoming a 
familiar pattern, this bill also never became law .
The bill was designed to promote sustainable devel-
opment and enable communities to reduce traffic 
congestion; cut greenhouse gas emissions and oil 
consumption; protect farmland and green spaces; revi-
talize existing Main Streets and urban centers; spur 
economic development; and create more affordable 
housing . If enacted, this piece of legislation would 
have been a natural complement to Massachusetts’ 
Chapter 40R Smart Growth Zoning and Housing Produc-
tion Act, but it is apparently dead at least as part of the 
FY2012 budget .
Neighborhood Stabilization Program 
A third round of the Neighborhood Stabilization 
Program (“NSP3”) was passed in 2010 with several 
housing legislation, introduced by then Chairman 
Barney Frank of Massachusetts, would have helped 
to stem the loss of affordable rental housing units 
across the country and prevent the displacement of 
low-income tenants, many of whom are elderly or 
disabled . Some short-term fixes have been approved or 
proposed in appropriation bills, including the recently 
approved Senate appropriations bill which will 
continue to allow the provision of enhanced vouchers 
for tenants in projects with maturing mortgages (see 
below) .
Since the 1950s, HUD has subsidized 1 .7 million 
rental units in more than 23,000 privately-owned, 
multi-family properties that are typically affordable 
to low-income tenants . Many of these units are more 
than 40 years old and in need of recapitalization . A 
2004 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 
found that more than 193,000 subsidized units were 
projected to become market rate housing in the next 
10 years when the HUD-subsidized mortgage matures 
and the mortgage subsidy and low-income afford-
ability restrictions attached to the property terminate . 
GAO estimated that approximately 200,000 individuals 
in more than 101,000 units would be at risk of paying 
higher rents because there were no existing tenant 
protections (such as enhanced vouchers) to protect 
the tenants from paying higher rents or being evicted 
when the mortgage matures . The bill that failed to 
pass muster in the Congress addressed the issues 
outlined in the GAO report . It also addressed a host 
of other issues related to protecting the significant 
investment made by the federal government in help-
ing to construct and maintain housing for low- and 
moderate-income tenants, many of whom are elderly 
or disabled . If the bill had passed, a number of its 
provisions would have:
■■ Provided resources and incentives to prevent the 
further loss of affordable housing units
■■ Provided grants and loans to for-profit and non-
profit housing sponsors to help ensure the property 
is recapitalized and kept affordable
■■ Established a voluntary Preservation Exchange 
Program to encourage owners to sell properties to 
purchasers who will keep the housing affordable
■■ Established a first right of refusal that provides state 
housing agencies with an opportunity to purchase 
a property from an owner who wishes to sell their 
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Rep .Water’s bill was referred to the House Committee 
on Financial Services, and was further referred to the 
Subcommittee on Insurance, Housing and Community 
Opportunity, where it is under consideration at this 
time .17 This legislation has as its goals:
■■ To reform public housing demolition and disposi-
tion rules to require one-for-one replacement and 
tenant protections 
■■ To provide public housing agencies with additional 
resources and flexibility to preserve public housing 
units, and 
■■ To create a pilot program to train public housing 
residents to provide home-based health services .18
Again, given the Congress’ current fixation with the 
federal deficit and debt, it is unlikely that this legis-
lation will be implemented, despite the deteriorat-
ing condition of public housing in many parts of the 
country .
Filed by Sen . Robert Menendez (D-New Jersey) in 
March 2011, S . 624: The Choice Neighborhoods Initiative 
Act of 2011was referred to the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, where it is under consid-
eration . This piece of legislation would authorize the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development to 
transform neighborhoods of extreme poverty into 
sustainable, mixed-income neighborhoods with access 
to economic opportunities by revitalizing severely 
distressed housing, and investing and leveraging 
investments in well-functioning services, educational 
opportunities, public assets, public transportation and 
improved access to jobs .19 
Closely related to this program concept, the Presi-
dent’s FY 2012 budget renews its request for funding 
for the Transforming Rental Assistance (TRA) initia-
tive . The budget proposes $200 million to fund a 
demonstration to test conversion of public housing to 
either Project-Based Vouchers or some other form of 
project-based assistance under Section 8 . Through the 
demonstration, HUD intends to convert up to 263,000 
units, including 255,000 units of public housing . The 
language in the budget proposal remains very broad, 
allowing the Secretary to “waive, or specify alternative 
requirements for, any provision that governs the use of 
assistance from which a property is converted pursu-
ant to this heading .” The budget states that partici-
pation in the demonstration will be voluntary and 
important amendments to the program .13 First passed 
in 2008, NSP has been an important tool for commu-
nities and nonprofits attempting to deal with the 
problems of foreclosed properties in the wake of the 
financial market collapse in 2008 . The basic program 
provided that NSP funds may be used for activities 
which include, but are not limited to:
■■ Establishing financing mechanisms for the purchase 
and redevelopment of foreclosed homes and resi-
dential properties 
■■ Purchasing and rehabilitating homes and residential 
properties that are abandoned or foreclosed 
■■ Establishing land banks for foreclosed homes
■■ Demolishing blighted structures 
■■ Redeveloping demolished or vacant properties 
The 2010 Act provided for $1 billion in spending with 
up to 2 percent set aside for technical assistance . In 
2011, the Commonwealth received a grant under NSP3 
of $6,190,994 .14 The city of Springfield, MA, received an 
additional $1 .2 million bringing the total to just under 
$7 .4 million for Massachusetts this year .15 Whether this 
legislation will be maintained in the future is still in 
doubt and it is unlikely that more funds will be allo-
cated to this program .
Public Housing Legislation
One of the most difficult issues affecting affordable 
housing nationally is the number of low-income 
public housing units that are substandard, function-
ally obsolete or otherwise uninhabitable or unmar-
ketable . Bringing all of these units up to current 
standards is not possible, given the amount of federal 
funding that would be required, and housing prac-
titioners have for years been testing out approaches 
to finance the amount of work necessary . The U .S . 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 
new study on capital needs in public housing found 
that the nation’s 1 .2 million public housing units need 
an estimated $25 .6 billion for large scale repairs to 
improve basic living conditions for residents .16 Two 
approaches currently under consideration would 
harness the power of private capital markets to make 
this possible .
The Public Housing Reinvestment and Tenant Protec-
tion Act of 2011 was filed by Rep . Maxine Waters 
(D-California) in February of 2011 . In April of 2011, 
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families and seniors of a decent place to live and 
would eliminate thousands of jobs . More than 550 
organizations signed on in support of this rebuttal .23 
The President’s Budget for FY2012, released in Febru-
ary of 2011, maintains support for the Low-income 
Housing Tax Credit program . 
So far, at least, there has been no action on Sen . 
Coburn’s bill, but in looking at ways to “close tax 
loopholes,” it is possible that the Congressional Debt 
Reduction Committee will include elimination of at 
least some of these programs in their recommenda-
tions . This could be devastating to the future produc-
tion of affordable housing .
HOME Investment Partnerships Program
HOME is the largest federal block grant to state and 
local governments explicitly created to encourage 
the production of affordable housing for low-income 
households . Its annual budget has been on the order of 
$2 billion .24 According to CHAPA, both the U .S . House 
and Senate versions of the FY2012 budget subject this 
program to deep cuts . 
Section 8 Vouchers: The Section 8 Savings Act (SESA)
The Section 8 Voucher program has proven itself over 
the years since its inception in 1974 to be one of the 
most important of the housing subsidy programs for 
low- and moderate-income households . Under the 
Section 8 Voucher program, eligible households pay 
30 percent of their income for rent, with HUD making 
up the difference, up to an approved Fair Market Rent . 
Section 8 relies upon the private market to produce the 
units, with the rental subsidies administered by public 
housing agencies .
The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) 
in Washington, DC, describes the program as “the 
nation’s most widely used form of low-income hous-
ing assistance, help[ing] roughly two million low-
income families afford modest rental units of their 
choice in the private market . Studies have shown that 
vouchers are highly effective in reducing homeless-
ness and housing instability (both of which have been 
linked to a range of developmental problems among 
children) and help families move to lower-poverty 
neighborhoods with better schools and less exposure 
to crime .”25 
the selection process will be competitive (except for 
properties currently assisted under RAP, Rent Supple-
ment, or Moderate Rehab), but it does not provide 
additional information on what selection criteria will 
be employed .20 
Although there is much debate among housing profes-
sionals and elected officials about the specifics of vari-
ous programmatic approaches, the basic idea carries 
promise for reclaiming low-income public housing 
units—an almost irreplaceable asset for people in need . 
HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan has stated that the 
absence of a viable preservation strategy for public 
housing has led to the loss of 150,000 units through 
demolition or sale over the last 15 years . Debate about 
this approach is likely to continue for some time, but it 
is unlikely that positive action will be taken on any of 
these proposals .
Low Income Housing Tax Credits 
Provisions in the 2009 Stimulus Bill (the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act or “ARRA”) had a 
significant and powerful effect on the ability of devel-
opers to monetize low income housing tax credits 
(LIHTC) and start construction on hundreds of afford-
able housing projects in Massachusetts and across the 
country . More than $144 .5 million has been expended 
from ARRA tax credit funding programs in Massa-
chusetts .21 Unfortunately, this stimulus funding has all 
been exhausted . 
Until funding is approved for the National Housing 
Trust Fund – an unlikely prospect—LIHTC remains 
the primary method for supporting new construction 
and rehabilitation of housing for low- and moderate-
income households . Unfortunately, this critical piece 
of existing legislation has come under attack in 
Congress .
In July of 2011, Sen . Tom Coburn (R-Oklahoma) 
released his proposed “Back in Black: A Deficit 
Reduction Plan,” which, among other tax reforms, 
proposes the elimination of the low-income hous-
ing tax credit (LIHTC), (along with the new markets 
tax credit (NMTC), historic preservation tax credit 
(HTC) and renewable energy tax credits (RETCs)) .22 In 
response, The Affordable Housing Tax Credit Coali-
tion (AHTCC) sent a detailed rebuttal of this proposal 
to other lawmakers . The AHTCC warned that repeal-
ing the LIHTC would deprive millions of low-income 
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bill . It includes a provision that would eliminate 
federal funds to continue to maintain public housing 
units that have been newly federalized . According 
to CHAPA, 48 state public housing developments 
with 3,856 units at 19 local housing authorities in the 
Commonwealth were approved for federalization . 
In the summer of 2010, 28 of these developments 
including nearly 1,700 units completed the federaliza-
tion process, using about $4 million in state grants .28 
According to CHAPA, under the proposed T-HUD 
budget, these units will no longer be eligible to receive 
federal operating and capital support . If this occurs, 
these housing units will be at severe risk of being taken 
off-line, depriving thousands of families of public 
housing .
For FY 2012, the President proposed a budget that 
reduces federal public operating housing funds and 
did not seek additional funding for supportive services 
to public housing residents beyond that which can be 
supported by operating subsidy accounts, but it did 
increase the capital budget for public housing margin-
ally . The budget includes:
■■ Operating Subsidies: The President’s FY 2012 budget 
requests $3 .962 billion for the Operating Fund for 
2012 (down from $4 .83 billion in FY11) . According 
to HUD’s budget justifications, this figure repre-
sents 79 .8 percent of eligibility under the current 
Operating Fund formula . However, the President’s 
budget also proposes an offset totaling $1 billion 
of Public Housing Administration (PHA) “excess” 
operating reserves . The requested appropriations, 
in combination with offset reserves, would be suffi-
cient to provide each agency with 100 percent of 
their formula eligibility .29 The House appropriations 
subcommittee has recommended a funding level 
that is $100 million below the President’s request, 
while the Senate Appropriations Committee has 
funded the program at the President’s request level . 
Both bills rely on HUD’s proposal to require public 
housing authorities to use excess operating reserves 
to fill the gap, but the Senate puts more restrictions 
on the extent to which HUD can order PHAs to use 
these reserves . 
■■ Capital Grants: The President’s FY 2012 budget 
requests $2 .405 billion for the Public Housing Capi-
tal Fund, with $2 .365 billion to be applied toward 
formula grants . The top-line request represents a 
reduction of $95 million from the FY 2010 enacted 
The Section 8 program has been used extensively 
in Massachusetts since 1974, when the state and its 
housing authorities became “early adopters” of the 
program . There are currently approximately 72,300 
tenant-based mobile Section 8 vouchers in use in Massa-
chusetts, plus nearly 57,500 project-based vouchers 
(including moderate rehabilitation projects) in afford-
able housing developments in the state, so that a total 
of nearly 130,000 households in Massachusetts benefit 
from the Section 8 program .26
On the positive side, Rep . Judy Biggert (R-Illinois), 
chair of the U .S . House Financial Services subcom-
mittee responsible for housing, released a draft of the 
Section 8 Savings Act (SESA) on June 16, 2011 . Similar 
in some respects to the Section 8 Voucher Reform 
Act (SEVRA), approved by the House Financial 
Services Committee in July 2009 but never enacted 
by the Congress, SESA would strengthen the hous-
ing voucher program . SESA’s reforms are focused on 
enabling state and local agencies to stretch limited 
funds to help more needy families (or avoid harsh 
cutbacks), ease administrative burdens on agencies 
and private owners, and support working families . 
Even though the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
estimates that passage of SESA could save more 
than $700 million in budget authority over five years 
through streamlining housing agency policies and 
procedures, it is not clear that this bill has a chance of 
passage in Congress . 27
Public Housing Budget Provisions 
Massachusetts has almost 40,000 federal public hous-
ing units which need ongoing funding for operations, 
repairs, modernization and resident services . The 
state’s public housing stock is generally older than in 
other parts of the country, placing it at greater risk of 
deterioration without reinvestment . This resource is 
extremely important because it provides permanent 
housing for some of the region’s lowest income fami-
lies, elders and people with disabilities who could 
not otherwise afford to rent apartments in the private 
market . Underfunded for many years, the public hous-
ing budget is always of great importance to housing 
advocates across the country .
Of special concern to Massachusetts is the FY2012 
House Transportation, Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, and Related Agencies (T-HUD) Appropriations 
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variety of federal programs . A large chunk of the 
state’s funds used for housing are annual operating 
funds; the remainder is capital or trust funds used for 
investment in public housing and to subsidize afford-
able housing construction . All of these funds are 
processed through the state’s Department of Housing 
and Community Development (DHCD) . State-funded 
operating funds are used largely to pay for admin-
istration of the agency, for rental assistance, and for 
public housing subsidies . In addition, in FY2010, 
operating funds for homelessness programs were 
shifted from the Department of Transitional Assis-
tance to DHCD .
Federally-financed funds extended to DHCD are used 
for such programs as the Section 8 rental voucher 
program, for new housing development and rehabili-
tation, for energy assistance and for various neigh-
borhood stabilization programs . For fiscal years 2010 
through 2012, DHCD has received funds from the 
federal American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 
for a range of programs, including the Homelessness 
and Rapid Re-Housing Program, Low Income Hous-
ing Tax Credits and weatherization programs . This is 
a declining resource, as DHCD received $357 million 
in FY2010 and $181 million in FY2011 . ARRA funding 
will decline further in FY2012 . Altogether, DHCD had 
$1 .3 billion in FY2011 to spend on housing, homeless-
ness and community services .
DHCD Operating Funds
In 1990, the state spent $386 million of its own funds 
on housing programs through DHCD’s operating 
budget (in FY2011 dollars) . Beginning in 1991, the 
amount declined an average of 14 percent per year, 
so that by 1994, the state was spending only about 
half the amount annually—$207 million . Over the 
next eight years, operating spending for housing 
continued to decline, but at a slower pace of 2 percent 
per year, and some of this decline was balanced with 
increases in capital spending through state bonds . 
By 2002, spending of operating funds was down to 
$172 million . Over the next two years, state spending 
on housing was slashed to just $79 million in 2004 . 
From 2004 to 2008, operating funds were increased to 
DHCD, but 2008 funding ($158 million) was still less 
than 2002 .
The current recession and the state’s fiscal crisis have 
taken a toll on the state share of DHCD operating 
level of $2 .5 billion, but the request is an increase of 
$361 million more than the President’s request for 
FY 2011 .30 The House appropriations subcommittee 
has proposed cutting funding to $1 .53 billion (25% 
less than the FY2011 appropriation) and the Senate 
appropriations committee has proposed providing 
$1 .875 million (an 8% cut ) .
Although this is good news in the sense that the 
request is moving in the right direction, the total capi-
tal needs of the country’s public housing, as indicated 
earlier are estimated at $20 to $30 billion or more than 
10 times the budget requested for FY2012. In general, in 
these tight fiscal times, public housing is nowhere near 
as high a priority as many housing advocates believe it 
should be . 
Rental Assistance Demonstration Program
One last piece of proposed legislation by the U .S . 
Senate authorizes a demonstration program to 
convert up to 60,000 public housing units to project-
based Section 8 units but provides no additional 
funding . Unlike the HUD proposal, the demonstra-
tion would be limited to public housing . Projects are 
to be chosen competitively and HUD must ensure 
awardees are diverse both geographically and in 
portfolio size, and HUD must also evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the program as a method to recapitalize 
public housing . The authorization runs until Septem-
ber 30, 2015 . The language in the bill directs HUD to 
use existing resources, with increases in Section 8 to 
be funded by reductions in public housing operat-
ing and capital funds . The accompanying Committee 
Report says the reductions should be directly related 
to the units in the demonstration . It is unclear how 
this would work (i .e ., will future rental assistance 
funding depend on future public housing funding 
levels) and if it is workable .
In any case, most of this legislation lies dormant for the 
foreseeable future as the Congress turns its attention 
almost exclusively to deficit reduction .
Public Spending on Housing in  
the Commonwealth 
The Commonwealth has two sources of funds to 
assist homeowners, renters and developers of hous-
ing . One is from its own revenue, the other from a 
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million HomeBASE program, which provides short-
term rental assistance and services instead of shelter 
beds or motel rooms . The combined FY2012 funding 
of these programs will be $136 million, higher than the 
EA budgeted funds for FY2011, but less than actual 
FY2011 spending . The provision of rental assistance is 
considered more cost effective than shelters or motels . 
Federal Spending through DHCD
From FY1989 to FY1999, inflation-adjusted federal 
spending through DHCD was relatively stable, with 
the exception of double-digit increases in FY1991 
and FY1994 (see Figure 5.2) . From FY1999 to FY2004, 
federal spending increased 60 percent ($180 million), to 
$482 million (FY2011 dollars), but then declined to $449 
million in FY2008 . Federal funds flowing to DHCD 
jumped to $620 million in FY2009 and $644 million in 
FY2010 . An additional $364 million was made avail-
able to DHCD during FY2010, and $180 million in 
FY2011, as part of the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act (ARRA) . As such, the total amount of 
federal funds allocated to DHCD increased from $449 
million in FY2008 to just over $1 billion in FY2010 . In 
addition, Washington supplied $12 .5 million in home-
less assistance funds in FY2010 and $12 .3 million in 
FY2011 . 
As of this writing, final FY2012 Federal spending 
figures are not yet available, though it is clear that 
funds, declining from $158 million in FY2008 to $115 
million in FY2011 as shown in Figure 5.1 . Total DHCD 
funds increased after 2009, but only because of the 
transfer of Homelessness operating funds into its 
account . For FY2012, DHCD will see a tiny $2 .9 million 
increase in operating funds, almost all of which will 
support an 8 .4 percent increase in the Massachusetts 
Rental Voucher Program .
As noted above, in FY2010 state homeless programs 
were shifted from the Department of Transitional 
Assistance to DHCD as part of the implementation 
of the recommendations of the Special Commission 
Relative to Ending Homelessness in the Common-
wealth .31 This move more than doubled DHCD’s 
operating funds . Emergency Assistance (EA) for 
Families is the largest of these programs . Any family 
who meets eligibility guidelines may access EA . The 
recession pushed more families into homelessness, 
resulting in a 74 percent increase in the number of 
families served by EA between September 2007 and 
September 2009 .32 
As a result, during FY2010, EA received $42 million 
in supplemental funding, for total FY2010 funding 
of $134 million . Under the FY2011 budget, EA was to 
receive $115 million in funding, but continued high 
levels of need forced the state to provide an additional 
$46 million in funding, for total FY2011 spending of 
$161 million . For FY2012, EA funding will decline to 
$98 million, largely due to the creation of the new $39 
FIGURE 5 .1
DHCD Real Operating Funds (FY2011 Dollars), FY1989–FY2012
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Figure 5.3 shows changes in total DHCD spending 
(federal, as well as state operating and capital funds), 
excluding the new homelessness funding, from 1989 to 
2011 (in FY2011 dollars) . Neither final federal spend-
ing data nor state capital spending data for FY2012 
were available at this writing . From FY1989 to FY1997, 
total funds declined 45 percent, from $1 billion to $580 
million . While there was some recovery in total spend-
ing from FY1998 to FY2008, federal cash infusions 
in FY2009 and FY2010 pushed total funding to $1 .3 
billion in FY2010 . With ARRA funding declining, total 
resources declined to $1 .1 billion in FY2011 and will 
decline further in FY2012 .
ARRA funding is set to decline further . In addition, 
spending on other federal programs such as weather-
ization, Neighborhood Stabilization and Home Invest-
ment Partnerships are set to decline dramatically, led 
by a $22 million, 55 percent decline in weatherization 
programs . What is most likely is that DHCD will end 
up with about $620 million in regular federal spending 
plus $46 million in remaining ARRA funds and $12 
million in federal homeless funds for a total that will 
likely not reach $700 million . This will represent a cut 
of 20 percent from FY2011 and as much as 33 percent 
from FY2010 .
FIGURE 5 .2
Total Real Federal Spending (FY2011 Dollars), FY1989–FY2011
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Conclusion
As we look at housing policy in 2011, we have some-
thing to cheer about in the Commonwealth, but great 
concern about the inability of the federal government 
to enact legislation that would be useful to enhance 
the production of rental housing and improve housing 
affordability . Even more worrisome is the possibility of 
the repeal of laws that have been central to the devel-
opment of affordable housing . Moreover, given the 
focus on deficit reduction, it is unlikely that there will 
be anywhere near as much federal funding for housing 
in the future as in the past .
The state’s fiscal health may pose a future problem for 
housing programs in the Commonwealth . Additional 
federal funds under the ARRA program made up for 
a shortfall in state funding until now . But these federal 
funds are nearly exhausted . As such, the Common-
wealth will likely be unable to sustain a full commit-
ment to housing provision at least over the next several 
years .
The success of the effort to save the Chapter 40B 
program is significant, especially as it demonstrates 
a willingness within the population of Massachusetts 
to support the production of affordable housing . We 
can also hope that developers will finally come into 
the market to offer rental housing, taking advantage 
of the numerous communities that have adopted 40R 
and therefore have zoned land ready for housing 
development .
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On June 1, 2011, The Wall Street Journal front page 
main headline blared “Housing Imperils Recovery .” 
In the very first paragraph, the article noted that home 
prices nationwide had sunk to 2002 levels, “effectively 
wiping out almost a decade’s worth of home equity 
across the U .S . and imperiling the fragile economic 
recovery as Americans confront the falling value of 
their biggest investment .”1 The article went on to point 
out that falling home prices undermine economic 
growth in several ways . Homeowners cut their 
consumption when the value of their main asset depre-
ciates and the further its value erodes, the more they 
are stuck in homes they cannot sell because they are 
worth less than they owe on their mortgages . Unem-
ployed homeowners find it hard to move to where jobs 
might exist because they cannot easily change where 
they live . All of this weighs on consumer confidence 
and their spending, turning business sentiment against 
investment and hiring . All of this leads to a vicious 
downward cycle .
In past Greater Boston Housing Report Cards, we have 
focused on how the economy affects housing prices 
and rents . Now with the Great Recession extending 
into its fourth year and with less and less hope for 
recovery in 2012, it is abundantly clear that we need to 
better understand how the housing market affects the 
overall economy and focus more attention on “fixing” 
housing in order to fix the economy . This is particu-
larly critical given the inability of Washington to come 
to an agreement on a jobs package as of this writing . 
The point of this year’s report card is that housing is 
now at the very center of the economic crisis and the 
economy does not recover without a major improve-
ment in the housing market .
A corollary to this argument is that in past report cards 
we have focused most of our attention on making 
housing more affordable in the Greater Boston metro 
region . No doubt this is still a worthy and important 
goal . But very much in line with those economists who 
argue that we need to “stimulate” the economy in the 
short-run and only then focus on deficit reduction, we 
see a need to stabilize home prices in the short-run 
and then make a concerted effort to make those prices 
more affordable over the long-run . This will take a 
set of new housing policies and we will lay out some 
alternatives at the end of this chapter .
The Economy: Where We Are
By now, if this were a normal business cycle, we 
would be back on the road to rapid economic growth 
and full employment . But in 2011, national economic 
growth stalled out and employment stopped growing . 
Massachusetts is doing a good deal better than the rest 
of the country, but it is not immune to national and 
even international events . When a group of 17 lead-
ing Massachusetts economists from UMass, Boston 
University, Northeastern, Harvard, MIT, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston and the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation came together in late September to 
deliver a prognosis on the Commonwealth’s near-
term economic health, they concluded that despite its 
superior economic performance to date, the Bay State’s 
economy will likely flag in the months to come .2 Beside 
the housing drag on the economy, these economists 
worry that the bipartisan Congressional deficit reduc-
tion “Supercommittee” will propose major cuts in 
defense and scientific research funding, two sectors 
that are key to Massachusetts’ better-than-average 
economic performance . They also worry that turmoil 
in European economies will hurt Massachusetts 
exports . This could be a “perfect storm” that under-
mines any hope of near-term economic recovery .
That Massachusetts home prices appear to be headed 
for a double-dip suggests that homeowners will have 
to wait a long time for the values of their homes to 
recover . For long-term homeowners, this only means 
the appreciation on their homes is not as great as it 
once was . For newer homeowners, this likely means 
they will continue to be underwater for some time to 
come, owing more on their mortgages than the current 
value of their homes . As we know from economic 
research, the negative “wealth effect” is a major 
damper on household consumption and therefore on 
6.
Conclusion and Policy Suggestions
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What Should be Done?
There are many plans afoot about what might be done 
to revive the housing market while at the same time 
assuring low- and moderate-income families safe and 
secure shelter . There are four areas that need attention:
■■ Stabilizing home prices in the short-term
■■ Providing for construction of affordable housing 
units
■■ Increasing rental housing to reduce rents
■■ Increasing production of homeownership units to 
moderate future prices 
Here are some ideas worth considering .
National Programs
A range of federal programs are needed to stabilize the 
housing market and increase the supply of rental hous-
ing . Some of these only require that existing programs 
be sustained . Others involve new approaches to hous-
ing preservation and home price stability .
Maintain Federal Low Income Housing Tax  
Credit Program
There is great concern that the federal Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) could be eliminated or 
reduced as part of corporate tax reform proposals 
(including a proposal to reduce the corporate tax rate 
in exchange for eliminating many current credits and 
deductions) . It is highly unlikely that Congress would 
provide replacement funding in the form of direct 
appropriations if it eliminated LIHTC .
Maintaining the housing credit is crucial to both the 
economy in the short run and to affordable housing 
production generally . It has been the nation’s larg-
est single housing production tool since 1986 and 
is key to multifamily rental production overall . The 
National Council of State Housing Agencies estimates that 
it finances approximately 90 percent of all affordable 
rental housing produced annually and the National 
Association of Home Builders reports that the credit 
financed half of all multifamily starts in 2010 .3 While 
tax credits are sometimes criticized as less efficient 
than grants, the use of credits for affordable hous-
ing development has had several offsetting benefits, 
including bringing “market discipline” to the financing 
economic growth and employment . In many Greater 
Boston communities, the sharp increase in foreclosures 
in 2010 and early 2011 adds to downward home price 
pressure, further depressing household consumption . 
That housing production in Greater Boston in 2011 is 
likely to be lower than at any time in at least the past 
two decades also suggests that residential construction 
employment will continue to suffer along with other 
industries that depend on homebuilding for their sales . 
Meanwhile, renters, who face the highest unemploy-
ment rates in Greater Boston, have seen rents rise to 
their highest level ever . Ironically, depressed prices in 
the homeowner market have been responsible for the 
increase in rents as foreclosed households seek rental 
housing and young families forego moving from their 
rental units into their first homes because of fear that 
home prices will fall further, pushing them underwa-
ter . Weak demand for homeownership means abnor-
mally strong demand for residential rental units .
Irony of ironies, stabilizing home prices and even 
creating the conditions where home prices are rising 
again may be important for increasing affordability 
for renters . We need to make it possible for potential 
homebuyers to come back into the market to improve 
household asset values and reverse the decline in 
homeownership rates . This is important in Massachu-
setts, but most important in states where homeowner-
ship rates have plummeted such as Nevada, Arizona, 
California and Florida and to some extent in the indus-
trial Midwest . 
Increasing homeownership is also an issue of racial 
justice . The progress that blacks and Hispanics have 
made in closing the homeownership gap with non-
Hispanic whites has been reversed as a result of the 
housing crisis . Almost nowhere in the country is the 
homeownership gap greater than in Greater Boston .  
So working to close that gap is particularly  
important here .
Unfortunately, the federal government is walking 
away from policies that historically have been helpful 
in producing new housing, rehabbing older housing, 
providing public housing and encouraging homeown-
ership . Moreover, with the last funds from the Ameri-
can Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) being 
spent, the Commonwealth will no longer be able to 
sustain its level of housing investment . 
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average not raised by the credit program . HOME also 
promotes affordable housing development in high 
opportunity suburban communities which do not 
receive other federal block grants because of their rela-
tive wealth .
Enact the Section Eight Savings Act (SESA) 
Housing advocates have been proposing administra-
tive reforms to the Section 8 voucher program for 
years that would simplify program administration, 
reduce program costs and better serve the households 
using the program . Passage of this bill would make it 
possible to reduce cuts to other HUD programs while 
improving overall program operations . Amendments 
to the current SESA language, including requiring 
better use of reserves and reallocation of uncommitted 
funds, could increase these benefits .
Ensure Government Sponsored Enterprises Continue 
as Congress Considers Reform
Congress and the Administration have been discuss-
ing how to reform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
the two major Government Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSEs) that provide a secondary market for single-
family and multi-family housing and that have 
proven critical to the availability of capital for these 
purposes for decades . Since their financial collapse in 
2008, and placement in government conservatorship, 
there has been much debate over their long-term 
future . Most proposals would replace the GSEs, with 
their implicit government guarantee of securitized 
mortgages, leaving federal support for mortgage 
lending primarily to HUD/FHA, Veterans Admin-
istration, and Rural Housing programs that serve 
targeted populations . These proposals would essen-
tially leave secondary mortgage market operations to 
the private sector, ignoring the critical role the GSEs 
have played in ensuring mortgage liquidity, espe-
cially in times—including the present—when private 
capital availability contracts . The GSEs accounted 
for 75 percent of all single family mortgages in the 
first quarter of 2011, and Ginnie Mae accounted for 
another 22 percent . 
Continued government support is critical to keeping 
mortgage funds flowing and restoring the housing 
market, especially given the government’s ability to 
take the long view, rather than having to respond to 
short-term profit expectations . 
and operation of affordable housing . Providing this 
federal funding as a permanently authorized tax credit 
rather than a grant or loan program subject to the 
annual budget process has also made it a reliable fund-
ing source .
The program has proved durable in the face of the 
current recession, with demand for credits only 
temporarily interrupted at the height of the recession 
in 2008-2009 . Investors in Massachusetts projects are 
now paying 85 to 90 cents per dollar of credit, close 
to pre-2008 levels and the “9%” credit is expected to 
generate $119 million or more in private funding for 
affordable housing in Massachusetts in 2011 . In addi-
tion, smaller (“4%”) credits available automatically to 
eligible developments funded with tax-exempt bonds 
will generate millions more . LIHTC typically provides 
60 percent of the funding for a project; without it, 
many production and preservation projects, including 
new transit-oriented housing and HOPE VI redevelop-
ments, would not go forward .
Preserve Funding for Federal HOME Block Grants
Given current long-term budget cutting targets 
approved by Congress, there is great uncertainty about 
the likely funding levels for HUD programs in Fiscal 
Year 2012 (which started this October 1) and in the 
years to follow . The appropriations committees and 
subcommittees in the House and Senate have both 
proposed cutting funding deeply for a number of 
HUD programs in FY2012 relatively to FY2011 . While 
the House and Senate propose very different cuts for 
some programs, both have proposed deep cuts in the 
HOME Investment Partnerships program (25% and 
38% respectively) .
Cutting HOME would seriously damage the ability 
of the Commonwealth and many cities and towns in 
Greater Boston to create and preserve affordable hous-
ing . Unlike the CDBG block grant program, which 
provides annual grants to 37 larger communities in 
Massachusetts for a variety of activities, the HOME 
grant is specifically for affordable housing activities 
and currently provides annual allocations to almost 
100 cities and towns statewide, as well as the state, 
through a mechanism that allows smaller towns to 
band together to receive direct block grants . The 
Commonwealth uses much of its HOME allocation 
($13 million in FY2011) to support LIHTC projects by 
providing some of the 40% of development costs on 
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for several million homebuyers to move quickly, 
taking much of the current inventory “off the shelf”, 
stabilizing home prices and encouraging new home 
construction . 
In order to assure that this government insurance 
policy does not permit homebuyers to game the 
system, the program would need some security 
measures . To qualify for the insurance, which would 
not cost more than $500 to cover administrative 
expenses, a home for sale would need a full and fair 
valuation by a licensed qualified appraisal firm and a 
home inspection by a licensed inspector . To discourage 
speculators from entering this market, the insurance 
program would be limited to owner-occupied proper-
ties with no more than three housing units . To assure 
that a family can really afford the home, the purchaser 
would be required to obtain a conventional mortgage 
and pay a minimum of 10 percent down . To assure 
that homes are not “flipped,” the insurance would 
only be paid if the homeowner held onto the property 
for a minimum of three years with the possible excep-
tion for homeowners who faced an economic calamity 
due to an unexpected health problem or long-term 
unemployment .
Once the homebuyer resells the property (after 
re-appraisal and re-inspection), the government 
would pay 85 percent of any loss between the origi-
nal purchase price and the subsequent selling price 
after deducting mortgage closing costs on the origi-
nal purchase . The homeowner would be responsible 
for the rest . The maximum insured loss under this 
program would be limited to $100,000 .
If few take advantage of this new program, the cost 
to the government would be trivial . If a large number 
of buyers come into the market, increased housing 
demand would contribute to stabilizing prices and 
therefore negate the need for paying a large number 
of claims . Three years from now, almost everyone 
expects home prices to be higher than today so the 
risk to the federal budget is tiny . But even under an 
unlikely worst case scenario where one-fourth of 
the homes insured somehow suffered a staggering 
22 percent further decline in prices—the price drop 
used in the worst case scenario when the Treasury 
stress-tested the banks for TARP funds—the cost to 
the government would be less than $10 billion on a 
million insurance policies . 
No one expects GSE reform to occur in the next year, 
given the fragility of the economy, but any future solu-
tion should consider the principles recommended by 
the Center for American Progress’ Mortgage Working 
Group (MWG): to ensure liquidity, responsible risk-
based pricing, broad access to capital across geogra-
phies, and the availability of capital for multifamily 
housing and affordable single family housing . It 
recommends the establishment of chartered mortgage 
institutions that could provide guarantees of timely 
payments to investors backed by on-budget govern-
ment catastrophic risk insurance . 
Support Federal Funding for Housing Counseling
Housing counseling for would-be homebuyers, as well 
as homeowners, has been an important tool for encour-
aging sustainable homeownership and for preventing 
foreclosures . Non-profit counseling organizations 
provide pre-purchase counseling, post-purchase coun-
seling, counseling for reverse mortgages and other 
services . Nationwide, these groups have provided 
assistance to four million households and worked to 
prevent mortgage delinquency for 2 .6 million house-
holds since 2009 .4 Funding for this program was elimi-
nated in FY2011 and only the Senate (not the House) 
has proposed funding it in FY2012 . Funding should be 
restored in FY2012 .
Home Price Insurance 
Another new idea aimed at stabilizing home prices 
at little cost to the federal treasury involves provid-
ing what amounts to insurance against a catastrophic 
decline in the value of one’s newly-purchased home .5 
Under such an arrangement, the U .S . Treasury in 
conjunction with the U .S . Department of Housing and 
Urban Development would put in place for the next 
18 months a home price insurance program providing 
a form of catastrophic loss protection for homebuy-
ers taking a chance on the current housing market . If 
families knew that they were insured against taking 
a large loss on a home bought this year or early next, 
many would likely come off the sidelines and begin 
looking for a home to buy . After all, if the program 
were in place and they postponed purchasing, they 
not only would lose the insurance option after 18 
months, but if many others took advantage of the 
program, they might miss the bottom of the market 
altogether . That should give enough encouragement 
73T h e  G r e a t e r  B o s t o n  H o u s i n g  R e p o r t  C a r d  2 0 1 1
with greater flexibility to maintain and revitalize their 
public housing inventory (see Chapter 5 for a more 
detailed description) .
Pass Zoning Reform Legislation
Outdated state planning and zoning enabling laws 
have added to the Commonwealth’s housing chal-
lenges .  Beacon Hill has not tackled comprehensive 
zoning legislation since 1975 .  The legislature needs to 
confront this challenge in order to promote the hous-
ing options Massachusetts needs to stay competitive .  
We encourage the legislature to pass comprehensive 
land use planning and zoning reform legislation 
that satisfies three principles: 1) promotes compact 
sustainable development, 2) encourages prompt and 
predictable permitting decisions, and 3) creates a more 
diverse housing stock . 
Support 40R & 40B
To assure a sufficient supply of communities where 
new housing can be developed, it is important to main-
tain and support both Chapter 40R and Chapter 40B . 
The successful defense of 40B in the November 2010 
referendum demonstrated that there is strong public 
support for this law and the legislature should resist 
any attempts to weaken it . Assuring adequate funding 
for Chapter 40R and its companion 40S will provide 
communities with confidence that the state will make 
good on its promise of local aid to those communities 
adopting smart growth zoning overlay districts where 
affordable housing can be readily developed . 
As noted in Chapter 5, the Trust Fund established to 
provide additional local aid to communities that adopt 
40R is nearing depletion . Legislation filed by Rep . 
Kevin Honan (House Bill 197) and Sen . Harriet Chan-
dler (Senate Bill 75, co-sponsored by Rep . Carolyn 
Dykema) would provide for a continuing and reliable 
source of funding of the Smart Growth Housing Trust 
Fund by capturing income tax payments from those 
living in 40R smart growth districts and depositing 
these funds temporarily in the Smart Growth Hous-
ing Trust Fund . The Trust Fund would then make the 
required payments to communities under Chapter 
40R and 40S .  Annually, after reserves are retained, 
any balance will be returned to the General Fund . This 
mechanism will provide, on an ongoing basis—with-
out specific legislative or administrative action each 
year—for the funds needed to fund Chapters 40R 
The U .S . Congressional Financial Services Committee 
has already drawn up draft legislation for such a plan . 
This would be a great time to dust it off and try to pass 
it . If it works, home prices should quickly stabilize, 
the current pressure on rental markets would begin 
to subside as some renters move to homeownership, 
the number of foreclosures because homebuyers are 
“underwater” should decline, new home construction 
would begin to become profitable and a good number 
of jobs would be created . 
State Housing Policy Recommendations
There are a number of policy reforms that can be 
carried out by the Commonwealth and in Greater 
Boston to expand housing production, stabilize home 
prices and reduce pressure on rents .
Expand the State Low Income Housing  
Tax Credit Program 
Applications for federal LIHTC allocations have soared 
in recent years, with new requests outstripping annual 
allocations by three to one in Massachusetts . As a 
result, the state has had to tell developers with fund-
able projects that it may be two or three years before 
they can receive a federal credit allocation . The state 
low-income housing credit program was created in 
1999 to compliment the federal program by providing 
investors with a credit against their state tax liability . 
State credits work like federal credits but are taken 
each year for five years rather than 10 . Raising the 
current $10-million ceiling on annual new state credit 
allocations to $20 million for the next four years would 
create about 2,700 rental units affordable for house-
holds with incomes up to 60 percent of area median 
income and provide a much needed boost to the 
construction industry .
Enact Supportive Housing Legislation
The legislature could enact legislation (House bill 368/
Senate bill 1967) to create 1,000 units of supportive 
housing and to enhance coordination across housing 
and human services agencies (see Chapter 5 for a more 
detailed description) .
Enact the Public Housing Innovations Bill
The legislature could enact legislation (House bill 375/
Senate bill 1935) to provide local housing authorities 
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have been implemented and new laws have been 
enacted at both the state and federal levels . However, 
given the persistence of the foreclosure crisis, more 
tools will be needed in the coming months and years . 
Some of these include:
■■ The state and federal governments should continue 
to support non-profit organizations to provide 
foreclosure counseling so that individual homeown-
ers can successfully remain in their homes, if at all 
possible, to assist with short sales in cooperation 
with local brokers or to transition to rental housing .
■■ The Obama Administration could strengthen the 
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) so 
that homeowners can move more quickly from trial 
loan modifications to permanent loan modifications 
and so that lenders have greater incentives to reduce 
the principal of the outstanding loan amount, 
thereby making it more sustainable and affordable 
for homeowners over the long term .
■■ The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) could 
expand the Home Affordable Refinance Program 
(HARP) to allow for a greater number of “under-
water” homeowners to be eligible to refinance their 
loans to lower interest rates through Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac . 
■■ Disposition of Real Estate Owned (REO) Proper-
ties . According to the Center for American Progress, 
in 2011 the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac owned approxi-
mately 250,000 residential properties, mostly from 
mortgages insured or securitized by these agen-
cies before the housing bubble burst .6 Some of 
these properties are still well-preserved and could 
be sold individually through normal real estate 
markets or at auction . But, as the Center claims, 
most of these properties are unoccupied and losing 
value as they deteriorate . Instead of continuing to 
hold these for sale well into the future, they could 
be converted into rental units for the time-being . 
This would help stem neighborhood blight, reduce 
the surplus of foreclosed housing on the market 
depressing home prices and provide a much-needed 
supply of additional rental housing, thus stabiliz-
ing rents . The Center calls this proposed program 
“Rehab-to-Rent .”
and 40S and thus will result in their becoming self-
sustaining . It is important to note that this bill will not 
increase the costs of 40R or 40S . It will simply assure 
that funds will be available to make the payments 
when the payments are due, as required by statute .  
Multi-University Graduate Student Village  
Development
Last year’s Greater Boston Housing Report Card suggested 
that with the increase in the graduate student popula-
tion in the region and the lack of housing provided for 
them by area universities, upward pressure was being 
placed on residential rents . Because of the concentra-
tion of universities in Greater Boston, this is more of a 
problem than in other areas of the country .
One way to provide for such housing is to have a 
number of universities collaborate with a private sector 
developer to construct one or more “multi-university 
graduate student villages .” The universities would be 
responsible for marketing units in these urban villages 
to their graduate students which would be developed 
conveniently near mass transit stops so that residents 
would have ready access to their respective campuses . 
The villages would not only contain units of various 
sizes and offered at a range of rents, but would contain 
community space for entertaining and seminars, a Zip 
Car facility, and retail space where there could be a 
supermarket, drycleaner, sports bar or other facilities .
Several developers and construction firms have 
shown interest in this concept . Given the continued 
increase in local rents, this would be a good time to 
press forward with university leaders to assess the 
viability of such a plan .
Federal, State, and Private Sector 
Approaches to Foreclosure Relief
Finally, there are actions that could be taken at the 
federal and state level which would reduce the impact 
of foreclosures on households facing the loss of their 
homes and help stabilize home values in the communi-
ties where foreclosures are most prevalent .
Addressing the foreclosure crisis requires a compre-
hensive approach at all levels of government working 
in partnership with the private sector and non-profit 
organizations . Since 2008, many laudable initiatives 
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Conclusion
There is a vast array of existing and new approaches 
to improving the housing market that warrant imme-
diate consideration given the enormous impact that 
the nation’s housing market has had on America’s 
economy . If some of these approaches were imple-
mented quickly, we could begin to see a faster exit 
from the Great Recession and at the same time put in 
place housing programs that will stabilize home values 
for those who have seen the values of their homes 
depreciate, reduce the number of families facing fore-
closure, take pressure off the overheated rental market 
and provide additional affordable housing for low and 
moderate-income households .
There is much to be done .
 In order to prevent private developers from cherry-
picking only the choicest properties for rehab and 
rent, the Federal Housing Finance Agency charged 
with disposing of REO units could require that 
investors and property managers partner with 
affordable housing organizations including local 
Community Development Corporations to purchase 
a pool of properties of varying quality for conver-
sion to rental units . CDCs and similar organizations 
can use community land trusts, funds from the 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) and 
HOME funds to help keep rents affordable in these 
converted units . The Center notes that the rehab of 
these units will help national and regional econo-
mies not only by stabilizing home prices and rents, 
but by generating construction jobs and employ-
ment connected to rental housing management .
■■ Support Project Rebuild: The President’s jobs bill 
(the American Jobs Act) announced in September 
2011, includes a proposed $15 billion appropriation 
to rebuild neighborhoods and communities hurt 
by high levels of foreclosure . It would essentially 
follow the model of the Neighborhood Stabilization 
Program (NSP), but expands eligibility to for-profits 
as well as continuing to make funds available to 
public agencies and non-profits . It also would allow 
funds to be used to rehabilitate and repurpose 
commercial properties in these areas . The proposal 
is intended to stimulate demand in the construction 
sector and stabilize property values in high foreclo-
sure neighborhoods . It would provide both formula 
allocations and competitive grants . The administra-
tion estimates that Massachusetts would receive $40 
million under the program .
■■ Massachusetts should explore the possibilities of 
starting a mediation program to allow for success-
ful resolutions of foreclosures between lenders and 
homeowners . A recent Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston study has documented that these programs 
can be quite effective in reducing foreclosures .7
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Units at Risk - 
2012
Abington 5,332 15 38 50 31 .6% $273,750 $246,750 -9 .9% Abington 66 74 21 0 .39% 0
Acton 7,645 48 89 68 -23 .6% $475,000 $455,000 -4 .2% Acton 21 37 11 0 .14% Y 2002 0
Amesbury 6,570 22 59 39 -33 .9% $290,000 $295,000 1 .7% Amesbury 69 97 43 0 .65% 0
Andover 11,513 147 147 130 -11 .6% $515,000 $468,784 -9 .0% Andover 55 62 25 0 .22% 0
Arlington 19,358 53 159 113 -28 .9% $491,000 $525,000 6 .9% Arlington 44 22 9 0 .05% 145
Ashland 5,781 20 57 45 -21 .1% $325,500 $392,000 20 .4% Ashland 55 79 23 0 .40% Y 2002 162
Avon 1,737 3 16 15 -6 .3% $273,500 $220,000 -19 .6% Avon 18 32 7 0 .40% 0
Ayer 3,141 38 16 23 43 .8% $265,000 $299,900 13 .2% Ayer 24 35 22 0 .70% Y 2001 20
Bedford 4,692 15 52 51 -1 .9% $523,500 $520,000 -0 .7% Bedford 14 7 4 0 .09% Y 2001 96
Bellingham 5,632 12 68 55 -19 .1% $241,500 $235,000 -2 .7% Bellingham 74 103 35 0 .62% 90
Belmont 9,936 15 79 69 -12 .7% $686,000 $710,000 3 .5% Belmont 17 27 8 0 .08% Y 2010 0
Berkley 1,870 15 29 8 -72 .4% $272,850 $262,500 -3 .8% Berkley 39 21 11 0 .59% 0
Berlin 891 8 8 12 50 .0% $471,465 $385,000 -18 .3% Berlin 8 1 3 0 .34% 40
Beverly 16,150 11 122 110 -9 .8% $329,250 $330,000 0 .2% Beverly 107 118 41 0 .25% 0
Billerica 13,055 139 125 117 -6 .4% $316,000 $290,000 -8 .2% Billerica 145 139 37 0 .28% 0
Blackstone 3,321 6 31 27 -12 .9% $225,000 $199,900 -11 .2% Blackstone 58 62 27 0 .81% 0
Bolton 1,472 19 32 28 -12 .5% $442,500 $458,775 3 .7% Bolton 13 0 3 0 .20% 0
Boston 250,367 351 530 441 -16 .8% $349,500 $332,000 -5 .0% Boston 1467 2134 828 0 .33% 2555
Boxboro 1,900 4 16 12 -25 .0% $438,500 $640,000 46 .0% Boxboro 18 17 7 0 .37% 0
Boxford 2,602 4 43 17 -60 .5% $525,000 $515,000 -1 .9% Boxford 13 23 5 0 .19% Y 2001 0
Braintree 12,924 49 134 114 -14 .9% $325,000 $315,000 -3 .1% Braintree 88 102 36 0 .28% Y 2002 239
Bridgewater 7,639 26 67 66 -1 .5% $298,500 $250,000 -16 .2% Bridgewater 87 51 37 0 .48% Y 2005 0
Brockton 34,794 27 348 241 -30 .7% $176,564 $152,000 -13 .9% Brockton 708 1065 368 1 .06% 113
Brookline 26,224 5 73 69 -5 .5% $1,065,000 $1,160,000 8 .9% Brookline 40 55 13 0 .05% 99
Burlington 8,395 68 94 71 -24 .5% $377,950 $360,000 -4 .7% Burlington 34 32 8 0 .10% 0
Cambridge 44,138 38 59 44 -25 .4% $714,750 $757,500 6 .0% Cambridge 48 85 24 0 .05% Y 2001 425
Canton 8,129 40 83 65 -21 .7% $403,500 $410,000 1 .6% Canton 60 35 23 0 .28% 105
Carlisle 1,647 5 22 17 -22 .7% $677,500 $692,750 2 .3% Carlisle 8 14 2 0 .12% Y 2001 18
Carver 4,063 10 37 45 21 .6% $250,000 $237,500 -5 .0% Carver 80 105 39 0 .96% Y 2006 0
Chelmsford 12,981 10 140 117 -16 .4% $335,000 $300,000 -10 .4% Chelmsford 81 90 39 0 .30% Y 2001 0
Chelsea 12,317 112 25 17 -32 .0% $206,700 $210,900 2 .0% Chelsea 141 17 87 0 .71% 112
Cohasset 2,752 239 41 24 -41 .5% $730,000 $857,500 17 .5% Cohasset 17 17 4 0 .15% Y 2001 0
Concord 6,095 386 79 88 11 .4% $675,000 $664,500 -1 .6% Concord 16 14 3 0 .05% Y 2004 0
Danvers 9,712 14 108 68 -37 .0% $314,250 $306,500 -2 .5% Danvers 69 90 37 0 .38% 0
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Billerica 13,055 139 125 117 -6 .4% $316,000 $290,000 -8 .2% Billerica 145 139 37 0 .28% 0
Blackstone 3,321 6 31 27 -12 .9% $225,000 $199,900 -11 .2% Blackstone 58 62 27 0 .81% 0
Bolton 1,472 19 32 28 -12 .5% $442,500 $458,775 3 .7% Bolton 13 0 3 0 .20% 0
Boston 250,367 351 530 441 -16 .8% $349,500 $332,000 -5 .0% Boston 1467 2134 828 0 .33% 2555
Boxboro 1,900 4 16 12 -25 .0% $438,500 $640,000 46 .0% Boxboro 18 17 7 0 .37% 0
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Deeds (2010) as 











Units at Risk - 
2012
Dedham 8,893 6 110 98 -10 .9% $349,500 $331,200 -5 .2% Dedham 88 1 25 0 .28% 0
Dighton 2,261 6 23 12 -47 .8% $273,300 $273,113 -0 .1% Dighton 32 40 11 0 .49% Y 2010 0
Dover 1,874 20 29 18 -37 .9% $779,900 $980,000 25 .7% Dover 8 15 3 0 .16% 0
Dracut 10,597 55 97 102 5 .2% $269,900 $224,000 -17 .0% Dracut 136 177 72 0 .68% Y 2001 0
Dunstable 933 12 9 11 22 .2% $385,000 $355,000 -7 .8% Dunstable 6 9 2 0 .21% Y 2006 0
Duxbury 5,103 12 58 74 27 .6% $525,500 $533,500 1 .5% Duxbury 48 1 12 0 .24% Y 2001 0
East Bridgewater 4,423 38 49 31 -36 .7% $260,000 $230,000 -11 .5% East Bridgewater 61 79 28 0 .63% 0
Easton 7,596 21 91 51 -44 .0% $394,800 $345,000 -12 .6% Easton 70 85 31 0 .41% Y 2001 0
Essex 1,357 15 20 6 -70 .0% $567,000 $477,250 -15 .8% Essex 7 10 2 0 .15% Y 2007 0
Everett 15,886 56 43 34 -20 .9% $255,000 $215,000 -15 .7% Everett 184 8 80 0 .50% 160
Foxborough 6,260 21 57 60 5 .3% $356,000 $343,450 -3 .5% Foxborough 42 0 24 0 .38% 0
Framingham 26,588 12 237 180 -24 .1% $300,000 $292,000 -2 .7% Framingham 236 354 144 0 .54% 439
Franklin 10,296 45 118 102 -13 .6% $377,000 $363,750 -3 .5% Franklin 85 83 32 0 .31% 58
Georgetown 2,601 19 38 25 -34 .2% $359,200 $336,750 -6 .3% Georgetown 32 31 11 0 .42% Y 2001 0
Gloucester 12,997 23 100 63 -37 .0% $286,250 $340,000 18 .8% Gloucester 73 112 34 0 .26% Y 2008 80
Groton 3,339 55 40 30 -25 .0% $424,500 $381,000 -10 .2% Groton 14 12 7 0 .21% Y 2004 0
Groveland 2,090 42 34 9 -73 .5% $315,000 $292,500 -7 .1% Groveland 18 20 7 0 .33% Y 2004 0
Halifax 2,804 8 31 36 16 .1% $256,500 $205,000 -20 .1% Halifax 48 59 21 0 .75% 0
Hamilton 2,717 5 38 35 -7 .9% $445,000 $379,000 -14 .8% Hamilton 18 22 13 0 .48% Y 2005 0
Hanover 4,440 11 64 51 -20 .3% $420,000 $390,000 -7 .1% Hanover 44 63 16 0 .36% Y 2004 0
Hanson 3,167 15 35 30 -14 .3% $240,000 $243,750 1 .6% Hanson 61 61 15 0 .47% Y 2008 0
Harvard 2,156 0 27 22 -18 .5% $487,000 $607,500 24 .7% Harvard 7 8 2 0 .09% Y 2001 0
Haverhill 23,675 62 178 145 -18 .5% $255,000 $225,000 -11 .8% Haverhill 309 451 182 0 .77% 33
Hingham 7,307 38 120 102 -15 .0% $570,000 $646,500 13 .4% Hingham 35 44 11 0 .15% Y 2001 0
Holbrook 4,145 11 50 36 -28 .0% $238,750 $213,000 -10 .8% Holbrook 56 63 25 0 .60% 0
Holliston 4,861 60 61 72 18 .0% $399,900 $377,500 -5 .6% Holliston 46 49 19 0 .39% Y 2001 0
Hopedale 2,284 5 27 22 -18 .5% $275,000 $277,500 0 .9% Hopedale 25 17 12 0 .53% 0
Hopkinton 4,521 53 71 54 -23 .9% $502,000 $577,500 15 .0% Hopkinton 32 42 15 0 .33% Y 2001 0
Hudson 7,144 22 68 60 -11 .8% $263,700 $252,000 -4 .4% Hudson 53 98 29 0 .41% Y 2007 0
Hull 4,679 8 48 40 -16 .7% $357,350 $320,750 -10 .2% Hull 76 0 29 0 .62% 0
Ipswich 5,414 77 56 38 -32 .1% $395,500 $367,500 -7 .1% Ipswich 44 46 12 0 .22% 0
Kingston 4,370 18 53 48 -9 .4% $317,000 $323,500 2 .1% Kingston 80 74 28 0 .64% Y 2005 20
Lakeville 3,385 23 53 32 -39 .6% $250,000 $272,000 8 .8% Lakeville 44 1 20 0 .59% 22
Lancaster 2,103 16 23 20 -13 .0% $293,500 $266,000 -9 .4% Lancaster 19 0 13 0 .62% 0
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Lawrence 25,540 20 111 75 -32 .4% $175,000 $155,000 -11 .4% Lawrence 5 9 2 0 .01% 212
Lexington 11,274 83 213 192 -9 .9% $695,000 $710,750 2 .3% Lexington 24 36 2 0 .02% Y 2006 72
Lincoln 2,076 5 20 18 -10 .0% $917,500 $917,500 0 .0% Lincoln 9 8 2 0 .10% Y 2002 125
Littleton 3,018 12 36 33 -8 .3% $389,250 $362,500 -6 .9% Littleton 23 23 6 0 .20% Y 2007 0
Lowell 39,381 41 233 170 -27 .0% $189,000 $178,450 -5 .6% Lowell 463 698 296 0 .75% 180
Lynn 34,569 18 224 137 -38 .8% $195,500 $185,000 -5 .4% Lynn 540 793 283 0 .82% 410
Lynnfield 4,249 18 61 50 -18 .0% $525,000 $490,000 -6 .7% Lynnfield 30 3 10 0 .24% 0
Malden 23,561 0 92 84 -8 .7% $271,000 $250,000 -7 .7% Malden 216 3 116 0 .49% 129
Manchester 2,219 10 28 28 0 .0% $854,500 $791,250 -7 .4% Manchester 5 0 5 0 .23% Y 2005 0
Mansfield 8,083 17 61 54 -11 .5% $326,000 $352,250 8 .1% Mansfield 60 70 26 0 .32% 0
Marblehead 8,746 16 91 84 -7 .7% $485,000 $516,250 6 .4% Marblehead 35 55 21 0 .24% 0
Marlborough 14,846 22 126 84 -33 .3% $263,000 $247,000 -6 .1% Marlborough 130 248 120 0 .81% 0
Marshfield 9,117 61 109 123 12 .8% $366,000 $330,000 -9 .8% Marshfield 124 131 35 0 .38% Y 2001 0
Maynard 4,398 6 49 51 4 .1% $311,900 $300,000 -3 .8% Maynard 31 27 8 0 .18% Y 2006 56
Medfield 4,038 16 69 51 -26 .1% $553,400 $512,000 -7 .5% Medfield 21 17 4 0 .10% 0
Medford 22,631 2 111 104 -6 .3% $338,500 $340,000 0 .4% Medford 117 70 36 0 .16% 93
Medway 4,243 9 57 50 -12 .3% $334,500 $317,250 -5 .2% Medway 42 54 20 0 .47% Y 2001 0
Melrose 11,200 22 118 107 -9 .3% $398,250 $395,000 -0 .8% Melrose 53 54 28 0 .25% 0
Mendon 1,870 5 22 12 -45 .5% $291,000 $331,500 13 .9% Mendon 20 20 7 0 .37% Y 2002 0
Merrimac 2,281 14 18 17 -5 .6% $280,000 $280,000 0 .0% Merrimac 24 32 11 0 .48% 24
Methuen 16,848 51 167 115 -31 .1% $252,000 $217,000 -13 .9% Methuen 245 271 101 0 .60% 0
Middleborough 7,195 60 75 77 2 .7% $225,000 $215,000 -4 .4% Middleborough 116 7 57 0 .79% Y 2010 16
Middleton 2,337 37 24 24 0 .0% $409,200 $437,500 6 .9% Middleton 33 28 7 0 .30% Y 2004 48
Milford 10,682 31 89 68 -23 .6% $280,000 $245,000 -12 .5% Milford 118 144 51 0 .48% 61
Millis 3,060 19 24 35 45 .8% $308,000 $315,000 2 .3% Millis 29 41 17 0 .56% Y 2006 0
Millville 956 0 11 7 -36 .4% $240,000 $165,000 -31 .3% Millville 21 19 14 1 .46% 0
Milton 9,142 2 124 102 -17 .7% $424,500 $454,950 7 .2% Milton 88 0 18 0 .20% 139
Nahant 1,676 0 8 7 -12 .5% $381,750 $425,000 11 .3% Nahant 11 15 2 0 .12% Y 2004 0
Natick 13,337 34 155 142 -8 .4% $397,500 $386,500 -2 .8% Natick 55 85 33 0 .25% 0
Needham 10,793 58 200 168 -16 .0% $630,000 $639,128 1 .4% Needham 29 37 9 0 .08% Y 2004 20
Newbury 2,614 9 31 22 -29 .0% $380,000 $393,250 3 .5% Newbury 6 20 6 0 .23% 0
Newburyport 7,717 14 84 71 -15 .5% $400,375 $410,000 2 .4% Newburyport 60 57 17 0 .22% Y 2002 101
Newton 31,857 96 279 263 -5 .7% $715,000 $770,000 7 .7% Newton 86 72 18 0 .06% Y 2001 71
Norfolk 2,851 39 49 34 -30 .6% $389,500 $418,000 7 .3% Norfolk 22 7 5 0 .18% Y 2001 0
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2012
Lawrence 25,540 20 111 75 -32 .4% $175,000 $155,000 -11 .4% Lawrence 5 9 2 0 .01% 212
Lexington 11,274 83 213 192 -9 .9% $695,000 $710,750 2 .3% Lexington 24 36 2 0 .02% Y 2006 72
Lincoln 2,076 5 20 18 -10 .0% $917,500 $917,500 0 .0% Lincoln 9 8 2 0 .10% Y 2002 125
Littleton 3,018 12 36 33 -8 .3% $389,250 $362,500 -6 .9% Littleton 23 23 6 0 .20% Y 2007 0
Lowell 39,381 41 233 170 -27 .0% $189,000 $178,450 -5 .6% Lowell 463 698 296 0 .75% 180
Lynn 34,569 18 224 137 -38 .8% $195,500 $185,000 -5 .4% Lynn 540 793 283 0 .82% 410
Lynnfield 4,249 18 61 50 -18 .0% $525,000 $490,000 -6 .7% Lynnfield 30 3 10 0 .24% 0
Malden 23,561 0 92 84 -8 .7% $271,000 $250,000 -7 .7% Malden 216 3 116 0 .49% 129
Manchester 2,219 10 28 28 0 .0% $854,500 $791,250 -7 .4% Manchester 5 0 5 0 .23% Y 2005 0
Mansfield 8,083 17 61 54 -11 .5% $326,000 $352,250 8 .1% Mansfield 60 70 26 0 .32% 0
Marblehead 8,746 16 91 84 -7 .7% $485,000 $516,250 6 .4% Marblehead 35 55 21 0 .24% 0
Marlborough 14,846 22 126 84 -33 .3% $263,000 $247,000 -6 .1% Marlborough 130 248 120 0 .81% 0
Marshfield 9,117 61 109 123 12 .8% $366,000 $330,000 -9 .8% Marshfield 124 131 35 0 .38% Y 2001 0
Maynard 4,398 6 49 51 4 .1% $311,900 $300,000 -3 .8% Maynard 31 27 8 0 .18% Y 2006 56
Medfield 4,038 16 69 51 -26 .1% $553,400 $512,000 -7 .5% Medfield 21 17 4 0 .10% 0
Medford 22,631 2 111 104 -6 .3% $338,500 $340,000 0 .4% Medford 117 70 36 0 .16% 93
Medway 4,243 9 57 50 -12 .3% $334,500 $317,250 -5 .2% Medway 42 54 20 0 .47% Y 2001 0
Melrose 11,200 22 118 107 -9 .3% $398,250 $395,000 -0 .8% Melrose 53 54 28 0 .25% 0
Mendon 1,870 5 22 12 -45 .5% $291,000 $331,500 13 .9% Mendon 20 20 7 0 .37% Y 2002 0
Merrimac 2,281 14 18 17 -5 .6% $280,000 $280,000 0 .0% Merrimac 24 32 11 0 .48% 24
Methuen 16,848 51 167 115 -31 .1% $252,000 $217,000 -13 .9% Methuen 245 271 101 0 .60% 0
Middleborough 7,195 60 75 77 2 .7% $225,000 $215,000 -4 .4% Middleborough 116 7 57 0 .79% Y 2010 16
Middleton 2,337 37 24 24 0 .0% $409,200 $437,500 6 .9% Middleton 33 28 7 0 .30% Y 2004 48
Milford 10,682 31 89 68 -23 .6% $280,000 $245,000 -12 .5% Milford 118 144 51 0 .48% 61
Millis 3,060 19 24 35 45 .8% $308,000 $315,000 2 .3% Millis 29 41 17 0 .56% Y 2006 0
Millville 956 0 11 7 -36 .4% $240,000 $165,000 -31 .3% Millville 21 19 14 1 .46% 0
Milton 9,142 2 124 102 -17 .7% $424,500 $454,950 7 .2% Milton 88 0 18 0 .20% 139
Nahant 1,676 0 8 7 -12 .5% $381,750 $425,000 11 .3% Nahant 11 15 2 0 .12% Y 2004 0
Natick 13,337 34 155 142 -8 .4% $397,500 $386,500 -2 .8% Natick 55 85 33 0 .25% 0
Needham 10,793 58 200 168 -16 .0% $630,000 $639,128 1 .4% Needham 29 37 9 0 .08% Y 2004 20
Newbury 2,614 9 31 22 -29 .0% $380,000 $393,250 3 .5% Newbury 6 20 6 0 .23% 0
Newburyport 7,717 14 84 71 -15 .5% $400,375 $410,000 2 .4% Newburyport 60 57 17 0 .22% Y 2002 101
Newton 31,857 96 279 263 -5 .7% $715,000 $770,000 7 .7% Newton 86 72 18 0 .06% Y 2001 71
Norfolk 2,851 39 49 34 -30 .6% $389,500 $418,000 7 .3% Norfolk 22 7 5 0 .18% Y 2001 0
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2012
North Andover 9,896 42 106 87 -17 .9% $474,450 $465,000 -2 .0% North Andover 69 107 35 0 .35% Y 2001 0
North Reading 4,839 22 51 52 2 .0% $430,000 $387,500 -9 .9% North Reading 41 0 16 0 .33% 0
Norton 5,942 21 70 51 -27 .1% $259,000 $252,500 -2 .5% Norton 74 108 36 0 .61% 24
Norwell 3,299 15 63 40 -36 .5% $482,500 $513,125 6 .3% Norwell 29 22 7 0 .21% Y 2002 0
Norwood 11,911 10 87 74 -14 .9% $355,000 $333,500 -6 .1% Norwood 71 2 23 0 .19% 35
Peabody 18,838 29 130 90 -30 .8% $298,950 $295,000 -1 .3% Peabody 144 199 79 0 .42% Y 2001 239
Pembroke 5,834 21 80 52 -35 .0% $284,500 $293,500 3 .2% Pembroke 89 79 31 0 .53% Y 2006 0
Pepperell 3,905 22 41 24 -41 .5% $285,000 $285,000 0 .0% Pepperell 44 53 20 0 .51% 40
Plainville 3,088 29 31 24 -22 .6% $262,000 $325,000 24 .0% Plainville 23 18 4 0 .13% 0
Plymouth 19,008 223 251 199 -20 .7% $272,500 $265,000 -2 .8% Plymouth 319 426 143 0 .75% Y 2002 58
Plympton 865 3 4 10 150 .0% $272,500 $310,250 13 .9% Plympton 12 20 6 0 .69% Y 2008 0
Quincy 39,912 74 200 188 -6 .0% $320,000 $299,450 -6 .4% Quincy 219 319 107 0 .27% Y 2006 367
Randolph 11,497 110 108 90 -16 .7% $246,500 $222,500 -9 .7% Randolph 243 185 94 0 .82% Y 2005 69
Raynham 4,197 24 48 36 -25 .0% $263,950 $297,500 12 .7% Raynham 54 64 29 0 .69% 0
Reading 8,811 12 95 79 -16 .8% $421,216 $386,000 -8 .4% Reading 39 2 13 0 .15% 0
Revere 20,102 17 95 55 -42 .1% $235,000 $200,000 -14 .9% Revere 241 197 134 0 .67% 0
Rockland 6,632 29 56 38 -32 .1% $256,250 $205,588 -19 .8% Rockland 93 14 39 0 .59% 0
Rockport 3,652 8 33 24 -27 .3% $425,000 $406,250 -4 .4% Rockport 13 23 6 0 .16% Y 2002 30
Rowley 1,985 5 16 18 12 .5% $333,000 $437,250 31 .3% Rowley 13 21 4 0 .20% Y 2001 0
Salem 18,103 7 61 58 -4 .9% $270,000 $260,500 -3 .5% Salem 152 186 63 0 .35% 322
Salisbury 3,456 23 27 21 -22 .2% $250,000 $255,000 2 .0% Salisbury 28 37 12 0 .35% 0
Saugus 10,111 75 98 61 -37 .8% $298,950 $270,000 -9 .7% Saugus 99 134 44 0 .44% 0
Scituate 6,869 17 101 91 -9 .9% $407,500 $479,000 17 .5% Scituate 62 53 16 0 .23% Y 2002 0
Sharon 6,006 17 88 72 -18 .2% $384,950 $400,000 3 .9% Sharon 44 43 10 0 .17% Y 2004 0
Sherborn 1,449 4 30 26 -13 .3% $720,000 $750,000 4 .2% Sherborn 9 1 1 0 .07% 0
Shirley 2,140 20 19 13 -31 .6% $265,000 $211,000 -20 .4% Shirley 22 28 17 0 .79% 0
Somerville 32,389 1 42 29 -31 .0% $384,000 $391,850 2 .0% Somerville 107 186 51 0 .16% 0
Southborough 2,988 14 52 47 -9 .6% $544,950 $482,500 -11 .5% Southborough 26 26 6 0 .20% Y 2003 0
Stoneham 9,231 0 62 65 4 .8% $416,500 $345,000 -17 .2% Stoneham 47 10 20 0 .22% 0
Stoughton 10,429 245 89 70 -21 .3% $300,000 $245,000 -18 .3% Stoughton 107 140 35 0 .34% Y 2008 130
Stow 2,108 27 30 31 3 .3% $429,950 $460,000 7 .0% Stow 8 10 4 0 .19% Y 2001 22
Sudbury 5,582 35 84 77 -8 .3% $600,500 $674,900 12 .4% Sudbury 27 27 10 0 .18% Y 2002 0
Swampscott 5,804 0 62 61 -1 .6% $401,500 $371,400 -7 .5% Swampscott 46 64 19 0 .33% 0
Taunton 22,874 59 156 124 -20 .5% $228,000 $214,300 -6 .0% Taunton 320 392 138 0 .60% 128
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North Andover 9,896 42 106 87 -17 .9% $474,450 $465,000 -2 .0% North Andover 69 107 35 0 .35% Y 2001 0
North Reading 4,839 22 51 52 2 .0% $430,000 $387,500 -9 .9% North Reading 41 0 16 0 .33% 0
Norton 5,942 21 70 51 -27 .1% $259,000 $252,500 -2 .5% Norton 74 108 36 0 .61% 24
Norwell 3,299 15 63 40 -36 .5% $482,500 $513,125 6 .3% Norwell 29 22 7 0 .21% Y 2002 0
Norwood 11,911 10 87 74 -14 .9% $355,000 $333,500 -6 .1% Norwood 71 2 23 0 .19% 35
Peabody 18,838 29 130 90 -30 .8% $298,950 $295,000 -1 .3% Peabody 144 199 79 0 .42% Y 2001 239
Pembroke 5,834 21 80 52 -35 .0% $284,500 $293,500 3 .2% Pembroke 89 79 31 0 .53% Y 2006 0
Pepperell 3,905 22 41 24 -41 .5% $285,000 $285,000 0 .0% Pepperell 44 53 20 0 .51% 40
Plainville 3,088 29 31 24 -22 .6% $262,000 $325,000 24 .0% Plainville 23 18 4 0 .13% 0
Plymouth 19,008 223 251 199 -20 .7% $272,500 $265,000 -2 .8% Plymouth 319 426 143 0 .75% Y 2002 58
Plympton 865 3 4 10 150 .0% $272,500 $310,250 13 .9% Plympton 12 20 6 0 .69% Y 2008 0
Quincy 39,912 74 200 188 -6 .0% $320,000 $299,450 -6 .4% Quincy 219 319 107 0 .27% Y 2006 367
Randolph 11,497 110 108 90 -16 .7% $246,500 $222,500 -9 .7% Randolph 243 185 94 0 .82% Y 2005 69
Raynham 4,197 24 48 36 -25 .0% $263,950 $297,500 12 .7% Raynham 54 64 29 0 .69% 0
Reading 8,811 12 95 79 -16 .8% $421,216 $386,000 -8 .4% Reading 39 2 13 0 .15% 0
Revere 20,102 17 95 55 -42 .1% $235,000 $200,000 -14 .9% Revere 241 197 134 0 .67% 0
Rockland 6,632 29 56 38 -32 .1% $256,250 $205,588 -19 .8% Rockland 93 14 39 0 .59% 0
Rockport 3,652 8 33 24 -27 .3% $425,000 $406,250 -4 .4% Rockport 13 23 6 0 .16% Y 2002 30
Rowley 1,985 5 16 18 12 .5% $333,000 $437,250 31 .3% Rowley 13 21 4 0 .20% Y 2001 0
Salem 18,103 7 61 58 -4 .9% $270,000 $260,500 -3 .5% Salem 152 186 63 0 .35% 322
Salisbury 3,456 23 27 21 -22 .2% $250,000 $255,000 2 .0% Salisbury 28 37 12 0 .35% 0
Saugus 10,111 75 98 61 -37 .8% $298,950 $270,000 -9 .7% Saugus 99 134 44 0 .44% 0
Scituate 6,869 17 101 91 -9 .9% $407,500 $479,000 17 .5% Scituate 62 53 16 0 .23% Y 2002 0
Sharon 6,006 17 88 72 -18 .2% $384,950 $400,000 3 .9% Sharon 44 43 10 0 .17% Y 2004 0
Sherborn 1,449 4 30 26 -13 .3% $720,000 $750,000 4 .2% Sherborn 9 1 1 0 .07% 0
Shirley 2,140 20 19 13 -31 .6% $265,000 $211,000 -20 .4% Shirley 22 28 17 0 .79% 0
Somerville 32,389 1 42 29 -31 .0% $384,000 $391,850 2 .0% Somerville 107 186 51 0 .16% 0
Southborough 2,988 14 52 47 -9 .6% $544,950 $482,500 -11 .5% Southborough 26 26 6 0 .20% Y 2003 0
Stoneham 9,231 0 62 65 4 .8% $416,500 $345,000 -17 .2% Stoneham 47 10 20 0 .22% 0
Stoughton 10,429 245 89 70 -21 .3% $300,000 $245,000 -18 .3% Stoughton 107 140 35 0 .34% Y 2008 130
Stow 2,108 27 30 31 3 .3% $429,950 $460,000 7 .0% Stow 8 10 4 0 .19% Y 2001 22
Sudbury 5,582 35 84 77 -8 .3% $600,500 $674,900 12 .4% Sudbury 27 27 10 0 .18% Y 2002 0
Swampscott 5,804 0 62 61 -1 .6% $401,500 $371,400 -7 .5% Swampscott 46 64 19 0 .33% 0
Taunton 22,874 59 156 124 -20 .5% $228,000 $214,300 -6 .0% Taunton 320 392 138 0 .60% 128
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Tewksbury 10,125 42 103 90 -12 .6% $306,600 $294,950 -3 .8% Tewksbury 109 102 36 0 .36% Y 2006 0
Topsfield 2,126 21 36 26 -27 .8% $433,000 $443,650 2 .5% Topsfield 16 15 1 0 .05% 0
Townsend 3,162 3 38 32 -15 .8% $228,750 $221,500 -3 .2% Townsend 43 53 24 0 .76% 0
Tyngsborough 3,784 115 35 37 5 .7% $364,900 $289,000 -20 .8% Tyngsborough 44 48 20 0 .53% Y 2001 0
Upton 2,083 19 37 30 -18 .9% $375,000 $388,069 3 .5% Upton 18 2 9 0 .43% Y 2003 89
Wakefield 9,914 35 93 75 -19 .4% $362,000 $362,000 0 .0% Wakefield 62 0 22 0 .22% 25
Walpole 8,202 40 109 76 -30 .3% $358,500 $388,500 8 .4% Walpole 63 0 19 0 .23% 0
Waltham 23,749 64 143 122 -14 .7% $392,500 $363,500 -7 .4% Waltham 88 76 27 0 .11% Y 2005 0
Wareham 8,650 198 124 105 -15 .3% $175,500 $170,000 -3 .1% Wareham 173 219 96 1 .11% Y 2002 24
Watertown 14,959 9 36 42 16 .7% $441,250 $412,875 -6 .4% Watertown 38 73 18 0 .12% 171
Wayland 4,703 13 70 63 -10 .0% $547,500 $544,900 -0 .5% Wayland 18 18 7 0 .15% Y 2001 0
Wellesley 8,789 187 187 166 -11 .2% $857,500 $867,500 1 .2% Wellesley 24 23 2 0 .02% Y 2002 13
Wenham 1,310 1 19 14 -26 .3% $431,000 $473,125 9 .8% Wenham 7 6 5 0 .38% Y 2005 0
West Bridgewater 2,507 6 25 24 -4 .0% $244,000 $282,000 15 .6% West Bridgewater 19 24 13 0 .52% Y 2008 0
West Newbury 1,414 13 26 15 -42 .3% $338,750 $455,000 34 .3% West Newbury 15 8 2 0 .14% Y 2006 0
Westford 6,877 90 93 60 -35 .5% $430,000 $469,000 9 .1% Westford 39 40 14 0 .20% Y 2001 0
Weston 3,796 26 65 61 -6 .2% $1,093,000 $1,075,000 -1 .6% Weston 13 18 1 0 .03% Y 2001 0
Westwood 5,218 14 71 52 -26 .8% $535,000 $482,250 -9 .9% Westwood 22 18 5 0 .10% 32
Weymouth 22,471 81 206 159 -22 .8% $300,000 $259,900 -13 .4% Weymouth 222 261 82 0 .36% Y 2005 188
Whitman 5,100 26 48 45 -6 .3% $249,000 $233,000 -6 .4% Whitman 99 7 27 0 .53% 0
Wilmington 7,141 39 98 71 -27 .6% $325,500 $340,000 4 .5% Wilmington 65 14 19 0 .27% 0
Winchester 7,860 18 108 84 -22 .2% $717,500 $763,000 6 .3% Winchester 23 35 7 0 .09% 0
Winthrop 8,009 0 34 28 -17 .6% $326,500 $282,999 -13 .3% Winthrop 69 6 29 0 .36% 56
Woburn 15,312 23 111 80 -27 .9% $315,000 $310,000 -1 .6% Woburn 92 110 42 0 .27% 39
Wrentham 3,477 16 46 39 -15 .2% $354,000 $410,000 15 .8% Wrentham 29 33 18 0 .52% 0
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Tewksbury 10,125 42 103 90 -12 .6% $306,600 $294,950 -3 .8% Tewksbury 109 102 36 0 .36% Y 2006 0
Topsfield 2,126 21 36 26 -27 .8% $433,000 $443,650 2 .5% Topsfield 16 15 1 0 .05% 0
Townsend 3,162 3 38 32 -15 .8% $228,750 $221,500 -3 .2% Townsend 43 53 24 0 .76% 0
Tyngsborough 3,784 115 35 37 5 .7% $364,900 $289,000 -20 .8% Tyngsborough 44 48 20 0 .53% Y 2001 0
Upton 2,083 19 37 30 -18 .9% $375,000 $388,069 3 .5% Upton 18 2 9 0 .43% Y 2003 89
Wakefield 9,914 35 93 75 -19 .4% $362,000 $362,000 0 .0% Wakefield 62 0 22 0 .22% 25
Walpole 8,202 40 109 76 -30 .3% $358,500 $388,500 8 .4% Walpole 63 0 19 0 .23% 0
Waltham 23,749 64 143 122 -14 .7% $392,500 $363,500 -7 .4% Waltham 88 76 27 0 .11% Y 2005 0
Wareham 8,650 198 124 105 -15 .3% $175,500 $170,000 -3 .1% Wareham 173 219 96 1 .11% Y 2002 24
Watertown 14,959 9 36 42 16 .7% $441,250 $412,875 -6 .4% Watertown 38 73 18 0 .12% 171
Wayland 4,703 13 70 63 -10 .0% $547,500 $544,900 -0 .5% Wayland 18 18 7 0 .15% Y 2001 0
Wellesley 8,789 187 187 166 -11 .2% $857,500 $867,500 1 .2% Wellesley 24 23 2 0 .02% Y 2002 13
Wenham 1,310 1 19 14 -26 .3% $431,000 $473,125 9 .8% Wenham 7 6 5 0 .38% Y 2005 0
West Bridgewater 2,507 6 25 24 -4 .0% $244,000 $282,000 15 .6% West Bridgewater 19 24 13 0 .52% Y 2008 0
West Newbury 1,414 13 26 15 -42 .3% $338,750 $455,000 34 .3% West Newbury 15 8 2 0 .14% Y 2006 0
Westford 6,877 90 93 60 -35 .5% $430,000 $469,000 9 .1% Westford 39 40 14 0 .20% Y 2001 0
Weston 3,796 26 65 61 -6 .2% $1,093,000 $1,075,000 -1 .6% Weston 13 18 1 0 .03% Y 2001 0
Westwood 5,218 14 71 52 -26 .8% $535,000 $482,250 -9 .9% Westwood 22 18 5 0 .10% 32
Weymouth 22,471 81 206 159 -22 .8% $300,000 $259,900 -13 .4% Weymouth 222 261 82 0 .36% Y 2005 188
Whitman 5,100 26 48 45 -6 .3% $249,000 $233,000 -6 .4% Whitman 99 7 27 0 .53% 0
Wilmington 7,141 39 98 71 -27 .6% $325,500 $340,000 4 .5% Wilmington 65 14 19 0 .27% 0
Winchester 7,860 18 108 84 -22 .2% $717,500 $763,000 6 .3% Winchester 23 35 7 0 .09% 0
Winthrop 8,009 0 34 28 -17 .6% $326,500 $282,999 -13 .3% Winthrop 69 6 29 0 .36% 56
Woburn 15,312 23 111 80 -27 .9% $315,000 $310,000 -1 .6% Woburn 92 110 42 0 .27% 39
Wrentham 3,477 16 46 39 -15 .2% $354,000 $410,000 15 .8% Wrentham 29 33 18 0 .52% 0
Sources:
Data on the number of sales and median sales prices, along with data on foreclosure petitions, auctions, and deeds, were provided by the Warren 
Group .  Foreclosure data represent the number of foreclosures on single-family, 2-family, 3-family, and condominium properties .
Data on building permits are taken from the U .S . Census Building Permit Survey .
Data on Expiring Use Units at Risk come from the Community Economic Development Assistance Corporation (CEDAC), Database of Expiring 
Use Properties in Massachusetts 2010, available from the Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association (CHAPA) at http://www .chapa .org/sites/
default/files/CEDACatriskreportAugust2011 .pdf .
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